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ABSTRACT
The broad outline of this study concerns development in
Pakistan during the critical years 1956-70. My on the scene
participation is the coign of vantage for observations, insights,
and judgments on events of those years.
Major emphasis is accorded to a large desert reclamation
project, the Thal Development Authority, a community in the
Abbasia Canal Project, and the urban environment of the city of
Bahawalpur. These three areas of my activity offered extensive
acquaintance with government, non-government, and foreign personnel.
The impact of their labors and of foreign aid from the
United States, the World Bank, and other international bodies,
is evaluated in the light of experienced or witnessed events.
The framework for integrating the parts of the study is
my own growth as a community organizer, governing as a local
mayor, and as a planner for designing, coordinating, and
executing diocesan development programs.
The conclusions pertain to the evolution and development
of my skills as a planner, and events as they involved the
international community. The solicitude of the international
community of nations was all out of proportion to the preparedness
of Pakistan to assimilate and raises the further question of
an international political posture beyond the scope of this study.
Thesis SupervisorsiDonald Schn Lisa R. Peattie
Title;Professor Professor
ii
"A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East".
- Kipling
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INTRODUCTION
Whateve" the wisdom or unwisdom of our nation's
involvement in World War II, ambiguity was the lot of the
young men who survived. We sought answers to the conflict,
and resolved to avoid the errors leading an older generation
into two world wars. The war uprooted the provincial aspect
of the depression filled lives we knew, and in its aftermath
we aspired to the heights. We asked for nothing, and were
given the G.I. Bill. It was a time of great personal turmoil,
and men decided upon careers unimaginable in the past or for-
eign to consideration. I wanted to be a marine engineer, but
instead became a Catholic priest.
My paternal forbears were mariners for several gener-
ations. My grandfather left Scotland as a twelve year old
cabin boy. Twenty years and seven shipwrecks later he settled
in Boston. My father helped build the largest sailing vessel
ever launched,. the seven-masted schooner Thomas W. Lawson.
Ditty boxes stored in the closet and an occasional visit from
half brothers on duty with the fleet in far off Pacific sta-
tions fed my boyish imagination. From my mother I inherited
an Irish attachment to Catholicism and a grand-nephew rela-
tionship to John L. Sullivan, the "Roxbury Strong-boy". My
family was steeped in patriotism and a holiday outing often
consisted of looking at ships in Boston harbour or visiting
historical sites. The same loyalty infused my Catholic faith,
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and I identified the democracy of America with christianity.
As soon as I reached enlistment age in 1943, I quit high
school and joined the navy. In short, I was a young man of
sensitive and altruistic beliefs.
Even as I write this prologue I am engulfed with a multi-
tude of conflicting emotions concerning those years. The war
had burst bonds of family and friends, as well as catapulting
me from milk shakes to scotch and soda. A man does not dive-
bomb battleships at 18 years of age and retain his innocence.
The experience radicalized me to a need for answers and an
understanding that has since motivated my life. Why do young
men die? . . . and old men love? Where can the comaraderie of
combat be found in a world without war? Why war?
For two years following the end of hostilities I engaged
in a number of temporary jobs while searching and seeking an
alternative to madness. More from inner compulsion than re-
flective deliberation, I applied for admission into the Domin-
ican Order. The ensuing eight years of monastic environment
exposed me to the ancient truths of philosophy and theology.
They were difficult years of monastic discipline, and aggra-
vated by my own unresolved inner conflicts. The opening of a
Pakistan mission field in the spring of 1956 offered a unique
opportunity for release from monastic confinement and a fresh
approach to my personal quest. I volunteered and was selected
vii
in company with three other men.
My initial enthusiasm was intensified by the scarcity of
available information about Pakistan. The most primitive of
environments was envisioned, and I tried to learn the rudi-
ments of medicine, dentistry, and engineering in three months.
The 21-day voyage by freighter -to Karachi and the 600-mile
trip upcountry via jeep confirmed my imaginative expectations.
With only a fortnight's residency in the nation, I was as-
signed to a new settlement in the Thal Desert. The following
pages describe the history of that settlement, the planned
development of West Pakistan as I witnessed it during the
fourteen year period from late 1956 to early 1970, and the un-
folding of my own role as an active agent in the development
process. The content of memory and factual occurrences are
the source material for interpreting my change in role. The
events took place; their significance for this study lies in
the accumulated impact on myself.
This is not a story of concise and elaborate historical
detail; it is the personal odyssey of one man. A number of
other men, both ecclesiastical and secular of diverse nation-
alities, contributed to the substance of this experience.
They are only indirectly responsible for the judgments con-
tained herein. This is not meant to be a polemic or an in-
dictment, but rather a sincere effort to arrive at the truth
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of my participation in a critical period of development in
West Pakistan. My perceptions and insights, my actions and
errors, constitute the framework for viewing events. The
idealism that animated me, my value system, and my underlying
motivation can be best realized by repeating: I am a man in
bondage to questions proposed in my youth. Such a description
does not beg the question of bias, but better enables the
reader in his understanding and acceptance of my motives.
World War II channeled my youthful idealism into the priest-
hood; the priesthood animated my activity in Pakistan; the
experience of Pakistan is the substance of this thesis.
ix
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IN THE BEGINNING
Of all the landscapes where men choose to live, the
desert is depicted as the least hospitable. Mountains inspire,
plains hold promise, oceans fascinate, and jungles challenge..
Deserts, on the other hand, are without life and seemingly
without love. But deserts have. a peculiar attraction for a
certain class of people. Every great religious leader, pro-
phet, mystic, or seeker of spiritual truth has been enamoured
by the desert. The desert of this story was just such a place
for my ministry as a Catholic priest, and it had a history
that long preceded my arrival.
To the peasant farmer of the Punjab Province of West Paki-
stan, the area called the "Thal" has from time immemorial been
synonymous with a wasteland. And indeed, the word is a San-
skrit derivative with exactly that meaning. This swath of
desert some 200 miles long and 40 miles wide bordering the
eastern reaches of the Indus River on the central plains of
West Pakistan is remarkably naked of history. Unlike the
other river areas in the sub-continent that can boast an
ancient or lost civilization and archeological findings, the
Thal has been of interest only to the local inhabitants and
until recent times the occasional geologist.
This latter awareness is accounted for by a rich alluvial
deposit of soil. Test holes over 900 feet deep show no
2significant change in character of the material with depth,
and no bedrock has been encountered. Geological consider-
ations indicate that the alluvium may be several thousands of
feet thick. 1 This centuries old endowment of the Indus River,
as it flowed down from its feedbed in the Himalayas and fanned
back and forth across the Punjab plains on its 2000-mile jour-
ney to the Arabian Seas, is the wealth of the Thal. A hundred
years ago, a civil officer was able to report: "There is no
doubt that the Indus did flow down the Thal at one time. I
have seen a deed of sale in which Basira, a village in the
center of the Thal and equidistant from the Indus and Chenab
Rivers, is described as Bet Bet Basira, which signifies the
'edge of the river'.
Recorded history of the few settlements that eked out a
livelihood on the river's edge are scarce when not completely
non-existent. A scholarly government official told me of a
remote village in the northern reaches of the Thal where the
men cut their hair so that a lock reached below the earlobe
and then curled up. No other village had such a custom, and
the only accountable relationship for the practice were the
images on ancient Greek coins. Possibly a soldier or camp
follower from Alexander's army, marching on its world conquest
down the Indus Valley, settled there.
For a few centuries preceding the advent of British
3colonialism, a number of nomadic tribes built settlements and
claimed vast areas of the Thal for grazing lands. Unlike the
Sikh, who conquered and ruled the northern reaches of the Pun-
jab, these dwellers were for the most part too busy fighting
the natural elements, when not engaged in conflict with one
another, to seek a united rule. Some of these early desert
settlements were fortified garrisons and must have been used
as trading posts for caravans on their way to the more settled
3
and civilized cities of the Punjab. Such a sparse history is
in keeping w.th the death valley environment so expressive of
the Thal and little different from my first exposure. An ob-
servant.colonial official in the last century aptly described
the brutal and harsh nature of the Thal as it affected the
people who lived there:
"The prevailing note among the Thal people is their pov-
erty--poverty not only of resource, but also of enterprise
and intelligence. A continual struggle with Nature in her
most niggard and capricious mood leaves them too exhausted for
any other effort. They will not enlist (in the Army), nor
take any kind of service, and admit their lack of enterprise
with the excuse that they are camelhearted. There is indeed
much truth in that comparison, for they have to undertake an
immense amount of the dullest kind of labor and on the poorest
of diets and for the meanest of rewards.
4"How arduous the lives of these people must be, only
those who have experienced the scorching sun and devastating
sandstorms of the Thal can realize. But the poverty of the
Thal carries some compensation in the health enjoyed by its
inhabitants, and the age of their men and the strength of
their women are a byword in the Thal. Indeed, it is the pov-
erty of poor living only, for there is never any actual fam-
ine; and in the worst of times, temporary migration is no real
hardship to a half-nomadic people. But they always hark back
to the Thal, for their primitive instincts are not yet trained
to a civilization which is embellished by the tax collector
and court orderly."4
As far back as 1870, the government recognized the po-
tential of the Thal. The first known draft for developing an
irrigation system was called the "Andrews Plan". It was li-
mited in scope, but it did perform the salutory service of
making Thal development explicit. From that time on, hardly
a decade passed without another such development scheme being
proposed. By the first decade of the present century, all the
necessary survey maps of land elevation, existing settlements,
and caravan routes were completed.5 Rearmament of the British
empire in preparation for the coming conflict of World War I
and its depressing aftermath effectively shelved Thal project
proposals for the first third of this century. Finally, in
51939 at the close of the depression years and on the eve of
World War II, an irrigation scheme designed for reclaiming
half the Thal was implemented. The exigencies of WW II cur-
tailed this scheme after some Rs. 100 million had been expend-
ed and about 1500 miles of an irrigation system excavated. It
must have been a heartbreaking decision, because the outlay of
capital and the effort expended was truly phenomenal consider-
ing the poverty of available resources in the Punjab and the
climatic conditions during execution.
To speculate on the inspiration and driving force of this
first Thal scheme would undoubtedly lead to the statistical
analysis of land holdings in the Punjab at the time. An in-
quiry in 1939 showed that broadly one out of every five owners
in the Punjab owned less than one cultivated acre, one in two
less than five acres. So small were the owners' holdings that
over 50 percent land revenue averaged less than Rs. 2 (about
40 ). The first Thal scheme under British auspicies was meant
to help rectify this economic and social imbalance.6
There is little available data on the first stage of this
massive Thal reclamation scheme except that by 1949 only
88,000 acres of land in the 500,000 prepared were being irri-
gated. The remainder had silted up and colonization had
ceased.
* * * * * * * * * * *
6WATER COaRSESDIGGING
7The defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II signalled
the end of the British Empire, and the once undivided sub-con-
tinent of India. The colonial masters reluctantly presided
over the sudden birth of Pakistan. The social tribulations
and cultural cleavage surrounding the independence of Pakistan
indelibly birthmarked this newcomer to the family of nations.
The Thal project when reactivated bore this stigma throughout
its official life, and no segment of the new nation escaped
its burden.
With the mass migration of mostly landless peasants into
Pakistan during the 1947 partition from India, population
pressure on agricultural lands of the Punjab drastically in-
creased. In the already over-crowded district of Lyallpur,
there was a growth of 20% from immigration. In addition,
there. was the disruption of established irrigation operations
consequent upon some headwaters lying in India and the canal
network in Pakistan. The resulting impasse nearly brought the
two nations to armed conflict and was only remedied by the
Indus Waters Treaty some years later. But by far and away,
the most crippling difficulty was administrative.
Th'e emigrating Hindus and Sikhs who left Pakistan during
the upheaval of partition in .1947 were the knowledgeable mer-
chants, accomplished businessmen, and skilled professionals.
Every public and private institution was affected; government
8departments, universities, hospitals, and research stations,
all were deprived of their supervisory personnel. Managerial
staff for banks and insurance companies were severely depleted
when not completely curtailed, and municipal services almost
ground to a halt. The administrative machinery of government
was represented by about 100 middle range officials of the
former Indian Civil Service; and their desks were packing
cases, while crates served for chairs. It is with this back-
ground of almost total disintegration of administration that
Pakistan as a new nation embarked upon reconstruction and de-
7
velopment.
In early 1949 an advisory board was formed to evaluate
and counsel government on the reactivation of the Thal project.
The Board requested the individual departments of agriculture,
forestry, and colonization to submit reports detailing their
possible activities and needs. On the basis of these reports,
three specialized committees were set up under the aegis of
the Board in order to formulate and submit to government a new
Thal project. The first of these committees advised the Board
concerning land utilization with special emphasis on non-
commanded areas, another committee prepared a colonization
program detailing the types of colonists and the conditions of
their settlement, while the remaining committee drew up plans
for mechanization needs in the new project area. The sum of
9these reports constituted the basis for the government Act
later in the year that formally established the Thal Develop-
ment Authority (hereafter referred to as "T.D.A.") .
Just as the preliminary organization of T.D.A. required
the involvement of the concerned government departments, so
also the legally promulgated Board of T.D.A. comprised a re-
presentation from these same government departments. Of the
seven members on the Board, three were from the civil dis-
tricts of administration encompassed by T.D.A. It is a signi-
ficant fact for anyone concerned with the planning process in
a developing country.
All the existing government departments concerned with
the T.D.A. project were involved in its formulation, and mem-
bers from each of these same departments comprised the Board
responsible for the execution of T.D.A. No super-agency was
formed, something greater than the totality of its parts; no
disruption of existing departmental structures occurred; and
there were no overlapping lines of authority to inhibit exe-
cution. Rather, the Board was envisioned as an instrument for
implementing a project requiring multi-departmental cooper-
ation. These departments had a hundred years of experience in
projects of similar scope and could be relied upon to execute
the T.D.A. scheme expeditiously and efficiently. What would
plague T.D.A. would be a combination of circumstances and
10
events completely outside the design of the organization.
It is remarkable that T.D.A. as a project was begun in
1949 considering the lack of administrators, technicians,
planners, and professionals throughout the nation. Within a
year, the shortage of such administrative personnel began to
be felt in T.D.A. To somewhat offset a growing disparity be-
tween what was happening and what had been envisaged, official
reports took refuge in sophisticated economic analysis. Sta-
tistics were offered for actual performance, and individual
departments succumbed to the new approach. Implementation
spurted, sputtered, and subsided. T.D.A. stagnated and no one
seemed concerned.
A comparable situation had arisen on the national scene.
Planning as such had been part of Pakistan's colonial heri-
tage, but a breakdown occurred with the upheaval of partition
and the reduced effectiveness of every institution in the so-
ciety from lack of qualified personnel. To merely maintain a
minimum of operating efficiency in all government departments
proved a herculean effort; and when this scarce resource was
siphoned off into other more profitable careers in society,
nothing could prevent a further breakdown in the quality of
administration. Small wonder that the actual project achieve-
ments of the nation in the first few years following partition
were very loosely integrated. Projects like the Thal were
11
carried on because of the momentum and work done prior to
partition, rather than from any effective national planning
9program.
The first impetus to coordinated national planning had
come from the member countries responsible for the Colombo
Plan. Under their aegis, a six year program beginning in 1950
was compiled in the brief space of three months and adopted
by government. The plan consisted of a carryover of projects
like T.D.A. or project proposals still on the drawing boards;
and it made such optimistic prognostications as a 30% increase
in the living standard without any substantiating evidence.1 0
The outbreak of the Korean War and its economic rewards to
Pakistan obviated any critical examination of the plan.
A whole host of changes took place during the five year
period covering most of this attempt at national planning.
Planning procedures and substitute committees were legislated,
planning objectives and allocation of funds changed; but de-
spite it all, by 1954 there was remarkable growth in industry.
However, this better than threefold growth in industrial as-
sets had its counterweight by further aggravating political
cleavages in the nation. The use of scarce managerial, tech-
nical and skilled personnel to achieve an industrial base
created a whole new class of wealthy entrepreneurs. In a
society where land possession was traditionally considered the
12
source of wealth, this new sense of riches to be quickly made
in industry distracted the policymakers from the essential
needs of agriculture. Failure to correct the imbalance be-
tween agriculture and industry was bound to weaken the not too
strong political leadership of the nation and endorse exploi-
tation by the new class of industrialists. An Economic Ap-
praisal Committee in 1954 merely glossed over this fact in its
report by saying: "...initially, this was unavoidable and did
not prove harmful, because the field of development was so
large and the needs so obvious that any project was bound to
bring in substantial benefits."A1 It is an arguable thesis
that robber barons must be created to expedite national growth;
but at this early state, it was at least tolerable. 1 2
Of more significant import was the Committee's appraisal
of introducing foreign advisers in the planning stages. Al-
though the "constitution of a planning group of technical
experts has been suggested by some foreign experts, in order
to undertake planning in various sectors", the Committee felt
that "considering the shortage of qualified persons in the
country and other limitations, the existing organization and
the procedure for its working appear on the right lines." 1 3
It was an observation that in retrospect should have been ad-
hered to. Instead, the idea of a five-year plan preempted all
other approaches, and the existing procedures of an almost ad
13
hoc presentation of projects every year were abandoned. This
latter approach was much more in accordance with the nation's
character. The change in course of planning coincided with
the entry of foreign advisers to the Planning Board. From
1954 until the late 1960's, the national planning effort was
in greater or lesser measure formed, guided, controlled, in-
fluenced, and implemented to a responsible degree by this body
of men.
The introduction of fulltime foreign advisers and period-
ic assignments of consultants coincided with attempts to, draft
a five-year plan for the period of 1955-1960. The number of
advisers on the national planning board was between eight and
twelve: small. in number, but extremely capable and effective.
Considering the lack of qualified personnel on the part of the
host country, it was inevitable that these foreign advisers
and consultants would shoulder the burden of planning work.
"Most of the advisers and consultants were general eco-
nomists, but there were also specialists in agricultural eco-
nomics, industrial engineering, irrigation, power, social ser-
vices, housing, manpower and public administration. They came
from colleges and universities, governmental organizations,
and private business. Although most -were from the United
States, others came from Europe and other parts of the world.
The level of competence was high, although none of the first
14
advisers had had planning experience in underdeveloped
countries. ,14
Pakistan had become the world's sixth largest nation at
the time of its cleavage from India. The efforts of its
founders were so totally concentrated on this political ob-
jective that little thought had been expended on the develop-
ment of the new nation. The will to achieve nationhood was
considered sufficient for solving subsequent problems. The
inadequacy of this approach was further compounded by an ex-
cessive loss of trained organizational, managerial, and tech-
nical personnel during partition. This twin disadvantage
stifled national planning efforts and crippled the T.D.A.
project. Inevitably, while the leadership of the nation mud-
dled through, the people carried the burden. This was nowhere
more true than in the colonization of the Thal.
The official Thal Handbook publicly declared: "By the
close of the third year, the Thal had lost all that horror
which had prevented people from even thinking of developing
this tract. The Thal lands were now coveted, both canal ir-
rigated and those outside the command area". 1 5 The actual
conditions were far different for large sections of T.D.A.
Lands allocated in the year the Handbook-was written lacked
water for irrigation, had no medical or educational facilities
available for the settlers, and were plagued by official
15
indifference which resulted in large numbers of settlers
deserting their lands due to excessive hardships. A few years
later, the Government set up a committee to investigate the
lack of performance in the Thal. What was expected to be a
million acre settlement scheme in six years turned out to be
less than half that amount, and no different than if the co-
lonists had been left to themselves.16 No public report ever
detailed the causes for the disparity between expectations
and results in T.D.A.
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the primal
defect of the new nation, namely lack of trained cadres in
every department of government and national institution, im-
paired colonization efforts. My story begins and is inextri-
cably linked to the progress of colonization in the Thal.
16
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II
ON THE JOB TRAINING
To encourage and begin colonization of 1,427,900 acres
of canal irrigated land in T.D.A., government offered tracts
of land at minimum cost to a number of groups within the na-
tion. These were former personnel from WW II and the military
services in general, minority religious sects, tribal units
from the hills, and refugees from the recent partition of
Pakistan and India. First colonization efforts proceeded
apace but soon slackened because of brutal environmental con-
ditions and a badly administered colonizatioi program. Colon-
ization outlay was insignificant; resources were expended for
physical features of the project, not for people. Unless a
man has experienced the climatic extreme of 130 degrees of
heat in the Thal Desert, he will have difficulty understanding
the strain upon men, the problem of animal husbandry, and the
need for help. The colonist was harassed by government agents
for being absent from lands that could not produce because
water was not available, and the responsible canal official
was more interested in keeping records than keeping colonists
on their lands. Desertion and absenteeism retarded settle-
ment of T.D.A.; still, most colonists remained because posses-
sion of land was almost a substitute for God.
Land ownership has a near mystical infatuation for the
rural millions of the East. Possession of land, even if less
19
than an acre, relates its owner directly to the feudal
structure of village society; everyone else has a serfdom
status. This universal fixation on land ownership expressed
itself in a number of ways, not the least being the high rate
of murder in the Punjab, or as the proverb put the reasons for
crime: "zamine, pani, zananni" - land, water, women.
This passionate desire of poor people to possess land
prompted the Catholic diocese of Multan to petition the Paki-
stan government for a land grant and colonization rights in
the Thal. A year and a half passed before the Catholic chris-
tian minority village and its future inhabitants were decided
upon. These first allottees numbered about sixty and had been
selected from the fifteen political districts of the Punjab.
Many of the character recommendations accompanying the land
applications of these first allottees were of less than a com-
plimentary character. In some minds the Thal was equated with
an ideal penal colony for dissident residents. With few ex-
ceptions, these christian settlers had come from the tenant
farmer class which would in a decade be identified throughout
the nation with the disreputable occupation of "sweeper". But
they came to the Thal, and they stayed, when many other com-
parable groups deserted after the first several months of dif-
ficulties. The christians had the advantage of unexcelled
leadership in the person of a middle aged Indian Catholic
20
priest, Fr. Thomas Concessao of the Dominican Order. He was
thoroughly conversant with the people, their language, and
their culture. As one farmer later described him, "He knew
our thoughts before we had them".
The first settlers came to the desert without their
families. On an appointed day, they met Fr. Thomas at a rail-
way junction some eighteen miles distant from their newly
assigned village. They then travelled this distance on foot
and came across a scene as desolate as Death Valley. There
was only one scrub-like tree in their eighteen hundred acres
of rolling sand dunes. Their day of arrival was the llth of
February 1954, a day whose memory the ~people still retain and
hold in the same reverence as Americans do the 4th of July.
In a very true sense, this was the birthday of Chak 270 T.D.A.,
Loreto Village.
Under the most brutal of environmental hardships, Fr.
Thomas initially settled a village nucleus of sixty men onto
fifteen acre plots; these men were later joined by their fami-
lies. The settlers immediately encountered the single physi-
cal hardship of all desert dwellers--water. About 10 percent
of all the artificially irrigated land in the world lies in
the Punjab. Without a steady supply of canal water from gov-
ernment constructed canals, the richness that is the Punjab
would quickly revert to a wasteland. In the entire village
21
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scene, water exerts the greatest influence on the allegiance
of men, their personal loyalties, and private opinions. As
the Punjabi peasant says: "The three most important things in
the desert are water, water, water, and in that order."
The christian village shared with countless others a
breakdown of administration in.the allocation of irrigation
water. The one saving strength of the christians was a high
quality of local leadership in the person of Fr. Thomas. It
could only be a partially compensating factor, because for two
years he was unable to obtain an adequate supply of irrigation
water. This defect in canal irrigation frustrated everyone
and created untold hardships in the first summer of unbearable
heat. By the end of two years, development of the christian
settlement was at a standstill, with little expectation that
things would change. The situation was further aggravated by
the discouragement of Fr. Thomas and his request for a trans-
fer from the Thal. I was his replacement.
The bishop deemed ordination to the priesthood and eight
years of study in the philosophical and theological disci-
plines suitable requisites for the assignment. My ignorance
of the local language, customs, culture, and even geographic
whereabouts, did not inhibit the choice. By profession and
aptitude, I was designated a spiritual leader in a society
that revered holy men; all other labors were considered
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distractions and incidental to that calling. I early voiced
the need to do something more and quoted the maxim "an empty
belly has no ears", but was admonished about engagement in the
social order. Within a fortnight, the village men petitioned
and obtained my appointment by government as "lomberdar", or
village mayor. Government traditionally selected the relig-
ious leader of a christian community as secular head with the
tacit agreement that his role would be nominal. The situation
confronting me demanded an entirely different interpretation
of that mandate. I was thirty years of age and eager to solve
the riddle of poverty.
The government designation of the village was Chak 270
T.D.A., and she was named "Loreto" in honor of a famous chris-
tian shrine. My first steps toward solution of the problems
facing the village were strictly a gut reaction to basic so-
cial needs. Not knowing the language and baffled by the new-
ness of the social structure--where food, shelter, and cloth-
ing habits were foreign to me--I found the practice of medi-
cine an undisguised blessing. The diagnoses came under the
major headings of malaria, typhoid, trachoma, pneumonia, small
pox, tuberculosis, and of course malnutrition. Within two
months I was assisting in delivering children, extracting
teeth, and performing minor surgery. I quickly learned and
was called upon to practice as an itinerant doctor for the
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CANAL IRRIGATION AND CROP PATTERNS IN LORETO VILLAGE
Acreage Total
Water Course Kharif Rabi Discharge Acreage
I 147 295 1.85 Cusecs 610
II 148 295 1.31 630
III 131 263 .97 570
Productivity for 1966
Rabi Kharif
crop acreage crop acreage
vegetables 3.82 sugar cane 171.50
oil seeds 7.03 vegetables 4.57
forestry 9.18 tobacco .18
wheat 522.75 cotton, melons,
gams 16.53 etc; 30.44
fodder 19.59 forestry 9.18
empty 2.00 bajra & maize 27.03
fodder 75.57
Total 580.90 Total' 318.47
Total Gross Value of Rabi Crop:------------------66,662.50 Rs.
Total Gross Value of Kharif Crop:----------------69,396.80 Rs.
Gross Value of 1966 Crops:----------------------136,059.30 Rs.
Net Value of 1966 Crops after water cost and cultivation
expenses have been deducted:------------------45,053.00 Rs.
Net Profit Per Acre Irrigated:-----------------------50.00 Rs.
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area.
It afforded me a rare opportunity to learn on the job.
Dirt roads, desert tracks, short cuts, and all the myriad ways
that small settlements connect and communicate with each other
were discovered. Unlike the older and more settled areas of
the Punjab, the Thal colonists came from every ethnic caste
and tribal group in the nation. I spent desert nights in skin
tents with migratory peoples from Afghanistan, bargained with
Pataahn trade-rs, medicated partition refugees from India, sang
songs with Punjabi children, and broke bread with the poorest
peasants. The only demand put upon me, beyond a minimum of
medical assistance, was compassion. The poor man's one unfor-
givable indictment is summed up in two words: "sakt dil",
hardhearted.
The immediacy with which I was assigned to this strug-
gling community had its very positive advantages. My precon-
ceived notions of life in the sub-continent were fully veri-
fied, and the learning process began in a primitive social
environment. Any mistake would be swallowed up in the overall
picture of problems, and survival for the community required
a leadership responsive to elemental human needs rather than
an expertise in governing. No one could second guess my ac-
tions because the difficulties permitted the widest latitude
of approach. Even the bizarre ideas of buying shoes for the
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people, purchasing supplies of vegetables and meat for the
whole village, building houses, and constructing communal cat-
tle sheds could be tolerated. The fact that a foreigner would
choose to live under such conditions became a defense for ec-
centricity with other missionaries.
The Catholic Church has five dioceses administering to
the ecclesiastical needs of its adherents who constitute one
percent of the population in West Pakistan. For the most
part, the concentration of personnel is in the schools, and
these schools cater to the elite stratas of the society. Tra-
dition and finance dictated this policy, and the sincere ef-
forts to administer to the other needs of the people were
always circumscribed by these constraints. Such a policy
curtailed much of the social concern of young missionaries and
caused conflicts in the ranks. The social order and the com-
plexities arising from partition posed issues beyond the grasp
of traditional policy procedures. Extremely dedicated mis-
sionary people performed social works in a variety of ways,
but no concerted policy beyond the gospel injunction to "feed
the hungry and clothe the naked" was promulgated.
Experienced mission personnel doubted the ability of an
American to long endure the trials of the Thal, while encour-
aging the effort and admiring the new approach. The village peo-
ple of Loreto wrote a petition to the bishop upon the transfer
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of Fr. Thomas and voiced their fears of the unlearned man
replacing him. The basic attribute no one considered, and
which soon became apparent, was my near ecstasy in a situation
proximate to chaos. A challenge other men dream of had become
mine to mold and fashion. Notwithstanding the rats running
across my bed at night in the adobe dwelling, nor the sickness
of the people and the awful sterility of the desert, I exper-
ienced the elation of a connoisseur drinking rare wine.
Living by myself posed no real problem. There was too
much to do and too little time in which to do it. With a
hundred mile distance separating me from my colleagues, I sub-
stituted a rapport of confidence with two village leaders.
Both were former soldiers, and both conspired to subvert one
another. It proved to be a raw edged experience of how the
political process works on a primitive level, and I slowly
learned the rudiments of leadership. It was helped immeasure-
ably by the structure of family life as it is practiced in the
Punjab.
The Punjabis are mostly peasant farmers for whom there
is one and only one social reality, the family. The family
was composed of all one's blood relatives, including distant
cousins, aunts, and uncles, an extended clan with a genealogy
traced through paternity. They were bound by an unwritten but
all demanding and complex series of rules governing one's
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relations and responsibilities to their own family. All other
social institutions were seen within a spectrum of attitudes
ranging from indifference to rivalry and enmity.
A member of the family had absolute responsibilities to
family superiors and absolute rights to be demanded from sub-
ordinates in the heirarchy. All ambiguous situations were
arbitrated by the head of the family, a position held within
each household by the father until it was given to--or taken
away by--one of the sons, invariably the male "elder". The
Punjabi showed calculated respect to members of other families
which were powerful, and haughtiness or indifference towards
families less powerful than his own. Thus, the Punjabi sur-
vived a harsh history of invasion, conquest, and colonization
by a procession of tribal rulers, oriental despots, and colon-
ial masters. The unique family pattern of the Punjab consti-
tutes the real sovereignty of that province, regardless of
what regime rules, and that dictum holds true today.
It was my good fortune to be ignorant of these underly-
ing relationships, and be by disposition warmly affectionate
with children. Children received priority of medical care,
and enjoyed a school milk feeding program supplemented by vi-
tamins from UNICEF. Supplies of food and clothing from Catho-
lic Relief Services were doled out according to the number of
children in a family, and festive events meant the
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distribution of gifts to children. I spent long periods of
time amusing children with a hand puppet, playing a harmonica
in their midst, and teaching them hand tricks. They in turn
taught me their native songs, the rudiments of the Punjabi
dialect, and the lore of village life. Before long they un-
derstood my faltering speech and became my means for convers-
ing with their elders. The parents all too often were killing
themselves to live, while the children were starving for af-
fection. I was able to supply the material wants of the
first, and enjoy the emotional response of the second. The
village people in return judged me free from desire of per-
sonal gain at their expense and unreservedly dedicated to im-
proving their lot.
Coupled with this process of learning was the acquisi-
tion and distribution of relief supplies on a large scale.
There is probably no aspect of humanitarian impulse more sin-
gle in purpose and more difficult in execution. It could
hardly be otherwise, when even the very cardboard boxes con-
taining milk powder, the bailing wire on clothes bundles, and
empty wheat bag, has a ready utility and a price. It was not
uncommon to see children playing on the desert floor with a
pair of britches made from an empty flour bag clearly sten-
ciled on the backside, "Gift of the American people; not to be
sold or exchanged; use no hooks". Contrary to law, relief
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supplies often ended up in the open market and caused grief
for aid officials; but the real problem lay in getting such
goods to that segment of society in need of them. Tons of
such supplies entered the economy. in devious ways or rotted on
the docks and in warehouses for lack of proper storage and
distribution facilities.1 8
No account of-village life in the Punjab is complete
without a description of the climate which so influences the
character of the people. For all practical purposes, there
are really only two seasons: summer and winter. When the
first hot days begin in late April or early May, every wester-
ner begins to make plans to leave the plains for the more com-
fortable hill stations. The first month or so of heat is
bearable with city temperatures recorded between 110 and 120
degrees (fahreinheit), but the compensating factor of electri-
city and fans makes it tolerable. In the villages, only hu-
man endurance can account for the ability to sustain ther-
mometer readings that can climb to 130 degrees. By ten
o'clock in the morning, most work ceases and travel becomes an
exhausting effort. Children with their bare calloused feet
cannot walk a ten-foot stretch of open ground without alight-
ing under some shade or dropping a copybook to stand on.
Afternoon siestas are contests of sheer will power, and the
body works overtime just to perspire. When prickly heat sears
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the flesh, nature has reached the perfection of the penetential
hairshirt. The welcome desert breeze turns into a cursed
sandstorm, and dust enters every conceivable-crevice, giving
rise to eye infections, skin sores, and choked-up lungs. 1 9
Winter comes like a thief in the night. One day a man
wears a shirt, and overnight he's wrapped in a blanket. It
signals the advent of malaria season soon to be followed by
pneumonia and general distress for lack of wheat or the money
to buy it. In the summer, the peasant can find refuge under
the shade of a tree and comfort in the knowledge that the
recent spring harvest supplies him his daily bread. In the
winter,- he shivers from inadequate clothing, and feels hunger
for days on end. He will take the one meal prepared for him-
self and share it with his children, but must close the door
to the begging stranger. Sickness will compound his night-
mare, and he treats tragedy as a custom. He'll watch his
wheat grow and judge eventual salvation or continued sorrow by
its proximity to harvest. In the villages, winter weeds out
the stragglers of life that populate the unmarked grave-
yards. 2 0
This first winter of 1956-57 was the seeding ground for
learning and sustaining the settlers with massive outlays of
food and clothing from U. S. relief supplies. Distribution
encompassed half a dozen adjacent villages and people coming
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from distances up to thirty miles seeking assistance. Any and
all surplus supplies in the diocese were commandeered and dis-
tributed. But the paramount need was to increase irrigation
water, and nothing proved more time consuming or frustrating
than efforts expended seeking to arouse irrigation officials.
I personally confronted a canal overseer with the written re-
cord of daily water flow as registered by him for one distri-
butary with the witnessed fact that no water had been in the
lower reaches of the canal in six months. He merely shrugged
his shoulders in complete indifference. It could hardly be
otherwise when his superior officer, the highest ranking irri-
gation official in the area, held a handkerchief to his nose.
when walking through a peasant village reduced to squalor from
his own official inaction.
Under conditions rampant in the Thal, government on all
levels was either already too burdened, too scattered, or just
plain lethargic to effectively assist the villages. The case
of Loreto village is unique only because it was made known.
There were a dozen other villages on the same eighteen mile
length of government canal in dire straits. The first step to
clarify the problem was to obtain maps.
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The written word is held in high esteem amongst
illiterate people, but it is nothing compared to the reverence
peasant farmers reserve for maps. Until a map can be shown,
much like evidence in a court, no government official will
take interest, other than to offer a sympathetic ear to the
complaints of village people. My first efforts to obtain an
irrigation map took all of eight months. Trying to interpret
it proved a hopeless task until an encineer explained the ar-
cane wording, numbers, and symbols.
When the map was deciphered, it showed a blatant error
in the original alignment and construction of the canal. Many
letters.were written to the irrigation authorities; government
engineers were solicited for a visit; administrative officials
were apprised of the difficulties; and all to no avail. The
estimated cost for repair and alignment of the canal was Rs.
50,000, about $10,000. It was a sum of money no locally re-
sponsible official cared to allocate.
The lack of irrigation water threatened the survival of
the village. Large amounts of foreign aid relief supplies
were distributed as a temporary relief measure to all the af-
fected villages. Such remedial action highlighted the need of
an engineering solution to the problem. For officialdom, the
canal in question was only an eighteen-mile stretch in a com-
plex network of several thousand miles of canals. The size of
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the reclamation project and the distances involved compounded
the problem of official inaction. Lack of roads and the re-
moteness of the area made it difficult for them to inspect at
the site. When official assurances were given, they remained
unfulfilled. The problem did not appear to be of such griev-
ous importance to local officialdom. However, for the four or
five villages affected by lack of water, government disinter-
est was tantamount to disaster. Recourse was finally made to
the highest irrigation engineer in the province, the Deputy
Chief Engineer. He visited the site and commented, "This,
canal is in worse condition than you described." He immed-
iately allocated government funds for a complete excavation
and true alignment of the canal. The critical mark of village
survival or dissolution had been passed.
After acquisition of the irrigation map, a similar ef-
fort was made to acquire two other essential maps. The first
one detailed the individual land holdings of the settlers as
allocated by government.. Approval from local authorities and
bureaucratic intransigency, coupled with misinformation on
government records, presented formidable obstacles to obtain-
ing this map. At the same time, a village site map of 120
acres was requested. It marked off the area for village hous-
ing, roads, school grounds, and all other allied facilities
for a new settlement. In both cases, the same perplexing
38
difficulties arose and only after persistent effort over many
months were the maps obtained.
The three maps are as follows:
.1. Irrigation Map - All the information of water rights,
land levels, and water distribution are on this map.
2. Land Allotment Map - This map detailed the signifi-
cant data of individual land holdings, boundaries,
and land rights.
3. Village Site Map - The exact location of homes,
streets, shops, and other community facilities are
reported on this map.
The maps, when once certified by an official signature
and government stamp, became the sole arbiters of spatial ar-
rangement for the village people. If the map showed a water
course directly transversing a field, then the men would have
stormy arguments for its implementation. Of course, such dis-
putes were many times rooted in the quest to have more than a
fair share of water or desire to steal a few feet of another
man's land. The same was true of the map for the village site,
with its determinations of who lived on the house plots allot-
ted. It was an extremely critical feature, because there were
always more people desiring to live in the village than the
land would accommodate. The maps settled this apportionment
of rights.
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Very few of the men could read a map; but all were
shrewd enough, when in possession of a map, to interrogate the
occasional government visitor or tax collector as to its mean-
ing. The maps were sometimes made of poor grade paper and
from much wear would lose recognized meaning except that the
people had memorized them. When this occurred, men would seem
to understand the thread of an argument even though the main
prop was deficient. Only when a serious matter arose, in
which many men had a stake, would the map again take on its
original symbolic importance. Eventually, the three mentioned
maps were printed on vellum paper and framed to obviate any
doubts when the maps were consulted.
No change could be made on a map once it was duly certi-
fied by the government. A change in the map would require
almost total unanimity on the part of the farmers and compar-
able cooperation on the side of government officials. In
cases of death, sale of landed property, or inheritance, only
the title of possession changed; the physical boundaries and
water rights as determined by the maps remained inviolable.
Visiting officials or the occasional policeman would request
the maps to familiarize themselves with the village or seek to
arbitrate a dispute. Most of the time, however, local griev-
ances were settled by the farmers themselves on the basis of
the maps as understood and interpreted.by them.
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Often in the early evening, after the farmers returned
from the fields and the long periods of men talking amongst
themselves ensued, someone would ask for the.maps. To this
day I am somewhat at a loss for the definitive answer. Maybe
it can be accounted for by the deeply imbued admiration for
the feats of English engineers during their days of empire.
Bridges were built, roads constructed, canals excavated, and
whole areas of new villages settled. Maps must have been in
great evidence by the "white sahibs"; and the lesson was not
lost on these simple peasant people. Whatever the reason,
maps are the silent guardians of the peace, and like consti-
tutions. to a nation, maps are the written witness of law for
village people.
Even while coping with the problem of canal irrigation,
I was laying the groundwork for a subsidized housing program.
Other mission personnel of long residency in the nation con-
sidered it a give-away program, but the bishop had no objec-
tion as long as I could finance it from private subscription.
It eventually proved to be the most unique of all the remark-
able features of Loreto village. This includes the difference
of design, the procedures for construction, and the spatial
arrangement on the land allotted by government for this pur-
pose. This prescribed area was excluded from agricultural use
and called the village site. In the case of Loreto village,
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it comprised 120 acres of rolling sand dunes in nowise
distinguishable from the rest of the barren desert. Three or
four stone markers placed by government surveyors, and often
hidden by slight shifts of sand, served as boundary signs.
The first settlers were too hard pressed for minimum
subsistence to have concern about the spatial arrangement of
their future village site. All efforts were concentrated on
obtaining adequate irrigation water for agricultural needs.
The single handpump installed at the base of the most command-
ing sand dune served the needs of both people and animals.
It also marked the temporary location of the village site; an
acre of slum in the middle of the desert. Their primitive
hovels housing entire families and their animals bred sickness
and disease, as well as highlighted the hopelessness of the
new settlers. The people and animals were huddled so close
that if one man had a cold the rest soon would be coughing.
It was a situation proximate to despair.
The first step taken to remedy this social calamity was
to obtain the official map of the village site. Its very size
of 120 acres made it unique, because most village sites
rarely exceeded half that size. However, government recog-
nized the commitment of christians to the cause of education
and doubled the original allotment, while at the same time
giving carte blanche for development.
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I drew up several plans for street layout, house plots,
and various community facilities. Only the vaguest of ideas
as to what constituted planning guided me. To unperturbably
envisage the future for one hundred and twenty acres of ap-
parent wasteland seemed incompatible with the more immediate
needs of food, shelter, clothing, and water supply for irri-
gation. The village site took shape on a piecemeal basis.
The first structure built was a five-room lomberdar's
residence. its location was a random happening; the site was
"convenient" (By such capricious actions are future cities
founded!). The local mason turned architect and built the
house without specific plans and by instinctive skill. Funds
for the construction of this building had been allocated by
the bishop, and payment to the struggling farmers for their
labor supplemented the dole of relief supplies. The house was
completed in the spring of 1957 and for the next four years
served as the church, additional classroom space, village
dispensary, and meeting hall for all official village and gov-
ernment business.
My activities although tolerated were increasingly the
subject of concern to my bishop. Funds diverted from pre-
scribed goals of diocesan policy were not lightly tolerated,
and any diocesan money invested in construction had to show
clear diocesan title for the finished product. Relief
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supplies received from government agencies constituted the
largest single outlay of goods not pertaining to diocesan
finance, and objections arose when the storage of such sup-
plies -or their distribution involved diocesan funds beyond a
bare minimum. I was spending money for transport and storage
of relief supplies far beyond the established norms of the
diocese, and openly advocated larger investments on schemes
for improving the people's welfare. These pertained to
installation of pumps for drinking water, subsidized housing,
new agricultural implements and storage facilities for the
village farmers, tube-wells for irrigation supplement, and
grain grinding machinery to ease the 2abor of the village wo-
men. The bishop permitted funds acquired by private subscrip-
tion to be used for these purposes, but my sources for such
assistance supplied only a fraction of the need. Development
agencies that subsidized projects in the social order were
unknown to me at the time, so I tentatively resolved the di-
lemma of financing social programs by juggling the monthly ac-
counts and relying on the benignity of my bishop.
Nothing better typified mission mentality than the use
of money and ignorance of finances. Our Dominican headquar-
ters in New York approved a yearly budget for the mission and
collected funds for that purpose. Each station staffed by the
diocese received a monthly allottment for specific operating
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costs and overruns seldom caused a problem. Money for
subsistence and the amenities of life posed no difficulty, and
some men consistently showed a surplus of funds from unexpend-
ed monthly resources. Such surplus funds could be spent at
the discretion of the individual missionary, and from train-
ing and tradition they invariably saw investment in education
and medicine. Funds expended beyond these traditional outlets
for social activity were frowned upon. Grants-in-aid or no-
collateral subsidies for housing, agriculture, and other
social schemes appeared wasteful. Missionaries quoted the
gospel dictum that the poor will always be with us, and limit-
ed their understanding to the thirteenth century dogma that
God takes care of the poor. They refused to acknowledge what
the social sciences had been teaching for several decades:
given a chance, the poor will help themselves.
The climax came when during a period of flu epidemic I
converted the recently constructed lomberdar's house into a
make-shift hospital. It alerted everyone to the degree of my
involvement in the social crder and they could only view with
alarm my plans for building subsidized houses in the village.
My counter argument that we were building monuments to mockery
unless something was done to remedy the deplorable housing
situation in the village held little relevence. The priest-
worker movement in Europe had been effectively suppressed a
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few years before, and no margin for discussion remained. 2 1
The issue began to disturb me, but it took another decade and
a half to resolve.
The assignment of another priest to Loreto village, Fr.
Terence Quinn, spared me an open reprimand and possible trans-
fer. He had been my classmate in the seminary and was fully
cognizant of my involvement in the social order. His degree
in civil engineering permitted him favor with our superiors
who had embarked upon an ecclesiastical building program. The
lean postwar years had ended and mission funds from a number
of outside sources began to increase. The investment invar-
iably went into new schools, churches, convents, rectories,
and hospitals. The old style of mission activity had not
changed, it only enlarged its field of activity. The con-
struction of a six-room school in Loreto village followed this
traditional pattern of mission objectives, but the new school
soon experienced an unorthodox use.
Shortly after its.completion, an unusually heavy rain-
fall, a rare phenomena in a desert of little agricultural de-
velopment, partially destroyed the then existing village
hovels. The school building was immediately commandeered as
a refugee center for the people, and the entire stock of
village housing was dismantled. All the wooden beams and
other such building materials were salvaged and a new housing
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program instituted. Three basic house designs had previously
been selected after collecting data from a number of other
areas and interviewing native contractors. These house
designs also incorporated what had been observed of the peo-
ple or experienced with them during the extremes of summer
heat and cold of winter. Funds had been obtained by private
subscription over a period of months, and our superiors ac-
quiesced.
Width and layout of streets meant adopting some crude
yardsticks of measurement. By investigating maps of older
established villages, a 35' width was fixed for all roads ex-
cept the central road, which was to be 60' in order to permit
entry of heavy trucks and tractors. This latter design proved
a valuable foresight in regards to its intended use, but was
harmful to the community insofar as it physically separated
the village into halves. People sometimes refer to their vil-
lage compatriots as "those people over there", meaning the
other half of the village site separated by the main road.
Again, without any firm purposeful design in mind, each
house plot was bordered by an access road on both the north
and south of their respective boundaries. It'provided plenty
of open space for public movement that everyone seems to ap-
preciate and utilize. *Not once has there been a serious com-
plaint registered about people or farm animals traversing
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somebody's house plot. Such complaints are endemic in many
villages and common to all.
A somewhat more involved problem emerged in assigning
individual house plots. Meetings were initially held and the
village site map explained. No one could agree on where their
house plot should be; some wanted to be next to a settler from
their former district of residency, or else complained the
land was too high, their fields too far, etc. I cut this gor-
dian knot and assigned house plots in a pattern such that no
single former geographic group of new settlers could establish
a political dominance over the growing community. Government
had selected the settlers from a variety of different adminis-
trative districts and this natural political bias was frag-
mented by assignment of house plots. The villages accepted
such.a decision without complaint, and the construction of new
housing began.
Several features of these homes are noteworthy. The
inside height did not exceed 8 feet, and thus provided for
ventilation in the summer and containment of heat in the win-
ter. Maximum width of a room was 11 feet, the most economical
length of a wooden beam. Wood is dear in the desert, and
beams of longer length were prohibitive in cost. The expanse
between beams was 5 feet, and wooden slats to carry the load
of the reed and mud roof linked each beam. All rooms were
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built in multiples of five feet in length for better
utilization of the beams. Most rooms were 15' in length.
The exception was a small storage room. We had observed the
overcrowded conditions of many village houses, where farm com-
modities or implements lying about reduced the living space
for the occupants. To remove this hindrance and at the same
time hold down construction costs, we incorporated this fea-
ture into the 8' wide verandah designed for each house. By
sealing off the last 5' of the verandah and permitting entry
from the inside via an archway, convenience and expense had
been satisfied. The benefits enjoyed by the people with the
addition of this storage room resulted in all future housing
of the diocese incorporating this feature.
The verahdahs were a luxury for many settlers. As fami-
lies grew in size, the members blocked off the open archways
of the verandah to provide more space for occupancy. A few
householders retained the verandah as a useful place for pre-
paring food, sheltered from the seasonal sand storm or infre-
quent rain shower. With the passage of time, the people
planted trees, and their natural shade during the hot summer
months replaced this advantage of the verandah.
From privately solicited funds, I subsidized the cost-
lier house building materials of overhead beams, doors, and
windows. Relief supplies of food covered the costs of labor
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for making sun-baked bricks, transport to the building site,
and labor construction costs. A ration of food to work, or
bricks made, permitted an equitable and expeditious program
for building to be undertaken at minimum cost. The entire
program took two years, but the critical shortage of housing
was remedied in the first six months.
The house plots were roughly a quarter of an acre in
size, and each house was recessed thirty feet from the bound-
ary line. This proved to be a mistake. All housing in the
sub-continent is built flush from the boundary line to in-
crease the size of the open inner court. Rooms are seldom
used for anything but sleeping, because climatic conditions
permit practically everything else to be done in the open.
By imposing a feature that was an extension of middle class
America (namely, the front lawn space) I had wasted precious
house plot land. With the passage of a few years, this lapse
in judgment was somewhat minimized, as the people themselves
built additions to their houses, and invariable to cover the
originally recessed land.
The homogeneity of the settlers and the newness of the
project area permitted two experiments with local cultural
habits. The first such experiment emphasized the health haz-
ard of animals sharing the same quarters as the people. Less
by persuasion than by fiat, all cows, oxen, water buffalos,
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sheep, and other farm animals were forbidden on the new house
plots. "No animals on the village site" became a byword, but
enforcement would have been nigh impossible. Too many people
refused to abide by this restriction. It either required a
member of the household constantly in the field, or else it
was an undue inconvenience for a farmer to be absent from his
home at night. Surprisingly though, about half the villagers
were content to keep their animals in the fields at all times.
Several reasons accounted for this fact. Animals provided a
rich source of much needed fertilizer, and some fields were
too far distant from the village site for the animals to be
taken out and returned every day.
The second such experiment with a cultural habit trans-
formed the whole pattern of social relations in the community.
It pertained to walls.
With rare exception, all houses in the sub-continent
are surrounded by a high, forbidding wall. The exact reason
for this custom varies, but it is universal. Once the people
of Loreto village became landowners, they subscribed to this
universal custom of a wall around their house property. On
the other hand, I was hostile to high walls, as an artifice
unnecessarily inhibiting social communication. In addition,
I had observed some crucial defects of high walls in many
older villages. Walls had been built, plastered, and repaired
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at the expense of soil from the village road. This caused
large deep holes, which became breeding places for mosquitoes
and resultant malarial sickness ("malaria is.the queen bee of
sickness in the East"). Even when walls were kept in a rela-
tively good state of repair, the hidden house deteriorated,
because custom dictated that only what could be seen should
be kept presentable. And finally, walls failed to keep out
the ever feared thief, and actually facilitated his work;
once over the wall, a thief had freedom of movement from out-
side observation and could act without interference. Insofar
as all housing was initially subsidized by myself, this norm
was able to be temporarily enforced. Fifteen years later, out
of 114 house plots, there are less than a dozen with walls.
Why was this experiment with an accepted custom successful?
For most of the people, the new house plot was the first
time in their lives they had acquired a permanent place of
residency. The new custom of no walls had the force of ac-
cepted custom within five years, negating the never-exper-
ienced custom of owning a house with a high wall boundary.
Furthermore, a number of side benefits arose that no one an-
ticipated. Among these was the greater familiarity with
neighbors who could be seen and recognized when passing by.
Parents were no longer restricted to a limited space and the
constant supervision of children inside a walled enclosure;
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children played in the streets, and one parent could supervise
for many. Family disputes erupted less, because the noise
would arouse the curiosity of neighbors, to the consequent
embarrassment of the disputants. No stranger entered the vil-
lage without a large number of people being aware of his pre-
sence, and theft was almost non-existent. News traveled fast-
er; the arrival of a marriage party, the dust from a vehicle
carrying a visiting official, or the departure of a guest,
were witnessed and shared by many people. The scorching sum-
mer heats only partially subsided at night, so that any even-
ing breeze unobstructed by the physical barrier of a wall was
welcome; In due course of time, trees substituted as boundary
markers for house plots and became the source of much needed
shade in the summer, with their branches supplying fuel the
year.round.
At this writing, most residents of Loreto village have
built small waist-high walls around sections of their property
to mark off a place for -sifting wheat, sorting clothing arti-
cles, or just for sitting. The pride they have in their homes
is exceptional. Several times a year they replaster them in-
side and outside. Sometimes new rooms are added or an entire-
ly separate house built on the same plot of land. Practically
everyone to this day agrees on the advantages of a wall-less
village.
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Village artisans and shopkeepers, with the approval of
the people, were entitled to a half-size house plot on the
village site. Skilled craftsmen, engaged in.work more impor-
tant to the farmers, enjoyed a high priority of choice. Two
village carpenters and two iron mongers were quickly endorsed
by the assembled village men. The delay in assigning shops
from lack of certain planning ideas resulted in a number of
such shops selling foodstuffs, cigarettes, kerosene, and other
variety items, being built by individuals on-their house
plots. This became the preferred arrangement for shops, and
a centrally located area for shops was deleted from the final
map. A.row of house plots on the farthest reaches of the vil-
lage site was reserved for a gradually growing cottage indus-
try. A shoemaker, a dyer, a weaver, and several other such
artisans reside there after having been approved by the vil-
lagers. A small diesel driven grinding mill also occupies a
portion of this area, and it serves the entire village as well
as the surrounding villages. In one of the more conspicuous
and centrally located places on the village site, a meeting
house on a 1/2-acre plot was built. It functions as a gather-
ing place for all village business and provides accommodations
for visiting officials. Final government approval for the
village site as developed was later granted. This official
approbation of the village site was then duly recorded in all
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legal records pertaining to the village.
In reviewing the housing policy of Loreto village, it
now appears that the settlers should have been permitted to
choose their own house plots, either by lottery or some other
method. My arbitrary decision to prevent clustering of set-
tlers from the same colonizing districts in the Punjab served
to retard political growth. By dispersing the settlers I had
hoped to create new relationships and unwittingly neglected
'those that already existed. The first recognized bond between
peasants outside their extended family is geographic propin-
quity. An office clerk will vehemently refuse a petitioner
until he discovers they have come from the same neighborhood,
and then resolve the issue with the plaintive question: "Why
didn't you tell me you were from Lyallpur?" The arbitrary
dispersion of settlers on house plots for the fixed purpose of
avoiding clusterings of men with similar geographic origins
hindered the self-government I sought to effect.
On the physical content of housing, it can be stated
that room size and design were copied by later colonists. The
recessing of houses and the construction of verandahs was dis-
continued; recessing proved wasteful of limited land holdings,
and verandahs were superfluous. The most distinctive aspect
of the housing concerns less the construction than the insti-
tution of a new custom; no walls around the property. This
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idea was initially enforced to avoid many negative effects
caused by high walls in other villages, but the innovation
later enjoyed full community support. I am inclined to think
that this single feature and its effect upon community life is
the principal reason why government designated Loreto as the
"model village" of the Thal Development Authority.
Concomitant with the milestones of increased water sup-
ply and house construction, education as a major objective of
village development took place. Three American Sisters ar-
rived in the fall of 1958 to manage, organize, and teach in
the school. Up to that time, the village school had been in
operation for several years under the tutelage of partially
trained Pakistani teachers, and they acted as a stop-gap mea-
sure in education while the more pressing needs of agriculture
and housing received attention.
The seeds for a completely different approach to edu-
cation were contained in the decision of the Sisters to teach
in an obscure village of the Thal Desert. In truth, the edu-
cational investment of three qualified foreign teachers to
Loreto village appeared a -considerable waste to not a few ob-
servers. Physical facilities for their residency were as yet
incomplete and there was no tradition of education with the
village people of whom only three could read and one could
write. Freedom for choice of assignment had been part of the
60
Sisters.' contract and they chose Loreto village. Their
enthusiasm and specific teaching skills laid the foundation
for an educational policy that previewed the aggiornamento of
Pope John XXIII and would culminate in an educational plan
involving the people of the village, the residents of scores
of other villages in T.D.A., diocesan policy makers, and my-
self as agent provocateur. In the meantime, the sparseness of
the environment, the unformed structure of the village society,
and my own preoccupation with remedying the more flagrant eco-
nomic needs of the village suspended concern for anything more
than the present. The future for education in Loreto village
would see a far different approach and it provides material
for a later chapter in this story.
* ** * ** ** ** *
From the beginning, no one contested my position as a
somewhat benign dictator. As long as all the people exper-
ienced an equal or similar degree of hardship and I was the
source f6r assistance, the village deferred to my leadership.
My means for assistance consisted in the main'of massive
amounts of relief aid and this artificially sustained the vil-
lage economy. It was a very weak base for governing. If the
relief aid should cease or the economics of the village shift
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to the agricultural produce from the fields, the structure of
authority in the village would change. But the curtailment
of relief aid and the growth of a viable economy determined by
field productivity came about with the solution to irrigation
supply of water. Once the settlers could exercise their par-
ticular skills in agriculture, animal husbandry, and irriga-
tion. practices, it was inevitable that some would prove more
industrious than others. The increase of irrigation water
permitted them increased agricultural productivity which in
turn granted the industrious settler a measure of authority in
the community. Awareness of this change and the distinct
possibility that a haphazard and indeterminate political
growth would be inimical to all, I hastened to accommodate an
emerging political power.
To this end I read and studied all the relevant Punjab
law and land administration manuals. These were few in num-
ber and the essential arbiters of all land and water disputes
for every local magistrate. A supplement to this approach,
and necessary to increase my own understanding of government,
was extensive reading of Jefferson, the Federalist Papers,
Hamilton, Lincoln, the lives of many great leaders, and es-
pecially the work of DeTocqueville on "Democracy in America".
The latter contained many profitable observations of a coloni-
zing people similar to what confronted me in the Thal. The
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principles of government enunciated in this work coincided
with my own experience and observatiois of the people in the
village. It became my vademecum for local self-government.2 2
To facilitate a growing policital process, the village
men were called upon to elect a group of five men to consult
with me on all matters pertaining to the welfare of the vi.1-
lage community. The object was to avoid any arbitrary action
by myself and at the same time give them a greater control
-over their own affairs. The chosen group followed a pattern
of political alliance only vaguely perceived in the past as
active in village life. Their initial steps at government
took the fori of making explicit rules and multiplying laws.
Such formulations were contrary to their own traditions and
soon discarded for the more time consuming art of persuasion
and personal allegiance to the extended family or former geo-
graphic residency. The growth of political activity coincid-
ed with the growing economic disparity amongst the colonists
as a result of their own agricultural endeavors. For the next
ten years, political evolution would prove to be anything but
a peaceful, gentle process; rather, a dynamic and at times
turbulent growth of political power would take place, compar-
able to the growth taking place within the village and the
nation at large. 2 3
* * * * * * * * * * *
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One of.the more revealing insights of rural life in this
period was tie universal respect accorded former colonial ad-
ministrators by the people. One day shortly after arrival in
the Thal, I gave a ride in my pick-up truck to a villager and
his family travelling the open desert. Upon alighting at his
destination he spoke to my Punjabi corpanion, and said: "It's
like the days when the lamb and the lion were together; when
the English were here." My own ancestry of Boston Irish and
-youthful sport of throwing rocks at British sailors on port
leave left me unprepared for such an explanation. But the in-
stances quickly multiplied, such as the day a colonist flagged
me down in the trackless waste to arbitrate a dispute between
himself and his neighbor. He mistook me for a colonial offi-
cer and a denial of the identification meant nothing to him
because he was convinced that only a foreign colonial master
could give him justice. When in conversation with a peasant
refugee at a way station, I mentioned my observation that it
seemed about eighty percent of the people wanted the English
back. The man corrected me by saying: "Sahib, if put to a
vote it would be 90%". This was especially true for the vil-
lage peasantry because the exceptional calibre of ICS (Indian
Civil Service) personnel in pre-partition days was a byword
in the sub-continent.24 On horseback, camel, ox-cart, and
later by motor vehicle, they travelled and dispensed justice
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to the disadvantaged in the most remote of hamlets. More
often than not, the colonists in the Thal area referred to me
as "Angrezi admi" - the Englishman. It was a tribute of iden-
tification with the esteem they accorded their former colonial
rulers.
Few acquaintanceships in the nation brought this more
sharply into focus than that which I had with the Chairman of
T.D.A. for the years 1958 and 1959. Most former English ICS
officers had left the sub-continent during partition, but a
number had remained at the request of the Pakistan government.
Mr. R. D. Howe, the new Chairman of TD.A. and former ICS of-
ficer, received assignation following government investigation
of colonization difficulties in the Thal. A railway running
the length of the project, construction of some 650 miles of
road, about 1500 miles of canal networks, and a million and a
half acres prepared for colonization had failed to solve the
real problems of inadequate administration to supervise the
more particularized needs of the colonists. With an esprit
and knowledge of the people unequalled by his predecessors in
T.D.A., and an opportunity not afforded his successors, this
former colonial administrator revitalized the initial vision
of T.D.A. and accomplished much in a short time. His appoint-
ment to a higher government post left a sense of indirection
amongst his staff, and the management of T.D.A. reverted to
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its former posture of uncertainty.
No such uncertainty distracted me. In the space of four
years, I had learned the rudiments of community organization,
achieved an expertise in village planning and construction,
familiarized myself with local government and cultural prac-
tices, and acquired an unabashed self--confidence in the un-
charted field of village rehabilitation. I had departed from
the single-minded dedication of a young priest concerned sole-
ly with improving the spiritual welfare of my flock, and ada-
mantly believed there was no contradiction between total
engagement in the social order and the clerical profession.
My religious superior at this time was a man of great
practical wisdom accumulated in his 17 years as an old China
hand. He tolerated most of my seemingly unorthodox activity
when not actually bemused by it. No such fraternal acceptance
was forthcoming from my fellow priests who like myself had no
exposure to the foreign missions prior to the Pakistan assign-
ment. A large part of our growing alienation was due to our
equally shared disadvantages. A social situation demanding
imaginative and creative initiative had been thrust upon us,
but all of us were untrained for the work, new to the culture,
and too inexperienced to realize the uniqueness of the chal-
lenge. We settled upon a modus operandi in accordance with
our first surroundings. I lived alone; my fellow priests
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lived in community. I actively engaged in the social order
because the needs sat on my doorstep; they resided in the high
rent section of an urban setting and could abstract from the
social issue after a visit to the slums. I was compelled to
experiment and innovate; they resorted to known and practiced
mission procedures, even though they were defunct. The sit-
uation called for a delicate appraisal of human relations on
both our parts; a more persuasive and less abrasive presen-
tation of my convictions to them, and their unbiased exami-
nation instead of condemnation of what I was doing in the
social order. Neither eventuality came to pass.
The crux of the issue was our training as theologians.
A departure from the carefully defined role of spiritual ad-
ministrator was considered recklessness. Unlike the priest-
doctor with his certified talents, or the priest-engineer and
his recognized qualifications, I had acquired a distinctive
skill on the job. Instead of being evaluated and accepted as
such, it was looked upon as a threat to the values and goals
of our calling. The bishop and my religious superior in their
combined mission experience and knowledge of men tolerated and
sought to guide my activity. My confreres, on the contrary,
consumed with the missionary. zeal of young men, openly and co-
vetly opposed me. It was a human situation fraught with con-
sequences for each of us, and subtlety began to destroy the
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bond that banded us together as brothers.
In these formative years, the social issue in the dio-
cese remained confused at best. I was unable to articulate
the process of role change that had taken place in Loreto vil-
lage, but merely able to enact it. My peers could make even
less a contribution because they were strangers to the pro-
cess, and so in the end the bishop tacitly permitted the issue
to remain unresolved for more favorable times. The delay
merely hardened initial positions instead of securing a mutu-
ally helpful compromise and insight into the social issue by
all the clergy of the diocese. These unresolved social issues
festered, and like the symptoms of a disease, mirrored the
sickness of the nation's body politic. The social issue was a
nationwide malady, not just a diocesan aberration.
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III
LEARNING TO GOVERN
What had been unsatisfactorily experienced of national
leadership in the limited area of T.D.A. was reflected in the
nation at large. The political democracy of Pakistan with its
party systems was ineffective, corrupt, and had brought the
country to the verge of bankruptcy. A major cause for this
democratic failure was the inability of the political process
either ideologically or in any other way to handle public is-
sues in a parliamentary manner.25 Coalition governments
changed frequently, standards of public administration de-
clined, and the growing economic problems finally precipitated
a crisis. In October 1958, a little more than a decade after
winning independence, the Pakistan Army proclaimed martial law
and assumed control of the country.
The advent of Martial Law was greeted by crowds rejoic-
ing in the streets, and people embraced one another as an ex-
pression of relief. The Army was the one institution revered
and respected by everyone. From tradition and organizational
structure, it had always commanded the respect and admiration
of the populace. From the first days of colonial rule, the
British had enlisted the Punjabi and trained him to be the
soldier par excellence of the sub-continent. If the nation
had any avocation as such, it was to the military manner of
life. Families for many generations had their sons and
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grandsons enlisted in the Army, and even in the same companies
of the same batallions as their forebears. The takeover of the
Army was the answer to the people's distrust of the multiple
political intrigues consequent upon partition from India and
gave hope to the men of good intention laboring to stabilize
and develop the new nation. What had been observed and exper-
ienced in the execution of the T.D.A. project was quickly seen
to have spread throughout the body politic and was like a can-
cerous growth in the new nation.2 6
Just how bad was the situation prior to Martial Law and
the beginning of Army rule in 1958? As an outsider with only
two years residency at the time, I had written home six weeks
before the event that "the situation is approaching anarchy".
David Bell, who was at that time in charge of American Aid,
had earlier told the nation it could question its right to
sovereignty if it continued to fail in feeding itself. Another
foreign observer and analyst could five years later write in
retrospect: "The country could ill afford the heavy burden
placed on its impoverished resources. Although many gains had
been made since partition, economic growth had been disappoint-
ing in spite of mounting development expenditures, increasing
foreign aid and the consumption of foreign exchange re-
serves."27 With the imposition of Army rule and drastic mea-
sures of the new government, "popular confidence in the regime
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increased as it gave increasing evidence of political,
economic and financial rectitude, political stability and a
desire to support measures for developing the economy. 28In
the newspapers and radio addresses to the nation, the word
politician became a term of opprobrium, with all nominal lead-
ers stripped of influence, put under house arrest, banished
from public life and barred from public activity.
In an interview two years later with a former colonial
army officer of long residency and understanding of the nation,
I was advised that the Army had made a mistake.29 They could
have accomplished their ends in less than two months; namely,
the display of strength necessary to impress and effect the
nascent political process. However, instead of returning to
the barracks, the Army retained power, and much of the officer
corps was soon subverted by emoluments from industrialists,
businessmen, and bankers in the form of bribes to cover mal-
practices in bookkeeping, availability of comfortable resi-
dences, and all the trappings of prestige arising from in-
fluence in the political sphere.3 0
The military regime in the seat of government with the
full approbation of the populace and a no-nonsense approach
to the political process was 'acclaimed by practically all the
foreign agencies working in Pakistan, their governments, aid
programs, and institutions seeking to help the development of
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the nation. They were halycon days; all steel and cement in
the nation was commandeered for the construction of a refugee
housing program in Karachi to remove the stigma that the city
rivalled Calcutta as the cesspool of the world. Sweeping land
reforms were announced, and prices had to be posted for every
article sold in the shops of the bazaars. All clerks and other
government employed personnel were obliged under penalty of
law to be punctual in their work and duty assignments.
For the first time since partition, everyone except the
deposed politicians shared the feeling that at last the nation
was on its way. The man in the village or on the street be-
lieved his trust in the Army would be vindicated and the new
leadership needed only time to prove itself. It was the first
and last occasion for the military .to enjoy the unanimous ap-
probation of political support from the populace.
The new regime infused badly needed life into the flag-
ging first five-year plan. The Planning Commission had been
struggling with limited results to build a staff, but Pakistan
personnel of the professional calibre required were unavail-
able, or when available, declined the offer to participate.
Much of the difficulty was due to the newness of the planning
concept, a lack of political leverage- in government, and the
.general disparate personalities engaged in a new approach to
national development. What was true of the planning apparatus
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in central government was even more so evident in the
districts. For all practical purposes, planning as such was a
peripheral activity to government.
This deficiency was underscored by the writers of the
draft of the first five-year plan: "We have been deeply im-
pressed in the course of preparing this Plan by the great dif-
ficulties which will be encountered in executing it. In vir-
tually every field the country is extremely short of trained
technicians and administrators to carry out development work,
and what is at least as serious in many fields, the country is
also short of organization with sufficient tradition, staff,
and experience to implement large development schemes. In a
great many cases, the shortage of trained manpower or of ex-
perienced organizations, rather than lack of finance, is the
factor limiting the speed of development."31
The foreign advisers were not entirely happy with the
extensive role they were called upon to play in national plan-
ning., They made attempts to limit their contribution, but too
often found themselves pressed by time schedules and directly
intervened in the planning process. Some advisers were able
to restrict their activities to an advisory role, but most
found it necessary to work, in greater or lesser degree, on
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the same tasks.as the Pakistani staff. Once the precedent
was set, and this in the first major attempt of the country at
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national planning, the planning process was inescapably
westernized. Remedial measures to train Pakistani staff were
undertaken, but at no time was a complete in-service program
for the staff established.33 The.demands for planning output
took precedence over this needed organizational structure.
The deficiency persisted throughout the tenure of the advisory
group, and all eventual planning suffered accordingly.
The first five-year plan itself was an exceptionally
well written and comprehensive model of its kind. Neverthe-
less, for all the effort expended to produce it, a full year
of the plan period elapsed before even the draft was published,
and an equal length of time before the- plan itself was in op-
eration. Only the fact that a number of the plan's objectives
were ongoing projects from the previous period rescued its
more salient objectives.
The real impetus for the execution of the plan came from
the new military leadership of the Army.34 Most of the bene-
fits accruing to the nation were due to this leadership. The
Army took control of the nation when the plan had still two
years remaining and gave the idea of planning a status hither-
to unknown. As a consequence,. there were notable gains in the
national economy. The greatest success was in the industrial
order, as in the preceding years before Army rule, and the
same social difficulty of excessive wealth in the hands of a
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few was aggravated. The industrialists became the new powers
of influence, while the former politicians were muzzled. The
despised politicians at least knew the people, the new class
of industrialists exploited them unmercifully. The Army ex-
coriated the former politicians while seeking favor of a new
industrial class far more detrimental to the interests of the
nation. Unwittingly, the foreign adviser found himself in
collusion with this arrangement of social forces.
Without the overwhelming expertise and prestige of for-
eign advisers, the military administrators would have had to
come to terms with the nation's woeful lack of qualified per-
sonnel. Instead, the Army rulers, under the guise of obvious
success occasioned by their intervention during the remaining
years of the first five-year plan, accelerated the planning
process and introduced a second five-year plan, beginning in
1960.
While the foreign adviser debated the exercise of his
newfound influence on the national scene, I was experiencing
the deep seated frustration of being unable to reconcile two
conflicting roles. The ecclesiastical role of priesthood
called for the administration of the sacraments, spiritual
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consolation for the sick and dying, and a prescribed number of
meditative exercises each day. The admirable aspects of this
life were further reinforced by religious vows, with obedience
the preeminent vow. Yet, the very nature of the environment
in which I found myself and my own understanding of the needs
to be met called for a relaxation of rules, a rethinking of
current mission procedures, and a reexamination of our role as
priests.
At night I would clandestinely write such thoughts in a
notebook and on the morrow tear out the pages. They seemed
too foreboding, too heretical, too contradictory of the estab-
lished order. An occasional observation of insight or encour-
agement from an outsider would confirm me in my role of social
activist. I learned to salvage my identity by subscribing to
the rules when in the presence of other missionaries in the
diocese, and doing otherwise when on my own. Such an accommo-
dation fostered a twofold misfortune; one of generating sus-
picion of my activities among my fellow priests, and the other
of hampering my own need for dialogue with them.
The uniqueness of the Thal experiment and my singular
approach had pre-defined the social issue for my confreres and
voided dispassionate discussion of the priest's role in the
social order. My activity in Loreto village instead of de-
lineating a new role, reinforced the natural conservatism
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inherent in religious life. Gradually but perceptibly I found
myself on a collision course with the majority of my co-work-
ers. My idealism took no account of a Catholic training that
was by tradition conformist rather then adventurous in the
social order; a Church conscious of its role in history, and
suspicious of other contributors; the heralder of a universal
doctrine of good news, and wary of individual spontaniety.
But I was unalterably happy in my r6le as social activist even
while subjected to the growing antagonism of other priests.
Th.e open support of both my bishop and my religious superior
contributed to my sense of security, and when they assigned me
to a new. station I readily complied.
* * ** ** ** * **
My transfer coincided with the commencement of the se-
cond five-year plan for 1960-1965 which signalled the involve-
ment of the World Bank in the financing of development for
Pakistan. My new station was in the Abbasia Canal Project, a
large irrigated land bordering the vast desert that acted as
a buffer between Pakistan and India. Like the Thal project,
it had been partially excavated in pre-partition days and co-
lonization took place following WW II. Unlike the Thal pro-
ject, the Abbasia Canal project straddled the main road and
77
rail communication system of the nation, so that no village in
its 120-mile length was more than a dozen miles from a com-
munication node. The paramount disadvantage was dependency
for water from the Sutlej River being diverted by India for
its own desert use. This difficulty more than all else pres-
sured the members of the World Bank to underwrite the Indus
Basin Plan, the largest multi-national irrigation scheme in the
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world.
Without the execution of this massive development pro-
grain, it is highly unlikely Pakistan could survive as a sov-
erign nation. The signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960
forestalled war between Pakistan and India, while committing a
consortium of nations to a massive financial obligation. It
irrevocably committed the United States to Pakistan, as Aswan
Dam did the Russians to Egypt. The plan has been describsd as
essentially a political undertaking rather than a development
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scheme. Its huge outlay of expenditure compelled the nation-
al planners to exclude it from their five-year projections and
place it in a category other than national planning. To date,
better than 2,500 man-years of outside technical assistance
have been used to execute what was essentially conceived as'an
irrigation-agricultural survival scheme for West Pakistan.37
The signing of the Indus Basin Treaty marked the second
five-year plan as one of the most ambitious reclamation and
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development plans of any nation in the world. In short order,
massive doses of foreign aid, large construction projects con-
tracted to foreign firms, studies of nationwide transportation
and power schemes by foreign consultants, and a disproportion-
ate allocation of funds to the military took place as accepted
policy. Those were heady days, and new government reorgani-
zation schemes and new governmental agencies to implement pro-
jects of national concern proliferated. With rare exception
most of it was a case of disguised forced feeding; the indi-
genous administrative, organizational, and technical personnel
were in too limited supply for the scope of work undertaken.
Foreign advisers, foreign consultants, foreign contractors,
and foreign aid were the necessary ingredients for the success-
ful management and execution of the second five-year plan. No
single project outside of an immediate industrial scheme was
completely administered, engineered, and executed by all Paki-
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stani personnel.
The effect of foreign advisers and consultants backed up
by large numbers of foreign technicians executing projects with
foreign aid was felt in every segment of the society during the
second five-year plan. The whole concatenation of political
confusion in the post partition period before Army rule, the
social dislocation caused by the immigration of countless re-
fugees and the sealing of the borders with India, as well as
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the attempt to build a total moslem culture on a peoples who
for centuries past had been an integral part of a polygot so-
ciety, remained unresolved under continued military rule and
an avalanche of foreign assistance. The nation headed in a new
direction under Army rule and the guidance of foreigners with
little heed to the underlying social and political factors dis-
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turbing the masses.
Make no mistake, the nation's problems were real enough
and there was need for outside help. Coupled with the trau-
matic dislocation accompanying partition from India in 1947,
there was a phenomenal rate of birth increase, a series of dis-
asterous floods, chronic food shortages, and the new menace of
water-logging destroying large tracts of the best agricultural
lands.40 If the unbiased observer.viewed the situation with
alarm, the foreign adviser or consultant who entered the scene
was to be extolled for his contribution to rectify the situa-
tion.
The foreign personnel came to assist Pakistan as tech-
nicians, whether that be in economic planning, industry, engin-
eering, or agriculture. Their jurisdiction was limited even
as their influence was extensive. This last feature had the
potential for seriously distorting the role of foreign person-
*nel in relation to the nation's unresolved political problems.
Without a definitive grasp of the political complexities and
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personalities contending for power, economic policies of far
reaching consequences were advocated. A more cautious and re-
ticent participation was deemed inexpedient for the sake of
accomplishment. The possibility of a singular illustration, a
crash program of national development, took precedence. The
personalities of the'participants, the professional identity
of goals, the snowball effect of increased foreign aid plus
national leadership compliance and international acclaim, all
these factors reinforced one another.
Initial successes in development enhanced the prestige
and influence of foreign advisors, consultants, and techni-
cians. They became the miracle antidote for remedying the
ills of the country. That the problems underlying the sit-
uation might be outside their ken or professional expertise
was unquestioned. Their access to resources became an
obligation; their services, a debt; and their compliance with
the existing social inequity, demanded. To do otherwise was
considered "interference in the internal affairs of the na-
tion." All foreign inputs of men, material, and money legiti-
mized a situation inimical to the nation as a whole and pro-
fitable to a restricted few.
The momentum of development could hardly have been
maintained without the prodigious input of foreign nations,
especially the United States.42 This input in both capital
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for financing and personnel for executing development was
circular in its effect; foreign advisers planned beyond the
capacity of the nation to sustain either financially or ad-
ministratively, so therefore more finances and more personnel
from outside the nation were needed. This last feature negates
any possibility of describing such aid as comparable to the
post-war Marshall Plan.
* * ** * * * * * * *
The effects of this new alliance between the military
regime o.f Pakistan and the international community of nations.
were least visible on the village level, even while evident
everywhere else. This was nowhere more true than in the vil-
lage of Fatimapur, Chak 74/3-R, in the district of Rahimyar
Khan. I had been assigned to Chak 74/3-R--meaning the 74th
village off the third distributary on the right side of the
Abbasia Canal--; the people from custom and convention called
it Fatimapur. About 600 people of both moslem and christian
belief had been eking out a living for a decade in the village.
The extremity of their poverty had reduced some landowners to
destitution, and they had sold their lands for a pittance.
It was a repeat of a situation all too prevalent in new colony
settlement projects; great expectations as new landowners, lack
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of irrigation water, compulsory sale of oxen for subsistence
sake, sale of land, and reduction to status of impoverished
tenant farmer, hired laborer, or migration to the city for
employment as a "sweeper".
Unlike the settlers of Loreto Village in the Thal Desert,
the people of Fatimapur village had organized leadership re-
sources within the community. They were succumbing to forces
outside their power to effect, and the hope arose that I might
change the situation. My presence in the makeshift quarters
of the village school added a little curiosity to an otherwise
lethargic community. The whole atmosphere breathed defeatism,
and the offer of the village mayor to relinquish his title in
my favor was a symptom of community ennui. The people living
in their fields isolated from one another contributed to the
dissolution of the community and loss of spirit. To prevent
further alienation of land holdings and encourage growth of a
community spirit became my initial objectives.
The smooth attainment of these ends was made immeasur-
ably more difficult by a change in the diocesan structure of
authority. In the past, my socially oriented activities were
tolerated, when not fully endorsed, by both my religious su-
perior and the bishop. When -my former religious superior be-
came the bishop and his replacement came from my peer group,
that amiable relationship ended. The new religious superior
83
had no forbearance for my social activity and commanded me to
engage in sacramental administration to the exclusion of all
else. I reluctantly complied, so ingrained was the sense of
religious obedience. At the same time, a learning period was
required in order to acquaint me with the social situation in
which I found myself. Application of previously learned prac-
tices guided me during this phase of familiarization.
The key to obtaining all my immediate objectives of in-
stilling new life in the community, teaching myself about this
group of people, and reversing the trend of land sales, was to
consistently act in an unpredictable manner. Some textbooks
would call it an existential approach but it is as old as St.
Francis of Assisi and antedates Buddha. It is rooted in a
spiritual belief of every man's inestimable worth and a very
humanly expressed compassion. This form of action expressed
itself in a number of flamboyant and often bizarre actions;
always effectively and impressively. If a child on a winter
day had no coat, I'd clothe him with my oversize jacket. On an
evening visit to a peasant hovel I'd medicate the sick and if
need be give the blanket off my bed. No hesitation was shown
in sharing with anyone my wallet, my table, -or my time. I
permitted children to enter into my room unannounced while
their elders were held to the respectful rules of a knock for
attention. The people perceptibly grew relaxed in my presence
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and once again the village began to hear drums at night, a
symbol of the moment's acceptance and tomorrow's hope.
As in my former assignment, -insufficient irrigation water
for agriculture lay at the root of the people's plight. To
increase this water supply became the sine qua non for economic
growth. The advantage of experience had taught me the utility
of approaching the highest officials to rectify such problems.
The Deputy Chief Engineer of my acquaintance (there were four
in the Punjab) had retired. A whole year passed before an of-
ficial of equal authority intervened in my behalf.
The catalytic occasion came about in this manner. A
Deputy Chief Engineer was staying at a'local government rest
house while visiting a relative. Always alert to the fact that
high officials can be readily approached by foreigners, espe-
cially Americans, I made my presence known and was afforded the
opportunity to speak. For two hours, we discussed irrigation
and water supply in the area. He disputed my grievances but
agreed to visit the village on the following day. Unknown to
me at the time, he bore the sobriquet of "father of the Abbas-
sia Canal" because of his engineering contributions. 4 3
Of the thousand acres of arable land in the village,
about one-third had shown little or no crop productivity in a
decade. From that fact alone, the deplorable condition of
some farmers could be deduced. Even as the Deputy Chief
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Engineer observed the scene, a powerfully built peasant farmer
broke into the circle of officials visiting the village and
extended a pair of hardened hands with the entreating voice of
a man pushed beyond endurance: "Eleven years without water!
Eleven years without water!" The officials were visibly sha-
ken, and supplemental water was allocated on the spot.44
As a consequence of increased water supply and hope for
greater crop productivity, the idea of a cooperative bank was
advanced as a possible economic assist to the village farmers.
Se.veral twenty mile journeys to the government registrar, many
small group conversations with the farmers, and the strong in-
fluence.of the village school master were necessary to create.
a receptive atmosphere for instituting the cooperative bank.
Yet, despite repeated requests to expedite approval for match-
ing funds from government after the farmers had collected and
deposited their share, the idea was aborted from failure and
lack of interest on the part of the government registrar. The
village was too far away., the weather was too hot, the funds
were inadequate, etc., all these reasons were advanced at one
time or another by the registrar, contrary to the overwhelming
support of the farmers themselves.
To better understand the whole cooperative ideal, I ac-
cepted an offer to attend the Rural Academy at Comilla in East
Pakistan. It was under the aegis of the government, backed by
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the Ford Foundation, and above all, directed by a former Indian
Civil Service officer, Dr. Hamid Khan. Of all the Pakistani
personnel I've ever met, he proved to be the only one with an
insight and workable program to change the feudal structure of
village life.45 My ten day exposure to his methods, ideas, and
accomplishments firmly convinced me that the cooperative ap-
proach as executed in the Punjab could never be successful on
a large scale. Government control and bureaucratic bottlenecks
inhibited any possible hope for widespread acceptance amongst
the rural peasantry. The observation remains valid today.
* * * * * * * * ** *
While the national government wallowed in funds received
from the international community, little of it percolated
down to the village level. Poverty of financial resources
plagued me in my desire to effect change in the social order.
The bone-clean financial condition of mission dioceses notice-
ably improved with the economic growth of western Europe and
the U. S. during the post WW II period. For the first time in
over two generations the plight of the socially concerned mis-
sionary could be relieved. Organizations in the- free world
sought to subsidize worthwhile social projects, and my bishop
assisted me in seeking them out. He was an unusual man, and
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whatever reluctance or concern he harboured about action in the
social order was suspended in the face of a real situation.
It is my own judgment that long exposure to poverty without
personal action to remedy it will invariably negate the most
elemental emotions of human compassion. Foreign missionaries
more than other professionals are apt to become immune to the
social problems of the people, and acquire a callousness and
hard heartedness in direct contradiction to their calling.
All too often the lack of funds to execute programs to
remove the more pressing hardships of the people compounded my
personal hardship of living in a village. The problems tenant
farmers enunciated were always the same, and in short order
overwhelmed me with the desire to do something about them. I
knew the implications of the problems, the remedial measures
to correct them, and the organizational structure of government
to assist me; I lacked the time and resources to concentrate
on more than one village for a prolonged period of time.
My bishop rendered assistance after receiving complimen-
tary feed back from the village men and viewing the scene.
When I confronted him with the desire to reconstruct Fatimapur
village, he pledged support and the influence bf his office to
obtain funds from an international relief organization. The
idea of reconstructing the village of Fatimapur with funds
from an international agency designed for that purpose was new
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to me. In the past, commodity supplies from U.S.A.I.D.
(United States Administration for International Development),
tool kits from CARE, clothing from CRS (Catholic Relief Ser-
vices), and medical supplies from UNICEF had been considered
the limit of largesse. This new opportunity required discard-
ing the usual missionary styled letter describing death, star-
vation, and disease. A refinement of the insights and exper-
iences of reconstruction in the Thal had to be spelled out,
backed up with pictures, diagrams, statistics, and an itemized
cost accounting. I was learning the procedures for project
presentation; of even greater import, I defined my own concepts
about the social order.
A Reader's Digest article on the reconstruction of
Loreto village became my entre and endorsement for seeking
funds to do the same thing for the village of Fatimapur. 4 6
This first project proposal viewed the village scene as a com-
plex social situation and was submitted to an aid giving or-
ganization in West Germany. In brief outline, the project
requested funding for the following needs:
12 pair of bullocks
32 duplex-mud brick houses
1 three-bed dispensary
12 hand pumps for drinking water
1 22/24 horsepower grain grinding machine
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1 3KW generator
2 season supply of fertilizer
A representative of the organization visited the site
and wrote up his own report of approval. Within six weeks,
the bishop notified me that a sum of $12,0C0 had been deposited
in the diocesan bank account for the reconstruction of Fatima-
pur village.
The single mistake I made in preparing the project re-
quest concerned the cost. It seemed astronomical to me, so I
pared every possible expense, removing all margin for contin-
gency expenses. The man who approved the project later de-
scribed my niggardliness: "It was the minnow that almost went
through the net". However, I soon realized the rash presump-
tion of thinking that allocation of funds guarantees a success-
ful project. Funds, like the balance sheet for accountants,
are only one feature of project implementation. Constant sur-
veillance of all aspects of the project is a keynote for ap-
propriate execution. Such supervision is possible for one
village, highly improbable for many villages, and usually dis-
asterous on a national scale.4 8
By employing the techniques and procedures for recon-
struction learned in the Thal, Chak 74/3-R, Fatimapur village,
took on a new look in a relatively short time. The sources of
material supply were close at hand, skilled and unskilled
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labor were plentiful, road communication was acceptable, and
the people cooperated throughout. The completed three-bed
dispensary proved so well adapted to the local needs it became
a prototype for the diocese. Laying out the lines of communi-
cation on the village site and allocating house plots offered
no difficulty. No time schedule for completion had been speci-
fied, and delays effecting rapid implementation of the project
were few. What did cause some disruption in execution fell
outside the purview of the project proposal, namely, the rapid
relocation of the people onto the village site and their ex-
perience of increased communal contact. As long as they lived
separated from one another in the fields, minimum disputes
arose; all this changed when they congregated on the village
site.
For the uninitiated, governing village people who can
neither read nor write would seem an easy task. Neither in
the individual instance, nor when the combined problems of six
hundred simple people are multiplied into one nassive whole is
there any validity for the view. No well-researched rule books
for governing village people lay on library shelves. Most of
the contingent daily decisions are arrived at on an ad hoc
(.a
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basis, matched against a backlog of similar confrontations.
The few following examples taken at random constitute
the common run of jurisprudence approach on the village level.
One morning before the sun was fully in orbit and the
day's work began in earnest, the unusual noise of a brawl close
to my bungalow broke out. A boy came running to me shouting:
"Fight! Fight!" It is of the utmost necessity at all times to
exhibit an even disposition in the crises that confront village
people; they are too easily excited by the occurrence of events
out of the ordinary to add to their confusion by a ruffled de--
meanor. Walking with a normal gait to the scene of the disor-
der, I quickly saw that two brothers int their early twenties
had been throwing blows, but seeing me coming had desisted and
reverted to shouting one another down.
My first action was a sharp command for silence, and dur-
ing the pause, sobbing could be heard from the elderly widowed
mother of the two combatants. I was then far less concerned
as to the reason for the inter-family fued than I was for the
embarrassment of the widow before her village neighbors. After
a brief rebuke to both her sons, the village chokedar, or
watchman, was summoned. Another man was sent to bring the
double-headed drum used on festive occasions to keep the beat
of music. When the chokedar arrived and the drum was on hand,
the two young men were told to clasp hands and begin walking
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up and down the village streets while the chokedar beat out a
tune of attention for all to come and see. Hardly had the two
young men walked fifty feet when they began to smile, and ev-'
eryone- else joined them. At the end of their short penitential
journey, they both publicly made obeisance to their mother, and
asked her forgiveness. Nobody in the village thought the less
of the widow, and there has not been a like recurrence in the
village of two family members openly brawling.
On another occasion, a runner came in from the village
to tell me that two old men were flailing one another with
their hands. Upon my arrival at the scene, it was evident that.
no physical injuries had been inflicted, although one antago-
nist was lying on the ground supposedly stunned unconscious by
his assilant's blows. This subterfuge is common enough amongst
villagers, whether it's a woman who became angry with her hus-
band, or a young man rebuked by his father, or as in the pre-
sent instance between two foolish old men quarrelling. The
purpose of such a ruse is to excite the sympathies of the on-
lookers, thereby making the imposter the virtual victor in the
eyes of the people. Rather than reason the matter out with
the possum-playing man, I ordered him carried to my verandah
and prohibited any and all relatives from visiting him.
As the hot sun began to move across the sky, the shadows
that protected him from the heat also moved. The man soon
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showed signs of discomfort, and in short order was thirsty
enough to vacate the porch without any assistance.
Both men knew an infraction of the vill-age peace had
been committed, and waited somewhat in trepidation for the ar-
rival of the police. However, in the circumstances, it seemed
too drastic a measure, and besides, interrogation by the police
would have been disgraceful for the two old men in front of all
the other village people. Rather than be hasty in an alterna-
tive decision, and knowing full well that an elapse of time
would salve the enmity and keep both the contestors on edge, I
reserved judgment until evening time when all the men had re-
turned from working in the fields. At that time, before an
assembly of the men, the two culprits requested my pardon and
listened to the rebuke registered for the shame they had
brought upon themselves and the disgraceful example set before
the other villagers, especially the children. The penalty for
their offense was then meted out. One party was to invite the
other party to his household hearth for tea, and the same was
to be repeated the following evening by the other party. It
satisfied the demands of justice, prevented a continuing
grudge, and averted any further public expression of the
matter.
Marriage cases are not too unusual, but do require a
particular finesse in handling. Part of the wariness stems
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from the nature of local Punjabi customs concerning the
subjugated status of women, and is in part rooted in their po-
verty itself. Often enough, marriage approaches an economic
arrangement; she cooks the food, he works in the fields. If
either one fails in their obligations, great difficulties arise
in the family. It is the underlying reason why many women will
neither voluntarily venture forth beyond the village confines
nor be permitted to go to the civil hospitals when they are
seriously ill.
The crying woman who came to me one evening was accom-
panied by her mother, who in turn did all the denouncing of
her brutal son-in-law. For myself, the old observation that
in-laws become out-laws when they intervene in marital affairs
still holds true, so I showed the mother-in-law to the door
and did my own investigation. It seems that the wife was
lazily lying down on the string bed when her husband came in
from a heavy day's work in the fields. No food was prepared
for him, and possibly he cuffed her a bit, but whatever hap-
pened she went home to her mother. My initial remarks were
rebukes for her failure to have had her husband's supper pre-
pared, and then I ordered her to remain for the night with one
of the staff families. In the meantime, the husband was sum-
moned, and he in nowise presented the spectacle of a brute,
but rather of a tired and indignant young spouse. My only
98
admonition to him was to exercise a little more patience in
the future, and to realize that the hot weather was upon us
and men's blood got correspondingly warm, as well as the fact
that there wasn't such a budget for the village dispensary that
I could afford to patch up his wife in the case of a more ser-
ious altercation. He humbly accepted the admonition, and apo-
logized for the trouble caused. The one thing he understood
clearly was that no attempt was being made by myself to inter-
fere with matters that strictly pertained to his rights as
head of the far-ily.
On the following morning, he again returned to complain
that his wife refused to cook the family food, and had once
again gone back to mother. Rather than delay further, I had
them both brought before me and walked them over to a small
store room we used for storage of supplies. The walls were
completely sealed to prevent infestation by rats, and there
was scant space to move about on the inside because of the
stored goods. In addition, it stood in the open, fully exposed
to the sun's burning rays of heat. Without further ado, the
door was unlocked and both the husband and wife told to enter.
Upon shutting the door on this windowless room, they were told
that when they had come to terms, to inform the chokedar who
was standing guard on the outside. Within the hour they ap-
pealed. When the door was opened for their release, they were
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holding hands like a couple in the park, and dripping
perspiration like two refugees from a Swedish bath. There has
not been need to repeat the performance, so effective was this
singular measure.
Anger at the callousness of minor officials and indigna-
tion at the general apathy of those concerned with assisting
villagers constantly assails anyone in the seat of immediate
village jurisdiction. However, the people themselves contri-
bute the culminating element of exasperation that leaves one
completely befuddled. An instance in question is the time
trees were planted down the main road leading into the village.
Three hours of canal water a week was allowed by law, but ra-
ther than demand the authorized supply, I merely told the farm-
ers to see that the seedlings received proper watering. No
further reflection was made on the issue until some weeks later
when I inquired from the mali (or gardner) how the new seed-
lings were faring. He told me that they had all died for lack
of water. Further inquiry revealed that the farmers thought I
planted the trees for myself, and intended to take them back
to America. With a maximum of forty-four pounds luggage via
air travel, it would have been most difficult, to say the
least.
Small cases involving my people and the people of ad-
jacent villages often arose. A policeman came into the
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village one time to apprehend a widow who had a flock of
children, and who barely subsisted by selling small food com-
modities in the bazaar or by bartering them for things to be
later resold in the village. She.had charged exactly two
annas (2() in excess to a shopkeeper for something worth six
annas, and the burly policeman took it upon himself to walk
the two miles to take the culprit into custody. My impatience
at the underpaid policeman being a party to such pressure on
another person even poorer than himself was not long delayed
in coming to the surface. After berating him for his needless
journey and the loss of shoe leather alone, I pointed out the
condition of the widow and the incongruity of his being
the instrument for additional hardship. The police constable
visibly colored with shame and excused himself. The widow was
warned not to repeat the offense in the future, and later in
the week to avert a temptation to repeat the offense, I gave
her a bag of wheat to help her along.
At another time, an absentee landlord on his semi-annual
visitation to his land came to me with a nine-year-old boy in
his clutches. A bundle of freshly-cut sugar cane was also laid
down before me as evidence of the crime. Insofar as there is
almost a natural dislike for absentee landlords who hire ten-
ants to do their work and seldom give a just share of the
crops harvested, I confronted this one landlord with the fact
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that as long as the crop was standing for harvest, it invited
thieves because of his known absence. Little mollified, he
kept demanding a just punishment, so I suggested we send the
boy to jail for six months. It would assure the offender of at
least two meals a day, and possibly better clothing than the
rags he was now wearing. This second approach had even less
appeal than the first because it seemed too outrageous, so fin-
ally I asked the landlord what he intended to do with the bun-
dle of freshly-cut sugar cane. In sheer contempt, he said:
"You see to it." Repeating my question and receiving the same
answer, I remanded the stolen goods to the boy with the warn-
ing not.to be near the sugar cane for the rest of the season.
Upon the boy's departure, I cut into the landlord with the
forceful remark that he was lucky to have any field at all if
the concern he showed for his tenants was any criterion of his
justice to men. He spoke incoherently in his excitement, but
he had been properly stung and further conversation was use-
less. I walked away in the middle of his expostulations, and
never heard a complaint from him since, although I was quite
sure some of the poorer people continued to steal his sugar
cane.
The ultimate norm for governing village people is be
kind, be kind, be kind. Nobody ever went too far wrong in
being kind. Extreme poverty demands this regulating principle
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of government in the Punjab. Poverty plagues the village
peasant at every step of his unshod feet, it serves his meals
with the pain of hunger, it chills his unclad body in the win-
ter cold, and dulls his mind in the scorching summer heat. It
would be next to impossible for a westerner to long endure the
eastern peasant's lot in life without despairing. This does
not mean that the peasant must be served a sentimental slop of
food and clothing handouts without any recognition of his
faults. Rather, it should engender an emphatic conviction
that destitution is a far more wicked injustice than the com-
bined crimes the villager commits.
Poverty's poison invariably and indelibly delineates the
worst features of peasant character. The universal manifesta-
tion of this evil is the harshness of the poor towards one
another. There are fleeting flashes of generosity, such as
when a man will cancel a ten rupee debt, the equivalent of al-
most a week's work, but these are too exceptional and too often
prompted by exhibitionism. In practical conduct of one poor
man towards another equally poor man, the yardstick approxi-
mates harshness. For a few annas (pennies), people have been
killed in the bazaar, and blood feuds carried bn over several
generations for the paltry sum of five rupees. The common
folk adage that the poor man is his own worst enemy cannot be
considered an exaggeration; but palpable poverty is the
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underlying cause of this evil.
The failings of the poor man are further faulted by cor-
ruption and exploitation on.the part of many intermediate
grade officials. Instead of being an honest instrument of
government, the small official lords it over those whom he is
supposed to serve. The politician further frustrates the poor
man by being solicitious at election time, and ignores him at
all other times. Men with the girth of a whale will criticize
the vices of the poor peasant and never reflect that their own
well-fed bellies evoke no respect for virtue. When the poverty
stricken peasant habitually becomes the prey for the perver-
sion of .justice, his vices can hardly be condemned; they are
a condition for his survival.
** ** ** * ** * *
Even as I carried on the multiple tasks of reconstruct-
ing a single village, rendering spiritual service to half a
hundred others in a wide area, increasing agricultural produc-
tivity, and carrying on local government, the military regime
in the seat of national leadership sought to win the alleg-
iance of the people. Martial Law was lifted and political ac-
tivity on a limited scale permitted, but by no means whole-
heartedly encouraged. A facade of participatory democracy,
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called "Basic Democracy", had earlier been decreed. It was a
pyramidal structure of government with its base in the villages
and ever more selective and responsive to the executive the
further removed from that base. No party system as such em-
erged, rather an autocratic presidential rule of benign dicta-
torship. In practice, the entrenched power of the local land-
lord combined to support the ruling powers of the military of-
ficers, civil service elite, and the new class of industrial-
ists.4 9
The first elections for delegates to the local union
councils took place early in the military regime. As the most
prominent minority leader in the district where Fatimapur vil-
lage was located, I was delegated to select a member to fill
the seat reserved for minorities on the local union council.
In consultation with and approval of the village men, the
school headmaster was chosen. Within a few days, his position
as the tie breaking vote in a council of eleven members became
critical for electing a chairman. Two days and nights saw ve-
hicles and influential residents visit the village equal to all
such traffic in the previous ten years of village existence.
The primary reason was to persuade me to dictate a course of
action for the headmaster, and failing that, to offer him a
bribe. Neither approach proved successful, but it did color
all enthusiasm for Basic Democracy as an instrument for
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improving the people's voice in government. No one of the
council members ever discussed the people's immediate needs
for better credit facilities, improved rural health, an end to
unjust land acquisitions, or sincere interest in the difficult
lot of landless farmers.50 The failure of the newly franchised
local leaders to do anything but preserve the woeful conditions
of the status quo merely reflected the designs of the ruling
classes for their own self-perpetuation. At no time before
partition had any leader promulgated a program for real social
change, and no subsequent program by the ruling classes cor-
rected that omission.51
The attempt by the military regime to create a new insti-
tution for governing the masses replicated the error of the
former colonial masters in their establishment of law courts.
The British instituted courts of law and legal procedures which
were alien to the people and in contravention of local custom.
As early as 1870, a high colonial administrator warned: "The
employment of pleaders and barristers in petty agricultural
causes is condemned by native opinion. The native view is,
that the matters at issue are extremely simple, that the em-
ployment of such an agency unnecessarily adds to the cost of
the litigation, - an addition which, in most instances, the
parties can very ill afford, - and that the lower classes of
legal practitioners are usually men of bad motives, who forment
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more litigation than they cure. These assertions are
unquestionably true. It is, moreover, also true that for cen-
turies prior to our rule the community have found it practic-
able to adjust their disputes without the intervention of any
legal practitioners; and all the better men among them regard
with regret the complication of their dealings with Government
by an agency of this nature". 52
Basic Democracy as a new institution was of this ill-
fated genre. The English lettered sign identifying every
union council dwelling in remote peasant hamlets testified to
its foreign origins. Like their colonial predecessors, the
military regime neglected existing and.viable institutions in
the rural oriented socity. The most important one was the
lomberdari, or position of village headman; in most cases a
moribund office, and easily revived. My credentials for this
view are based on my deputation by government as the lomberdar
of Fatimapur village.
The incumbent lomberdar had early offered to abdicate
his position in my favor; he was powerless to effect any change
requiring government intervention. I had recognized the pre-
eminent position of the lomberdar in the eyes of the people
and contrasted it with the impotence of the office in the
larger scheme of government. The lomberdar only became effec-
tive in the larger society if the office holder added something
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extrinsic to the office itself. This could be in the form of
power contingent upon large land holdi ngs, political influence
by civil office or military rank, and by recognized religious
leadership. In my own case, the extr-insic addition to the of-
fice of lomberdar resided in my foreign nationality and reli-
gious role of Catholic priest. My application for the leader-
ship of lomberdar was reluctantly applied for and quickly
approved by government. I became the new village mayor with
the local reputation for influence with high officialdom.
The most important yet generally under-estimated person
in the whole interdependent structure of village life is the
lomberdar. Despite the many cited instances where he is just
the personal representative of a particular family, rather than
a spokesmana for the entire village, or the fewer cases where
he is too ineffectual in his ignorance to offer any hope of
transitional assistance to the village people, he is a focal
point for government in the village.
The traditions that make plowing by an ox the accepted
form of agriculture are familiar to the lomberdar. He knows
the custom whereby a village woman at the open well or hand
pump must never be disturbed by the presence of a man. He
knows just what farmer can be expected to work hard and employ
chemical fertilizer if available, or what small fields in his
village will never yield good crops for lack of irrigation
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water or poor quality soil. His knowledge of the village
under his jurisdiction is like that of a sage, but he is with-
out the proper encouragement or means to implement his wisdom.
The man appointed as lomberdar to collect taxes is the
man who can also allay many of his village grievances. It is
the lomberdar who must meet the scheduled date for deposit of
the people's taxes or suffer removal from his appointed posi-
tion. More often than not, he supplies a goodly sum of his
own money and grants the defectors a period of grace. The
people in turn remunerate him via cash or kind as and when
they can. This method thus assures the loyalty of each indi-
vidual villager, permits the lomberdar. to strengthen his
status, and allows him certain freedom to bring pressure upon
recalcitrants. Unless a farmer pays his taxes by a specific
date, he can be summoned to the courts and either fined, im-
prisoned, or suffer the loss of his land. The latter recourse
is seldom enjoined; it is tantamount to denying a man his
life. Couple this hidden authority with the lomberdar's in-
sight into the complexities of inter-marriage amongst his
people, the financial state of each peasant family, and the
personal portfolio in his memory of each resident farmer, and
you have a superbly effective tool to work with.
Whatever his shortcomings, the lomberdar has the estab-
lished tradition of authority behind him, and innate
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recognition on the part of the village peasant.52 But he is
being put in the shadows as a result of the rapid introduction
of universal education, better means of communication, and
advanced methods of agriculture. He is being relegated to the
sole function of a government lackey to assure collection of
taxes, and the village suffers accordingly. Instead of making
an orderly progress as a result of the ever-increasing stimu-
lus of a world on the move, the peasant is subjected to a
multitude of improvements that have specific reference to his
life, but lacking the direction of the lomberdar's leadership,
he is reluctant to adopt them. The peasant's world of dark-
ness is not being lit up by a candle; it's being illuminated
in a blaze of klieg lights. The one guiding hand of long-term
acquaintance for the peasant is the lomnberdar. The lomberdar
knows his people as no government field assistant, or statis-
tician, or foreign advisor can ever hope to know them.
The village people for their part, especially with an
illiteracy rate that for all practical purposes approaches
ninety percent, are as dumb sheep. Without their headman
taking the lead, they are content to close their eyes to the
light beckoning them until progress passes them by.
Everyong else deputed to assist the village, be it agri-
cultural assistants, visiting health technicians, or primary
school teachers, are given instruction and emoluements for
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their contribution to village development. Why not the
lomberdars?
It does not mean that his position of authority should
be made despotic and invulnerable. On the contrary, if given
the proper incentives, he could effect a change in the whole
structure of village organization. Such a change would event-
ually make him only a nominal leader, much like the regents of
many modern countries. Once a cooperative has been estab-
lished, or agricultural output increased beyond the minimal
level, or education given its proper position in the scheme of
things, authority would no longer be centered in one man's
hands; it would of necessity be shared.
As it ncw stands, the lomberdar is the leader accepted
by the peasant people. Whether or not he fulfills all the
great expectations of the preceding does not eliminate the
fact that he does hold a pivotal position in the present vil-
lage system. Some nations have tried radical measures to
solve the problem of contemporary village life, e.g., wiping
out the existing structure entirely and beginning anew. The
results do not seem to justify this extreme procedure. To
effect a change for the better in Pakistani-village life, a'
recognition of the lomberdar's pivotal position is the first
step.
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My own degree of success as lomberdar in governing the
people of Fatimapur village was in sharp contrast to the ex-
perience of being governed by my religious superior. My every
financial decision was second-guessed, despite the extremely
well utilized grant for village reconstruction and the visible
results. The lack of harmonious relations between us became
a byword in the diocese. Recourse proved fruitless because
too many of my fellow priests agreed with him and covertly
censured my work. This mounting tension coupled with increased
involvement in the social order, exposure to the structure and
operations of government, and performance of my designated
duties as parish priest, began to take.its toll. After three
and a half years in Fatimapur village, I was physically and
emotionally exhausted.
The first sign seemed harmless enough, a slight eye in-
fection; common in dust and sand surroundings. However, after
six weeks of infection with no abatement from increased doses
of medication, I planned an extended trip to a large mission
hospital in Karachi. The lady doctor diagnosed anemia, pos-
sible leprosy, and permanent loss of partial vision in one
eye. My days of labor in Fatimapur village abiuptly ended.
After a month's convalescence, I was assigned to a new station;
Bahawalpur city.
The prodigy of labor expended in Fatimapur village to
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accomplish so much in such a short time had no defenders
amongst my fellow priests. The implementation of a comprehen-
sive project for the social order overshadowed any other dio-
cesan endeavor and established its own precedent. It also
fueled dormant diocesan jealousies, frustrations, and antago-
nisms born of ineptitude. Lost to view in these layers of.
emotional responses was a successful model for village recon-
struction.
Fatimapur village contained all the prerequisites for an
orderly and systematic solution to the social problems be-
setting the community before my arrival. By extension, the
same probably held true for all villages with any duration of
settlement. Established relationships among the people, a
decade of continuous land cultivation, a knowledge of what
needed to be done, and the community's will to endure, consti-
tuted the given elements for my role. I was the catalyst at
the opportune time for a community requiring the elementary
virtues of intelligent leadership. Reconstruction of the
village site with its housing, street layout, planting of
trees, village roads, new dispensary, and improved school fa-
cilities helped consolidate what the people themselves had.
long contributed to maintaining their communal identity. Re-
construction of the village site precipitated changes that
allowed me to learn and be taught the more subtle techniques
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for governing the community. I grew in awareness and
understanding of the components comprising the basic struc-
tures of the larger society of West Pakistan, acquiring skill
and sensitivity as to how the parts interact among themselves.
The intensity of my service in Fatimapur village represented
more than a passing interim in my mission life, and a diocesan
wide disregard of that experience altered my attachment to the
diocese. A day would come when it ceased altogether.
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IV
THE END OF AN ERP-
Of all the urban centers in West Pakistan, Bahawalpur
city with its 85,000 inhabitants best represented the nation's
theocratic and agricultural foundations. The headquarters
city of a princely state prior to partition, it had no indus-
try. Government employ, commerce in agricultural commodities,
hides and wool, upheld the economy. Government offices
housed in princely palaces, an army cantonement area, ancient
walls around the city, and a leisurely pace of life all added
up to a haunting reflection on the days of the British Raj.
This attractive quality .of former splendour found further re-
inforcement in the sound of camel bells on the way to market
or coming in from the desert, the daily call to prayer from
many mosques, the joyful festivities concluding ramazan, the
bazaar with its pungent odors, dark alleys, and wooden lat-
ticed shutters. No other city evidenced a more islamic cul-
ture.
The first Catholic missionaries took up residency in
Bahawalpur city in 1956. The large, many-roomed priory for
priests at the mission shared ten acres of the city's prime
residential land with a new Sister's convent, an English med-
ium school, an Urdu medium school, a fifty-bed hospital, and
of course, a cathedral sized church. This imposing congestion
of buildings in the city designated by government as the uni-
versity training center-for the moslem religion was not lost
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on the local populace. Complaints in the newspaper or oc-
casional gathering of protesting students seldom amounted to
much more than an inconvenience.. The civil service elite,
military officer caste, and wealthy landlords championed the
cause of the foreign missionaries in exchange for the oppor-
tunity to register their children in the English medium school
run by the Sisters.
From the beginning, government had given low priority to
education. 53The best educational institutions of English med-
ium in the country, from primary grades through college, were
managed by foreigners; and for the most part mission affil-
iated. The children of the rich and powerful seldom went
elsewhere for their education. A chance conversation with
any ranking civil servant or army officer usually touched on
the topic of his child's education in the local mission
school. Some missionaries labored to spread education among
the poorest classes; such efforts garnered real results and
provoked debate about the preponderant placement of mission
personnel in English medium schools for the rich and privi-
leged. The illiteracy of the poor and their despised social
position made them objects of.charity in the traditional
framework of mission policy. Only gradually did the idea of
the poor as a social phenomena demanding specific professional
skills permeate policy. Education for the poor was destined
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to become the burning issue for foreign missionaries and the
Catholic Church in Pakistan; by that time government had
taken the initiative.
At the mission station, all the creature comforts of
good food, tastefully designed and decorated living quarters,
overhead fans and several air-conditioned rooms, did little
to compensate me for the rigidity of religious observance.
An immoderate monastic discipline prevailed and deterred any
endeavour designed to grapple with social conditions outside
the mission compound. Sacramental service to fifty villages,
visits to the sick of the city, and evening prayers to clus-
ters of sweepers occupied our ministry. The reality of the
surrounding social phenomena of poverty crying for insight
and leadership, escaped the religious administrator and dis-
cour'aged me. I mapped the location of all sweeper settle-
ments in the city and knew their problems. It was a temporary
opportunity, their problems were manageable; but not for long.
Foreign aid, national development plans, the Indus Basin Wa-
ters Treaty, all these inputs were upsetting established re-
lationships between the city and the countryside, breaking
centuries old customs, and bringing about political and social
unrest. All this was taking place and the Church of Anselm,
Bernard, and Michelangelo continued to preach an obsolescent
moral law to people bleeding for social justice.
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My understanding of the social order found reinforcement
and clarity from selective reading. The era of Vatican II
had begun, and men of stature previously censured enjoyed ac-
claim. The French Jesuit, DeChardin, in his Phenomena of Man,
anchored my thought with the dedicatory phrase: "To those who
love the world". A visit to another diocese and a marathon
three days writing a project report for a fellow missionary
sharpened my skill at observing what needed to be done in the
social order and how to go about it. The project in question
involved 620 sons of sweepers enrolled as students in primi-
tive educational facilities and little hope for improvement.
All the criteria for a successful project were evident; dedi-
cation of staff, good management, scholastic achievement of
the student body, and maximum use of available space. A tube-
well. scheme, a sweeper's colony housing subsidy, an agricul-
tural settlement assist, and a medical care grant followed in
quick succession. Each project demanded study of the specific
situation, submission of a written proposal to one of several
international agencies, and a body of correspondence before
final approval. The net result of such efforts added up to
more financial assist to the diocese from project proposals
than by private subscription to individual missionaries. The
latter had been a response to the traditional letter of appeal
for charity, and project proposals while displacing it had yet
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to be recognized as an idea whose time had come. That time
would never really come because a new approach to the social
situation surrounding the lives of missionaries in West Paki-
stan called into question too many accepted assumptions; re-
quired too great a departure from established procedures; and
suggested a painful omission in ecclesiastical studies which
called for additional training.
Our training had stressed the heirarchical structure of
authority in the Church while ignoring the society in which
we would labor. The missions were no exception to this norm,
and we learned the nuances of class functions on the job.
Pakistan in principle is supposed to be a classless society
as prescribed by islamic beliefs. In actual practice, there
exist two distinct groupings in the nation; the rich and the
poor. A middle class as such doesn't function in the society.
The very rich have often been schooled in England or elsewhere
outside Pakistan. They are the offspring of the new class of
industrialists, inheritors of the landed wealth, entrenched
civil servants, and the military elite. Their orientation is
westward, and Americans find them more like themselves than
any other segment of society in the sub-continent. And indeed,
many of them are as removed from their people as the American
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tourist.
On the other hand, there are the poor. They include the
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peasant farmer and his family, the shopkeeper and the day
laborer, the millworker and the student, the tax collector
and the police constable; in short, the mass of society. For
them, the word "American" conveys the idea of money, vast sums
of money. To have money, to possess something of worth, to
exhibit the signs of wealth in clothing worn, land possessed,
animals in the field, or jewelry adorning the body, borders on
an obsession for the poor. Perhaps tie cause lies in the ex-
tremity of poverty experienced by so -many. Their penury is
tantamount to destitution, and makes beggary an occupation.
The universal recognition of the Arab trader as a hard bar-
gainer is no misnomer. He expends prodigious energy grasping
for money, conniving for opportunities, scheming for wealth,
and plotting a path that makes avarice an unavoidable content
of daily life.
The oft repeated theme of envy or violence arising from
the marked inequalities between the classes of rich and poor
scarcely existed in Pakistan. The first generation of indus-
trialists lived frugally and aroused little envy except for
their business expertise.55 Only when riches by the offspring
of the new industrial leaders-began to be displayed ostenta-
tiously did inequitable distribution of wealth become a source
of conflict. For the most part, the resentment this wealth
aroused took place in the cities where large concentrations of
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students and industrial workers joined forces.
A much greater and more subtle hostility existed between
the urban government employees and the vast population of the
countryside. The better trained government employees could
seldom be enticed to work in the countryside; only by coercion
of government mandate could such assignments be effected.
Medical personnel, teachers, agricultural technicians, canal
officials, magistrates, the whole body of the nation's
trained resources disparaged employment and residency in the
countryside. The alienation of the Army from the populace at
large never equalled the almost pathalogical dislike of the
nation's trained cadres for assignment to the countryside.
The Army as a national institution had a history of low
profile in the country and followed this pattern of conduct
after taking the reins of government. The trained cadres, on
the contrary, denied the heritage bequeathed them by their
former colonial masters. Under colonial administration, civil
servants concerned themselves with the most remote hamlet,
individual officers of intermediate rank could be found tour-
ing and listening to the complaints of the poor, and office
bureaucrats were exceptionally well versed in language and
local dialect. This healthy' relation of government to its
subjects for the most part ceased with the departure of the
colonials and the upheaval of partition. Work for government
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became a source of self aggrandizement and exploitation; it
had been present before, now it became rampant, and the popu-
lace suffered. 56My posting in Bahawalpur city reinforced the
oft repeated complaint of the people of government disdain
for them.
The city was strictly a center for administration to the
surrounding agricultural districts. Only the influx of land-
less farmers into its limited confines indicated a change from
pre-partition days. A large number of these new residents
became my clients as well as some fifty settlements of chris-
tian tenant farmers in the surrounding villages within an
orbit of thirty miles. There was a great deal of comrrunica"
tion between the rural area and the city, seldom vice versa.
Riots in the city would alarm the local administrators of
government, while the blatant and widespread hardships of the
ubiquitous landless tenant farmer aroused no one. Absentee
landlords, destitute tenant farmers, and callous minor offi-
cials abounded. It was a situation ripe for anyone preaching
a program of violent change.57
The poor of the city suffered this same indifference of
attention. In Bahawalpur city I had occasion to work closely
for a short time with about 2000 christians, most of them
"sweepers". They made up 10% of the city employees, and were
less than a decade removed from village life. An ox yoke on
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the mud wall of a sweeper's hovel crowded into an airless and
lightless slum would evoke the remark: "Yes, someday I'm going
back to the land". The truth was, they couldn't go back to
the villages from whence they came, and even if they could
their children wouldn't follow; they had been urbanized by the
accident of birth.
Organization and unbiased leadership were the paramount
needs of these people. All the elements of social power lay
dispersed among them; numbers of people, political shrewdness,
individuals of commanding presence, and a labor position of
"sweeper" that the society on all levels despised but valued
as critical. The individual groupings of slum dwellers had
alleciance to a "chaudri", or local leader. The identifica-
tion of chaudri was summed up in the Punjabi aphorism: "To
know a scorpion, touch it". A chaudri' s influence did not
extend beyond the local group; they were circumscribed by the
autonomy of their power. It permitted no sharing, and invited
inter-group rivalry. They had their people's welfare at heart
while suffering from a myopia of the larger political action
possible for their adherents. As a unified body, the sweepers
could demand better working conditions, more pay, and decent
housing. As it was, they were subjected to extortion from the
police, contempt from their employers, and discrimination from
the populace. Their greatest asset lay in their willingness
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to work and refusal to enter the ranks of the many beggars
plaguing the whole society. 58
My first efforts to organize them met with a ready re-
sponse from the locally elected assembly member, the newspaper
editor, and city officials. Resistance had been encountered
in the city of Rahimyar Khan a few years before when the rul-
ing magistrate, the District Commissioner, cautioned me in an
aside that any disturbance among the sweepers would be viewed
unfavorably by the officials. In the present instance, the
sweepers as a body and several chaudris approached me to be-
come their leader. The restrictions surrounding my assignment
forbade such a necessary and desired role. My religious su-
perior, as almost all other foreign missionary administrators
in the Punjab, considered the Church exempt from an active
role in social leadership.
Unable to work directly on the social problems of the
sweepers, I was yet able to exercise influence in curtailing
extortion by the local police, and keep alive a process for
petitioning government for a sweeper's housing colony. The
Commissioner, the highest ranking official outside of cabinet
rank, used his office in this regard. He had previously
granted land rights for a sweeper's colony in another city,
and had a known reputation for compassion. He represented the
best in the civil service, and shortly thereafter became the
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Home Minister, a position comparable to the Secretary of the
Interior in the U.S. 5 9 Officials of equal merit, but of less-
er rank, could be found in all branches of government service.
They were courteous, kind, and capable. Their singular ap-
proach to government, i.e., maintenance of law and order
coupled with revenue powers, had been a positive attribute
under colonial administration. It figured as a fault in the
planned development of the new nation. Indispensable at the
time of partition and the only true governing body for the
time prior to martial law, they have continued to survive in-
tact through multiple national crises, vast social disloca-
tions, and the partial dissolution of the country. They
represent the finest qualities in the nation's character and
also bear the censure for lack of.fundamental change in the
social order. Proud of their traditions and jealous of their
prerogatives, they both attract and repel the outside obser-
ver. The drafters of the first five-year plan could rightly
say of them: "No amount of improvement in the mechanics of
public administration, its structure, organization and pro-
cedures, and in the skills of its workers will enable it to
achieve the desired goal unless there is a change in the out-
look of the public service."60 That, change in outlook never
came about.
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* * ** * * * * * * *
After a year and a half in Bahawalpur city, by 1965, I
was anxious for a less restricted and more congenial assign-
ment. The combination of government inaction for the poor and
my religious superior's prohibition on engagement in the so-
cial order was barely tolerable. My state of soul contrasted
sharply with the military government's euphoria over the in-
coming reports for the second five-year plan. There was no
61denying the statistics; they were impressive.. Foreign ex-
change reserves increased and industry became a showcase. One
of the major disasters of the nation, floods in the Punjab,
had been drastically curtailed where not completely controlled.
Food prices hcld a relatively constant level and the bazaars
displayed a wide variety of artifacts. Soft drinks like Coca-
Cola and Seven-Up became standard fare at every bus stop, rail
station, and cross roads. Some cause for reflection on the
whole process of national development and the degree of for-
eign influence was expressed from time to time in the news-
papers or in private conversations. These complaints antagon-
ized government; the foreign community viewed them as the
childish rhetoric of the press. The'feeling that things had
changed and would continue to do so enchanted the vast major-
ity of the people, rich and poor alike.
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Prosperity seemed to be on the rise, and the Minister of
Finance could confidently assert of the forthcoming third
five-year plan: "The targets will be much more ambitious than
those of the second plan, as they ought to be." 6 2 The nation
had wedded itself to five-year plans. Few planners contested
the fantastic profits of industry approaching 100% or better,
the terrible conditions of mill workers, the exploitation and
corruption on the docks in Karachi, the only seaport for West
Pakistan with its sixty million inhabitants; all these were
necessary side effects of economic growth theory and "trickle
down" philosophy.
These times marked the golden years of expectations for
both Pakistani and foreign leaders. Ten years of administra-
tive shuffling in the planning department, organizational
build-up, and influence within government had coalesced with
the take-over of the Army, the signing of the Indus Basin
Waters Treaty, and the approbation of the international com-
munity. The hope of establishing a precedent for planning in
underdeveloped countries appeared practicable.
The exuberance of high Pakistan government officials was
tempered by their counterparts on the district level. Per-
iodic police reports registered an increase of political ac-
tivity inimical to the ruling regime. Meetings took place at
railway junctions, country crossroads, or in village settings
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close to the thoroughfares of commercial traffic. The oppo-
sition voices ranged over lack of fundamental civil rights,
the blatant corruption of the judicial system, the venialty of
local officials, police brutality, and the miserable working
conditions of industrial labor. Foreigners were shielded from
intimations of such activity by their residency in enclaves
outside the few large urban centers or in restricted access
compounds elsewhere. All the news media either complied with
government dictates or faced shutdown. Many foreign advisors,
technicians, and engineers spent time in the field under ad-;
verse climatic and environmental conditions, and always under
the specific time constraint to finish a particular project
rather than as critical observers of an unstable political and
social scene. Political processes and social disturbances
remained outside the purview or interest of most foreign per-
sonnel.63 This lack of recognition and realization of the
importance underlying political opposition and social agita-
tion escaped the national planners. It proved to be their
singular blind spot and their efforts only held in abeyance
these suppressed forces. As long as the nation's leadership
remained in military hands, the successes of the planners were
secure; their day of reckoning was in the offing.
The Army left to its own devices and enjoying the acclaim
of the international community for its domestic policies, took
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a militant stand toward its defined enemy, India. An unpre-
cedented supply of arms, especially the U.S. built Patton
tank, deceived the military into a conviction of superior
strength. This deception was further bolstered by the poor
showing of Indian troops in their brief confrontation with the
Chinese, and a diversionary thrust by the Pakistan Army into
the desolate Rann of Kutch boarding the two countries. This
unwarranted illusion of military might permeated the ruling
class. The real difficulties of a nation wallowing in poverty
and preponderantly dependant upon foxeign aid weighed as no-
thing in the balance. A surprise was in store for everyone.
The usual newspaper propaganda about Indian suppression
of the rights of the people in Kashmir held little interest
for me; the claim had saturated the news media for too long.
One small incident while visiting a village outside of Baha-
walpur city alerted me to the impact such propaganda made upon
the more aggressive tribal people. While visiting a small
group of tenant farmers I saw some tents not too distant and
ambled over out of affection and acquaintance with the tribal
people elsewhere in the nation. After a cup of green tea and
the usual pleasantries accorded to a visitor, the leader of
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the group pointedly asked me: "Is it true they are killing
moslems in India?" The question suggested its own answer and
my contrary view held no credence for the speaker. Unbridled
nationalism coupled with religious fanalicism had aroused many
unlettered people in the nation-, and even those who should
have known better.64
A few months later, I took my first extended trip to
India and spent several weeks touring the Indian Punjab. The
difference bet-ween thc two Punjabs (so demarcated by partition
in 1947) was striking. India evidenced better. and more 'ser-
viceable roads, greater and more apparent agricultural acti-
vity, and the engineering feat of Bukra Dam without foreign
assistance. The dam had been undertaken following partition
and was the primal cause for diversion of water from Pakistan
Punjab; it initiated the Indus Basin Waters Treaty and World
Bank involvement on an unprecedented scale in Pakistan. No
one could gainsay India's pride in the accomplishment, and the
contrast to Pakistan impressed any knowledgeable observer.
This same contrasting experience was repeated in Delhi
where the society of men and women had a more balanced rela-
tionship than in Pakistan. Husbands walked beside their wives
in the bazaars and on the streets, young men with their fian-
ces shared tables at restaurants, and the purdah was rarely
encountered. To juxtapose this exposure with the city of
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Lahore in a brief flight by plane impressed myself as a tra-
veller. The constant and conspicuous congregation of Paki-
stani men in hotel dining rooms, or public restaurants, or on
trains, wherever people gathered; and the strict separation of
women by islamic law, always had an air of unreality in Paki-
stan. It was as if everyone had subscribed to a social con-
tract they knew was bankrupt but were unable to forego. This
marked inequality of the sexes in Pakistan spells out more of
the national problem than any dozen books on income distrubu-
tion, political power, or poverty of resources.. As I said to
a militant young college student: "Until you have to comb
your hair to compete for a woman's affection, you'll never
make it". 6 5
The plane that brought me back to Pakistan was just about
the last one before the border between Pakistan and India
erupted into full scale war in early September 1965. The two
week brevity of the war should not detract from its intensity
and the extremes of nationalism and patriotism it aroused. It
is doubtful either nation had anticipated escalating the scale
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of events to such a degree in so short a time. The outcome
dispelled the unjustified belief by the Pakistanis of invin-
cibility on the battlefield,' but it did weld the nation to-
gether and gave the people a feeling of unity. In the after-
math of the conflict, a new sense of nationhood permeated the
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population, and the military services, especially the air
force, were its symbols. The foreign community felt other-
wise, and began to question hitherto unquestioned premises.
These centered on the nation's military leadership, the un-
reality of a nation whose two parts were separated by 1500
miles and as many other differences, and the continued support
of a mostly U.S. sponsored development enterprise. Donors of
foreign aid entertained doubts. In the end they cooperated
from the compulsion of previous commitment and the promise of
exciting development reports. No single voice was heard ac-
cross the land to lead a people mired in poverty and suddenly
rich enough to go to war. As a farmer said to me: "When two
oxen fight, only the grass gets crushed; the poor people alone
will suffer from this war."
The war alerted me as nothing else to the incapacity of
my religious superiors to understand, let alone comprehend,
the significant changes taking place in the nation. While the
conflict centered north of Bahawalpur city, in the Lahore re-
gion, the foreign missionaries were under tight police secur-
ity. My relationship with the local police inspector proved
invaluable, and he informed me of the government's blanket
disapproval of any movement by foreign personnel and the cer-
tainty of expulsion from the country if undertaken. When my
religious superior ignored these official pronouncements, I
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refused to obey his orders. The resulting breakdown of any
allegiance between us expedited my transfer possibilities. A
temporary assignment to the Thal quickly became available, and
by judicious use of friendship with local officials I obtained
the required police permit for travel. My destination was the
village of my first acquaintance, Loreto Chak 270 T.D.A.
To leave the mission station at Bahawalpur city with its
distorted version of religious life and its prohibitions on
activity in the social order entailed less satisfaction than
the discomfo:ct of leaving the sweeper colony; their lot held
little hope for improvement under the leadership of their
priests'. The Sisters would continue to teach the children,
but in a masculine oriented society unless the priest set the
path for progress, the best of women's labors became ine ffi-
cacious or in the extreme, futile. My motivations also inclu-
ded a conviction that food shortages, inflation, and all the
other classic evils consequent upon war would soon engulf the
nation. The Thal offered the greatest leverage for effecting
the most people without hindrance from religious superiors or
officialdom if these things came to pass.
The anticipated crises of food shortage and social dis-
turbances as aftermaths of the war with India failed to mater-
ialize. Instead, Loreto village confronted me with impressive
changes that had taken place in my years of absence.
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Government had completed the allottment of all uncolonized
lands in the village, refugees and relatives had burgeoned the
population tenfold, and the physical appearances of the vil-
lage site had changed with the planting of trees, new build-
ings, and levelled sand dunes. As one visiting official later
remarked: "The place sells itself."
I shared the station with four Sisters who worked in the
village school and dispensary, as well as another priest, Fr.
Gregory Doherty. He administered to groups of christians in
110 villages of T.D.A. Our preferences for work defined the
division of labor; he would service the villages outside Lo-
reto, and I would administer Loreto village. The increased
complexity of the scene in T.D.A. facing both of us suggested
the idea for planned goals. We discussed every possible ave-
nue of improvement for our people. By reflecting on our own
qualifications we arrived at the conclusion that no one else
in our leadership role had lengthier continuity of service in
the Thal, greater wealth of experience, or more detailed know-
ledge, experience, and intuition of the Thal.
A fir'st- draft focussed on serving some five thousand
christians in T.D.A. and a hundred times more moslems. While
this rough draft did offer a framework for conceptualizing
the whole issue of Thal development, the anticipated cost con-
signed it to the realm of fancy. Gradually and perceptibly we
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narrowed our horizon to the future of Loreto village and its
relevance in T.D.A.
By geographic location, proximity to government services,
existing physical facilities, personnel and community organi-
zation, Loreto village had no peer in the Thal. The negative
attributes of the village pertained to poor road access for
commercial traffic, and endemic water-logging of agricultural
lands. Both needs required government assistance. It called
for a policy of deliberatey cultivating government personnel
and agencies influential with government. In conjunction with
this approach, financial sources for project support was
stressed. In due course of time, all. the elements of a com-
prehensive development plan for one large village had been
specified. We called it the Loreto Master Plan.
In the past, the whim of the resident missionary deter-
mined the allocation of scarce resources for a particular mis-
sion station. The results were haphazard, and the effects
dispersed. One of the purposes of the Loreto Master Plan was
to enunciate a program with clearly defined objectives over a
period of time. Traditional diocesan practice virtually im-
plied rubber-stamping current needs; the finished Loreto Mas-
ter Plan explicitly projected and prescribed for a combination
of present and future needs. Adaptations, modifications, and
reasonable departures from the Plan had been taken into
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account; only the requirement to think of the complex social
situation as an integrated whole remained constant.
The aims of the Loreto Master Plan as we developed them
over a period of two years, are as follows:
1. A planned program and itemization of cost for the pur-
chase of land at strategic points of communication and
commerce in. the Thal Development Authority.
2. Programs for electrification of Loreto village, con-
struction of a road connecting the village to the rest
of the Thal, and development of agriculture.
3. An educationally and architecturally sound expansion
program for the Loreto school.
4. A detailed cost analysis and return benefit from the
above programs.
.Section 1 of the Plan fell to Fr. Gregory because most of
his parochial labors concerned the greater Thal area. I was
to pursue items 2 and 4, with both of us sharing 3.
All four parts of the Plan overlapped in one way or an-
other; each part portrayed the same social phenomena in a dif-
ferent perspective. Execution of any one phase required sim-
ultaneous orchestration with one or more other components of
the Plan. The completed Plan related less to the score of
written pages detailing its major points than in the learning
process experienced by Fr. Gregory and myself. By repeatedly
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discussing and interpreting relationships in the social order,
we honed our skills. Agreement between us on the formal con-
tent of the Plan offered no difficulty; we foundered when de-
cisions had to be made for spending our limited budget sur-
plus. The resulting disagreements strained our personal re-
lationship at times; it in nowise effected our united front
when defending or expounding the thesis of planning in the
diocese. A resolution to the conflict of funding the Loreto
Master Plan diminished when funds in abundance from project
reports became available. By that time, Fr. Gregory had been
assigned to another station and I inherited the task of im-
plementing our jointly sponsored Plan.
Phase 1 of the Plan fell into abeyance when real estate
prices skyrocketed and local government calculatedly deterred
purchase of lands by representatives of the christian minority.
Phase 2 of the.Plan might have met a similar fate if foreign
aid, especially on the part of the United States, had.not been
responsible for electrification and agricultural development
in the Punjab. No Pakistani bureaucrat objected to a minis-
.cule funding for one isolated village in the Thal when his own
position of authority favored friends on a grandiose scale
with these same funds. I was a supplicant, and also an Ameri-
can citizen; the latter carried weight, the former meant ridi-
cule.
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A Peace Corps Volunteer made the first site plans and
architectural drawings. The professional quality of his work
convinced everyone of our determination to develop Loreto vil-
lage in an orderly way. A branch office of the Bank of Ameri-
ca in Lahore was approached for funding, and the manager be-
came an interested friend. 68e 'introduced me to several key
funding bodies within the United States program for Aid to
International Development (U.S.A.I.D.) and their department
heads. At first, it seemed a presumptious intrusion on my
part to disturb men who were literally handling millions of
dollars in development funds; the warmth and interest of their
response showed otherwise. One contact led to another and be-
fore long I knew decision makers in every department of A.I.D.
These men in turn acquainted me with the relations between
their departments and the contractors executing programs in
the field. This proved especially helpful in the four divis-
ions of agriculture, electrification, education, and financ-
ing.
Familiarity with the demands of private aid organizations
had prepared me for sponsoring projects to government agenc-
ies. Receipt of agricultural tools from CARE required a re-
port on the use of the donated equipment. UNICEF supplies
were obtained upon submission of quarterly reports, and relief
organizations, both church and non-church affiliated,
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subsidized projects for small scale ventures on the basis of
written presentation and corresponding project data. The ges-
tation period for individual agricultural projects, housing
schemes, educational programs, and health measures, varied
from a few months to several years. In most cases, correspon-
dence was exchanged requiring modification of design, addi-
tional data of local needs, or a request to review costs.
This preparation demanded concentration and refinement of
ideas; mere description of need found no audience outside per-
sonal correspondence to friends. The professionals demanded
professional work and I was obliged to comply with their stan-
dards.69
* * * * * * ** * * *
By far and away, the one agricultural dilemma that every
farmer feared in Loreto village, and the Plan sought to al-
leviate, was water-logging. Water-logging as a national ca-
lamity had been occasioned by a combination of geological con-
ditions and a century of expanding canal irrigation in the
Punjab. With a land elevation difference of a foot in a mile
and thousands of cubic feet of water inundating the plains
from canals, it was inevitable and unforseen that the ground
water table would rise to dangerous levels. When the ground
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water table rose to within two feet or less of the surface
soil it forced underlying salts to the surface and caused "sa-
linity"; when the same water flooded the surface, it became
known as water-logging. Both effects destroyed the land for
agricultural purposes.
In the first days of colonization in the Thal, such a
phenomena was unknown; the ground water table at 42 feet had
the sweetness of fresh spring water. A decade later, the
doomsayers predicted that the entire Punjab would become a
lake unless radical measures were introduced. The response of
the international community resulted in the Revelle study, a
twenty-five year comprehensive scheme for agriculture and ir-
rigation in the Punjab. 70This report triggered the heavy fi-
nancing of the World Bank and the U. S. government. Because
Thal lands had few champions in the seats of power, little
overt attention had been given to the problem in that area.
Yet, hundreds of Thal acres contained a high content of salts,
and water-logging buckled road foundations making them un-
serviceable for miles. Despite the prognosis and doubtful
concern of government, I studiedc and surveyed the extent of
the problem in Loreto village and the surrounding area.
The results were disheartening. One third'of the best
village lands had succumbed to some degree of salinity; crop
productivity for most of the land owners in the area had
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decreased substantially, and some men had rented their lands
to alleviate their immediate distress. At the observed rate
of loss, less than five years would elapse before the entire
village suffered a similar fate. No matter what the solution
or remedies to be employed, the first step required educating
the farmer.
Individual farmers well knew their plight; to make the
entire community aware of the problem seemed a futile task.
The individual farmer lived and labored, breathed and bar-
gained within the confines of his fifteen acre plot. The be-
nevolence of the community or a unified village effort in the
face of natural exigencies seldom existed. To the peasant
farmer, natural calamities appeared outside the range of human
control; such events belonged to God's providence. Neutraliz-
ing this accepted local lore and seeking to educate the far-
mers required ingenuity rather than specific skills in lan-
guage or knowledge of customs. It presupposed my personal
f.amiliarity with the people and their acceptance of my leader-
ship. I was exuberantly confident on both counts.
The need for a total reorientation in agriculture was ex-
pounded at Mass on Sundays, by individual encounters with the
farmers in their fields, and the always enjoyable pastime of
visiting farmers in their homes. My own knowledge of agricul-
ture took quantum leaps from reading government sponsored
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studies, attendance at several seminars sponsored by A.I.D.
officials, and written communique, as well as verbal confron-
tation with foreign advisers who were the architects of the
soon to come "green revolution". - The advice and guidance
of foreign agricultural technicians extended to the selection
of farmers for brief courses in new agricultural techniques,
supply of statistical data from soil and water samples sub-
mitted to them, and actual instruction on site to the farmers
via graphs, slides, and movies. This teaching program un-
earthed the suspicion that few farmers knew or cared about
agriculture. The view found confirmation in the judgment of
a visiting U.S.A.T.D. official. After spending a day in the
fields with the farmers, he bluntly informed me: "Only one
landowner in five is a farmer."
Christians in the Thal, unlike the hereditary landlords
of the Arain lineage or people from Jullundar in East Punjab,
had never owned land. They had cultivated for the Sikh or
found employment as day laborers and had little appreciation
for the soil's productivity except that its possession set a
man apart from others in the community. The realization of
this disturbing social phenomena had to simmer until I better
understood the underlying mechanism and how to channel it.
The information failed to dismay me because the few real farm-
ers were inexorably acquiring the cultivation rights of their
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less interested neighbors and increasing the total produc-
tivity of agriculture in the village. For them, I hammered
out a program of agricultural improvement.
A cornerstone of the program required supplementary sup-
ply of water for irrigation. Canal irrigation by government
allowed one cusec of water for 320 acres of land. It came
closer to one cusec for 500 to 600 acres of land after evapo-
ration, leakage on the water courses, and annual shutdown for
canal repairs. In the U.S., one cusec for 100 acres is con-
sidered a norm, so even under optimum conditions the supply in
the Thal was deficient.
The crucial factor for tube-well operation lay in power
supply. Diesel operated tube-wells cost too much for fuel
charges and could only be economically justified for high cash
crops like citrus fruits or outright sale of water during per-
iods of critical need. A diesel powered tube-well supplying
water to raise food grains or fodder crops proved prohibitive
in operating costs. Foreign engineers drilling tube-wells on
government contract thirty-five miles south of Loreto educated
me on the benefits of electricity. They also.visited the vil-
lage and supplied the technical data for a project report on
tube-wells in Loreto. It presumed government source of elec-
trical supply from power lines fourteen miles distant; a pre-
sumption of the first magnitude.
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Commonwealth Associates, a U.S. based electrical engin-
eering firm, had the contract for supervising power grid in-
stallations in the Punjab. Their main office in Lahore, some
250 miles from Loreto village, advised me as to procedures and
key personnel instrumental for the electrification of the Thal.
By a personally sponsored field survey of the village site,
measuring the route for fourteen miles of power lines and poles
from the nearest electrical sub-station, and itemizing the po-
wer requirements of a ten square mile area, I was able to in-
fluence favorable decisions on the hichest levels of planning
in the government. Without such personal and persistent ad-
vocacy,'no electrification of the area would have been envis-
aged for a decade or more. This perscnal representation of
local problems was precisely what concerned industrialists and
wealthy landlords exercised, and my intercession for one
voiceless area conformed to this unwritten practice. The in-
stitutional structures for a better representation and eval-
uation of needs in countless rural communities did not exist.
The two notable attempts of a Village Aid Program in the first
five-year plan, and Basic Democracies of the second plan, ne-
ver replaced the time honored moghul custom of authority dis-
pensing favors to interested and influential parties.
Even granted the source of electrical power, the cost of
tube-wells and the installation of transmission power lines
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was in excess of $50,000; more than half the annual operating
costs of the entire diocese. The effort and interest to be
expended on this aspect of the Plan seemed like pie in the sky
until a cost breakdown of the total village holdings revealed
otherwise.
LORETO VILLAGE CHURCH
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Estimated Real Estate Value
Moveable and Immoveable Property in Loreto
Property Valuation:
1000 acres @ 2000 Rs. per acre
600 acres @ 1000 Rs. per acre
120 acres @ 8000 Rs. per acre
Total value of land in Loreto village:
2,000,000 Rs.
600,000
960,000
3,560,000 Rs
Moveable and Immoveable Property:
Church
School
Convent
Priest's House
Storage
Dis pensary
Boys' Boarding
Girls' Boarding
Staff Quarters
Village Housing
Roads, trees, playgrounds, etc.
Animals (oxen, cows, donkeys, sheep, goats,
chickens)
Earns, plows, hand pumps, fodder machines, etc.
Total value of moveable and immoveable
property in Loreto village:
or
60,000
200,000
70 ,000
60,000
30,000
25,000
130,000
225,000
45,000
160.,000
30,000
Rs.
325,000
30,000
1,390,000 Rs.
Total Real Estate value, moveable and.immoveable
property in Loreto village: 4,956,000 Rs.
At an exchange rate of $1 U.S. to 4.76 Es., the
village holdings exceeded $1,000,000.
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The study used current market prices for land rather than
the original land grant cost of 120 rupees per acre. It
showed that a medium sized village is a million dollar invest-
ment, and the hereditary landlord possessing several villages
is a millionaire. For this very reason, land prices in T.D.A.
had inflated from nominal land'grant costs to auction prices
prohibitive except for the privileged rich. These auctions
commandeered prices that would scarcely find favor for the
best of Mississippi bottom lands. Government lured the first
settlers into the Thal with land grants, then satisfied itself
with maximized profits from land sales. No leader took cogni-
zance of the increase in absentee landlords, the growing num-
bers of tenant farmers, and the mounting social problems con-
sequent upon this land sale speculation. It took no great
intelligence to realize that the grand idea of T.D.A. had long
since been aborted; the area was a backwater for small farmers
on the scene, tenant farmers employed by absentee landlords
rich enough to buy land, and a horde of poor peasants.
Under the circumstances, I embarked upon a frenetic pro-
gram to enlist influential government officials and foreign
consultants for tube-well installation in the Thal. The land-
ed aristocracy of the Punjab consistently employed a similar
approach, and their efforts were immensely helped by close
alliance with the civil service elite and military officer
148
caste via inter-marriage or otherwise. Government policy
further slanted the issue in their favor by granting lands or
permitting their acquisition on favorable terms for the civil
service elite and military officers while on state service.
Land settlement in the Punjab exhibited inbreeding on a ram-
pant scale with all new colonization areas reserving large
blocks of land for the upper echelon of civil service and
military personnel. 71Government installation of tube-wells
followed a discriminatory pattern, and only by chance rather
than from deliberate design did smaller farmers profit from
this program. A single wealthy landlord could influence an
almost 'immediate rectification of his water-logging problems,
but the lack of voice on the part of thousands of small farm-
ers doomed their expectations to the realm of fate. The pa-
ternal relationship of colonial rulers to their humblest
charges had gone, and no institutional structure had taken its
place. 7 2
The one institution that might have facilitated change,
the religion of islam, bred a conservatism that affected an
entrenchment of the status quo. 73Islam as an institution in
the society transcended religion and influenced law, customs,
war, family life, politics, education; in sum, the totality of
human existence. It fostered a virulent religious fanaticism
that in one way or another inhibited all changes in the rural
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structure. To a lesser degree, but still evident, the same
was true in the major cities of the nation. It could scarcely
be otherwise when the demand for a theocratic state sounded
from every mosque at one time or another, and men professing
to pray practiced the ritual in public offices, while travel-
ling in crowded trains, at roadside bus stops, or wherever a
man could find room to prostrate himself.
It was admirable to myself as a leader of another great
faith, but the disparities between religious beliefs and ram-
pant social injustices gave pause for reflection on Lenin's
dictum of religion as an opiate. The christian minority also
suffered from this excess of religious formalism and I often
ridiculed overt superstition or counselled against pompous
piety as a substitute for social concern. Again, though, this
same dichotomy between professed belief and practice in the
day to day activity of the people had scourged the nation from
the day one, No spiritual leader of a Gandian stature had
arisen to purify and channel the religious aspirations of the
people, and no political leader had the necessary strength to
confront the issue nationwide.
* * ** * * * * * * *
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Travel by day or night, on buses, in trains, by plane or
Landrover, brought me into association with a myriad of gov-
ernment officials. An amazing lack of continuity and famili-
arity -with conditions in the rural areas was shared by most of
them. Part of the problem lay in the vast populations under
the control of individual district officials, the primitive
connunications links between the government in the cities and
the countryside, as well as the rapid turnover of capable in-
dividuals. The Commissioner of Bahawalpur seldom remained
more than nine months in office, and the negative effects upon
planned development in the division frustrated everyone. Even
the more technically trained irrigation officials experienced
this problem. In the Thal, I had occasion to write up a memo-
randum at the request of the irrigation engineer on the ad-
verse operating costs of diesel powered tube-wells. le appre-
ciated my advice and I helplessly watched as government imple-
mented the scheme for diesel units. Shortly thereafter,
another engineer sought-my counsel to correct the error. Like
the echo from a ringing bell, the lack of trained personnel
with continuity of service in district areas kept being heard.
Short terms of service and residency in big city enclaves
hampered the performance of foreign personnel as it did their
Pakistani counterparts. Practices and procedures established
early in the planned development of the nation became
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entrenched assumptions for subsequent replacement personnel.
Very few key foreign advisers had lengthy continuity of ser-
vice or established authority to break with earlier develop-
ment concepts. Despite the rhetoric contained in the first
five-year plan emphasizing concern for the human factors so
necessary to make development a success, a fundamental shift
took place early in the planning process that made economics
the key criteria. The former colonial rulers were usually
well qualified in language and knowledge of the country.
Their level of authority was for the most part in direct pro-
portion to their understanding and experience of the people.
It was the rare administrator or project director who was un-
able to converse with his engineer, the office clerk, or la-
borer on the job.74 His exposure to the people and their
exposure to him were mutually beneficial. The new approach
completely subordinated this necessary interplay with the peo-
ple and enshrined professional expertise. For the most part
this was expressed in terms of technology and economics. The
problems of the nation were conceptualized instead of being
experienced and shared.75
The whole cultural life of the east is deeply sensate;
the senses rule for the majority of the people. By doing a
strictly professional labor divorced from the content of the
culture, the foreigner was inadvertently encouraging those
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forces least. responsive or understanding of the masses, namely
the military, large landlords, civil service elite, and the
new industrialists. Colonialism was gone and the people no
longer had off-bounds military cantonements in their midst
staffed by foreign troops. Instead, the Army rulers content-
edly encouraged the presence of foreign professionals to ma-
nipulate the development course of the nation when in reality
there was almost a total block of relevant communication be-
tween these new colonials and the populace at large.
Foreign technicians in the field were held in high es-
teem by the populace. Their intensity and skill became a
byword .and discomfited their Pakistani counterparts. As one
engineer observed: "At first, I was embarrassed knowing my
salary was five times that of my counterpart. Then I realized
I was working five times harder." It was with pride I intro-
duced a middle aged U.S.A.I.D. agricultural technician- to the
farmers of Loreto village and knew he'd spend all day in the
fields with them when a. more youthful Pakistani counterpart
would merely "salaam" and pass on. This humanitarian impulse
to help on the part of foreign technicians was offset by their
specific government assignments which invariably benefited the
rich and powerful.
This state of affairs was perpetuated by the lack of any
institution or mechanism in the society to permit liason with
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the populace. Outside their official duties in the assigned
national development schemes, the foreign community of advis-
ers and consultants took pains to assist particular needy
groups. Individual schools were subsidized, services freely
donated to hospitals., funds raised, and immediate household
employees well treated. These works were commendable, even if
on an insignificant scale in relation to the overall develop-
ment undertaken in the nation.
Such activities were discharged with the same spirit of
humanitarian idealism which at one time or another moved the
most obdurate foreign national. This same motivation rein-
forced much of the effort expended in the national development
labors of the foreign community; it rarely bridged the gap of
language barrier and social understanding. As a consequence,
major development undertakings unless completely engineered
and managed by.foreigners in key positions fell prey to the
dynamic social and political forces seeking to express them-
selves in the nation. These took place in the form of rival-
ries for administrative seats of power, or critical engineer-
ing 'posts, or prestige positions. When informed of a break-
down in a multi-million dollar power plant, the first words on
the telephone by the Pakistan director of electrical power to
the plant engineer were: "Who did it?" It was an inquiry of
the deeper malaise in the body politic where men of
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substantial a-ithority were less concerned as to what was
happening than who was involved.
Responses of this kind by indigenous personnel frustrated
the foreign planners and their allies, the overseas contrac-
tors.. The prime obj-ective of both was to get the job done;
failure was likened to a betrayal of western know-how. The
scales had long since been tipped against them because the
whole array of western development values perished for lack of
preparedness in the society. Hospital personnel could let a
badly burned man die because "he's from the villages", and
countless other cases of the nation's indifference to its own
larger ills could be multiplied. Human values that would
eventually have penetrated the consciousness of the nation had
never been the prime object of national planning. It was
clearly evident to any sojourner in the city bazaar with its
beggars, or sick souls on railway platforms, or undernourished
peasants in the villages. No aspect of the Pakistan planning
process proved hazier or more misunderstood than the specifi-
cation of human values as a national goal. Exorbitant in-
-fluxes of foreign aid impugned these goals. from the start..
Foreign aid brought out the worst features of the national
character and promoted the monstrosity of avarice on a nation-
al scale. The Pakistani engineer, industrialist, or techni-
cian never discussed his work in terms of people helped,
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assistance rendered, or improvement for the nation's poor. He
measured human welfare, national progress, and personal accom-
plishment in the meanest of terms; money acquired by hook or
by crook, and more often the latter. By misplacing emphasis
on statistical figures and rapture with increased GNP, the
planners ruptured rather than changed the society. Bangla
Desh resulted from the avarice of exploitation, not from dis-
loyalty to islam.
The ecclesiastical heirarchy of the Catholic Church pur-
sued a policy not unlike that of resident foreigners working
on national development programs. 76Church leaders registered
little awareness of social and political movements in the
country. And this despite a long history of service to the
people, a body of exceptionally dedicated missionary staff,
and a faithful flock clinging to the under belly of society.
Whereas Pope John XXIII had put his imprint on the twentieth
century with the encyclical "Pacem in terris", Pakistani ec-
clesiastical leaders periodically gathered to discuss liturgi-
cal reforms or ward off government take-over of mission
schools. To a man, the bishops impressed me by their simpli-
city and resonance of faith. Leading lives governed by a nar-
rowly defined morality, they ruled with a caution indistin-
guishable from irresolution. It salvaged them; their consti-
tuency suffered.
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The fuling classes' appreciation of human values is best
exemplified in the primacy of foreign educational institutions
in the field of education. These institutions dominated the
scene. The wealthy and powerful had recourse to them, and
government obliged by minimum allocation of resources for the
education of the populace at large. The ruling classes ca-
tered to themselves, and the rest of the population counted
as straw in the wind. The 1961 census reported 12% literacy
in a population of 110 million for the world's sixth largest
nation. Even this meager percentage figure was questionable.
In the district where I resided, the criterion of literacy
meant a man could read and write his own name.
* * * * * * * * * * *
Phase 3 of the Loreto Master Plan called for an increase
of student body and expansion of school facilities in Loreto
village to change the statistic of illiteracy for the chris-
tian minority and their moslem neighbors. Excellence in edu-
cation was the outstanding attribute accorded to foreign mis-
sionaries. In Loreto village this deserved praise had been
earned by three highly qualified American Sisters. It wasn't
at all evident in the first years that the village school with
its crude mud walls and total enrollment not exceeding fifty
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children for six grades would become a large educational com-
plex. Part of this change in perspective was due to the ad-
vent of boarding schools within the confines of Loreto
village.
Government lacked schools in many of the outer stations
where tenant farmers lived. More often than not though, most
illiterate peasant parents were indifferent or even hostile to
education. Unless the mission assumed the responsibility for
boarding children in Loreto village, scant chance existed that
the christian minority in the outer villages would ever be
educated. This emphasis on education for children outside
Loreto coincided with a pattern of increased student enroll-
ment in Loreto village itself. A population expansion of 11%
to 15% a year had been taking place within the village since
its foundation, and school operation took the lion's share of
the station's budget allowance. Education with all its atten-
dant costs of construction, employment and housing of staff,
and innovative administrative policy, became a key facet of
the Loreto Master Plan. 77
From a small population with three people able to read and
one to write, the village could claim an almost 95% literacy
rate for everyone under 21 years of age in a population of two
thousand by 1968. The source of financing all social projects
like education was exogenous to the resources of the people.
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The diocese supplied these funds from U.S. solicited origins
or by project grants from organizations in western Europe.
Like foreign aid to the nation at large, the diocesan funds
had many times helped the people unable to help themselves.
No clear comprehensive plan guided the expenditure of these
funds for housing subsidies, excavating water courses, tube-
well installation, medical costs, scholarships for higher edu-
cation, and school buildings; an ad hoc dispersed growth tak-
ing place in fits and starts ruled the scene. The Loreto
Master Plan was an attempt to avoid this random development
in education.
The drastic change in school enrollment occasioned by the
construction of boarding facilities to accommodate the child-
ren of tenant farmers in the numberless small villages and
railway junc-Cions of T.D.A., curtailed proposed diocesan in-
vestments in tube-wells. The phenomena of a few land owners
diligently pursuing agriculture, and these few exercising
cultivation rights over adjacent properties, implied their
capability to finance tube-wells. I would continue to prevail
upon government for electrification; the farmers could finance
the tube-wells. Education preempted all other approaches to
the Loreto Master Plan.
Several causes prescribed this choice. Evidence had
mounted to show that the social landscape of the village was
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fast changing shape. The heirarchical structure of a village
society where ownership of land and land returns determined
the pecking order of social status was being undermined by the
nation's need for technologically trained personnel. The vil-
lage carpenter and iron monger traditionally lived on the
edges of the village, and, like untouchables, seldom married
outside their social class. The economics of their lives was
regulated by work done for property owners, and it fell short
of half the return of a poor farmer. With the introduction of
large irrigation development schemes throughout the nation via
the Indus Basin Waters Treaty, a need for such local artisans
became paramount on government projects. With outside employ-
ment, the village artisans could earn in two months what no
village could scarcely provide in 'a year. Students with tech-
nical high school education became more valuable to foreign
contractors than locally trained engineers, and men with their
college B.A. would seek this training from the limited facili-
ties in the nation. Education in Loreto village sought to
capitalize on technical and scientific career training.
Upgrading the school staff and expanding facilities
called for a financial outlay opposed to the prosaic picture
of a village in the desert. The president of an American
tube-well contracting firm, H.T. Smith Inc.,7 Ret the Sisters
and became interested in their work. ~Shortly thereafter, he
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despatched an architect to survey the existing school plant
and interrogate the Sisters on their needs as outlined in the
Loreto Master Plan. Within six months a total high school
complex with superb science and laboratory equipment, library
facilities, office space, and twelve new classrooms had been
professionally prepared. Everything learned about teaching
for ten years in the desert had been incorporated into the
finished plans; height of classrooms, ventilation for extreme
heat, exposure to sun for the winter cold, as well as color-
fully painted rooms. This last feature contrasted sharply
with the universal custom of whitewashing publicly used build-
ings in the nation. By experimenting with this simple device
in several existing classrooms, the school took on the aura of
a visit to a museum of art for the students; so barren of
color is the desert. Having designed the new school complex,
the engineering firm agreed to build half of it.
With this impetus to spur me on, I submitted the remaind-
er of the school building plan to an international agency for
funding. They obliged, and furthered our Loreto Master Plan
by funding a community center for women. The marked separa-
tion of the sexes in Pakistan had been the concern of the
American Sisters, and one of them, Sr. Catherine Raymond,
early organized a small sewing class. It soon blossomed into
a woman's community affair with fashion shows, child care
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instruction, and adult literacy. The new woman' s community
center recognized the importance of this budding village in-
stitution. Eventually it became central to the education of
girls who either through lack of school interest or parental
choice discontinued.formal education. The woman's community
center served them as a staging area while making the transi-
tion.to a more active role in their families, preparation for
marriage, and as adult members of the village society.
An exceptional rapport existed amongst the Americans of
the mission staff stationed in Loreto village.- We jointly
discussed school policy, individual student scholarships, and
plans for school building expansion. We developed an infor-
mation program involving the village men so that they could
understand the school policy changes most apt to dire.ctly ef-
fect their lives. To avert any crises in this matter, a
series of meetings were held with the village men in atten-
dance. The Sisters made known their ideas for scholarship
choices, rules for admittance, hopes for expansion and edu-
cational goals. As a further venture into the future, the
,offer was made to permit a select body of five men from the
village to oversee all financing of the school, consultation
for the employment of additional staff, and control of admini-
stration as soon as an acceptable Pakistani candidate could be
found. The last feature became a necessity, not because of
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government intervention, but solely from the realization that
education was displacing ownership of land as the status sym-
bol of the village.
It might seem a commonplace to an outsider, the idea of
local teaching personnel being elevated to the level of school.
administrators; it was endorsed with less than unanimity in
the diocese. The employment of a highly qualified christian
educator as school principal in Loreto village involved inter-
viewing a number of candidates, and long journeys to persuade
interested applicants. The experience was not unlike that
encountered in the selection of a college president in the U.
S. The decisive factor proved to be salary size, and this be-
came possible with a grant from the I.O.S. (Investors Over-
seas Services) Foundation to supplement teacher salaries. The
new principal and school administrator had qualifications
shared by only.one other Catholic christian in the Punjab. At
present, he is the only Pakistani in the whole diocese with
such a wide range of autonomy and authority in education, and
his success to date has more than justified the experiment.
.The Pakistan government decreed in March 1972 the nationali-
zation of all foreign or privately owned schools over the next
two years. It can be assumed that during this transfer of au-
thority and jurisdiction, Loreto village school will be the
model for the diocesan administrators.
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* * * * * * * * * * *
As long as agriculture received my adequate interest
which included tube-well installation, electrification, and
government construction of a road, the farmers accepted the
changes education involved. They knew that their lands were
too small to absorb all the labor potential of the growing
village and that many youths were unable or unwilling to work
in the fields. Education of sons and daughters would increase
their own social status and offered promise for additional in-
come from outside employment. The quality of the school staff
headed by three American teaching Sisters and the size of the
school buildings satisfied their pride in the eyes of adjacent
communities. In .this setting of relative social progress,
governing the village was a fairly easy occupation for myself.
Several landlords of the village seeking to enhance their pow-
er and prestige questioned this state of equilibrium. Their
claim against a foreigner as village mayor had much merit and
justification; their obvious motives earned them no support
from the majority of village residents. Government decided
the issue.
The Colonization Officer of T.D.A. periodically approved
local lomberdars, and in the case of Loreto village had been
obliged to visit the site in order to satisfy contrary claims.
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Before the assembled body of all village land holders, he
asked who desired a new lomberdar. Only one man sought to re-
place the incumbent, and on the basis that no foreigner should
rule locally. The complaint was valid and in accordance with
my own mature thoughts on the subject. However, the Coloni-
zation Officer concurred with the decision of the majority to
make no change. The reluctance of the farmers to make a
change had as cause the disparate factions common to all vil-
lages, and they therefore refrained from offering an alterna-
tive candidate. Their omission and my lack of. foresight in
the matter permitted little room for maneuver.
Two weeks later, government selected as the new lomberdar
a landlord of little particular appeal to the village. I had
to assuage the frustration of the -farmers and at the same time
sustain the new mayor as the lawfully appointed authority.
These efforts proved partially successful, but the inadequacy
of the new mayor quickly became apparent to all. Periodic
difficulties arose in the form of refusal by the people to pay
taxes, land and water disputes of greater frequency, and a de-
terioration of community spirit.
To have accepted the authority of lomberdar in the begin-
ning was a prerequisite for welding the village together. By
retaining the position too long, I had created a situation in-
imical to the goal of village self-government. Government
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itself shares the responsibility for this state of affairs.
By falsely informing the people of the correctness of their
choice of a foreigner, the Colonization Officer effectively
suspended discussion of a replacement acceptable to the many.
From the first days, I had inculcated an esprit and respect
for local leadership, and yet the very difference of my lead-
ership style made it difficult to choose a successor.
As minority members of the nation, christians would often
try to hide their identity from fear of discrimination. The
leadership given by the Church in Loreto village did much to
remove these inhibitions. Whether in the port city of Kara-
chi, or the Punjab capital of Lahore, former village peasants
would proudly identify their home as "Loreto Chak 270 T.D.A.";
the Province of the Punjab, the district of Muzaffargarh, or
Leiah tehsil, had far less meaning for them. They spoke of
their village with the same pride as city dwellers do in the
more cosmopolitan centers of New York, London, or Moscow.
With the failure of government to consolidate this fragile
community spirit, my experiment in building a new village so-
cial order had been jeopardized. There was no fear of commun-
ity collapse; just a loss of the dynamism to realize its full
potential. No village in the Thal started with greater handi-
- caps or achieved so much in the short span of fifteen years.
As the tractor driver, Khurshid, said: "What we do here in a
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year would take five years in other places."
No small part of the successful development of Loreto
village was due to its very remoteness. Distance from relig-
ious superiors and indifference of local government officials
permitted a wide latitude of action without interference. In
Bahawalpur city, development in the social order was choked by
religious mandate or government obstruction. In the Thal, six
weeks would pass before my superiors expressed concern for a
fait accompli, and government officials approved work of any
kind in an otherwise stagnant project. area. So much had been
done in Loreto village over a short period of time that it
stunned visitors and silenced critics. In the latter stage of
village development, fellow priests refrained from visiting
and contributed to my growing sense of alienation.
** * ** * * * * * *
The shape and change of government in Loreto presaged
those of the nation, and before long the farmers jokingly
referred to my descent from power as "like Ayub Khan". The
changes in the national scene began with a series of student-
worker strikes against the ruling regime. At first, they
seemed like harmless riots, just as I misjudged as harmless
the one or two landlords contesting my position as village
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mayor. The mounting frequency and violence of national riots,
however, soon beguiled the claim of Ayub's regime celebrating
a "Decade of Development". To the surprise of the foreign
community, President Ayub Khan suddenly resigned from office
in March 1969, and the military once again proclaimed martial
79
law.
Ayub Khan was the personage internationally equated with
leadership and national development in Pakistan. Hadn't
President Kennedy sumptiously feted him on his state visit to
Washington where he spoke to a joint session of Senate and
Congress? Who could take his place? The cause for what ap-
peared a drastic change in national leadership caused conster-
nation in many foreign quarters. The Army had ruthlessly and
expeditiously in the past uprooted forces far more threaten-
ing -than student rioters and striking workers. After a few
months, most observers concluded that the matter was an in-
ternal affair of the military as opposed to a major policy
change.
If foreign personnel were now inclined to view the role
of the military with less equanimity after the removal of Ayub
Khan, their awakening concern was understandable. For a full
decade, the economy of the nation had shown remarkable pro-
gress; industry both heavy and light significantly increased,
manufacturing broadened its field of enterprise, exports
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showed marked improvement, and agriculture was in the heady
throes of the "green revolution". Political instability
would endanger the whole structure. The foreign community of
advisers, consultants, contracting engineers, and other for-
eign aid groups were beginning to question their past contri-
bution and future scope of their work. In this they were
justified.
A number of well executed projects were either not func-
tioning or malfunctioning because of conditions contingent
upon the lack of qualified Pakistani personnel and a corrupt
administration. 80What with the political system lacking the
command-ing figure of Ayub Khan, the enthusiasm for development
had suffered. Most foreign advisers, consultants, contrac-
tors, and others could claim some continuity of exposure and
experience with the nation to feel uneasy in the new political
atmosphere. Some observers were more astute than others in
their realization that the nation could not much longer pursue
its present course. One such high ranking official told me
in conversation that the data coming into his office raised
the spectre of national breakdown a few years hence. His
plaintiff cry proved prophetic: "I don't want to be around
here in 1972." The Army rulers willfully executed this pro-
phecy.
Over the years, I had come to admire the Army, its
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organizing abilities, its efficiency, and the quality of its
members. After the 1965 war with India, the Army frequently
and on an ever larger scale held maneuvers in the Thal. Their
technologically sophisticated equipment presented a striking
contrast to the bullock power of the peasants. U.S. built
tanks, mobile field artillery, Mercedes-Benz heavy duty
trucks, helicopters, and supersonic jets overhead impressed
the people while contradicting the prevalent poverty of the
society.81
The singular silence of every aid giving agency concern-
ing the large allocation of national revenue to defense in
Pakistan is a cause for wonder. In the very first five-year
plan (1955-1960), before the Army took over government, the
authors were explicit in their alarm at the proportion of
resources allocated to defense:
"The magnitude of the resources absorbed by our de-
fense programme is shown by the fact that while a
sum of 3,700 million rupees is estimated to be av-
ailable from domestic sources for financing the
development programme in the public s.ector, de-
fense will require 4,775 million rupees from the
same sources. During 1955-58, expenditure on
defense is expected to be only slightly less than
the total net tax revenues of the Central Government.
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In comparing the burden of defense expenditure in
Pakistan with that in countries such as India,
Australia, Ceylon, Thailand, and Turkey, we find
that whatever standard adopted to compare their
relative positions, whether it be the amount of
expenditure per capita or ratio between defense
expenditure and national income - the relative
size of defense expenditure in Pakistan appears
to be among the largest." 82
In addition, there was the "classified" aid in arms' by
the U.S., estimated at $2.4 billion between 1954 and 1965. A
reduction in such aid did take place in 1965 following the war
with India, at which time China replaced the United States as
the main supplier of military equipment. The U.S. later re-
sumed arms aid in diminished quantity. Figures are scarce or
doctored as regards the annual military share of national re-
venue; but it is safe to say it averaged between 50%-60% for
83the twenty-five years of the nation's existence. of course,
such a lion's share leaves out roads built by the civil sec-
tor for military use, or the import of petroleum products un-
der the label "industry", or the myriad other ways for prac-
ticing deceptive accounting.' No matter how appraised, the
magnitude of national income earmarked for defense was all out
of proportion to the existing poverty -of the nation, and
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furthered the delusion of omnipotence on the part of the
84
nation's military leadership.
No underdeveloped nation in the modern world, unless
lavishly subsidized by foreign aid, could have embarked upon
a development program of the size and cost incurred by Paki-
stan and at the same time maintain such a high rate of invest-
ment in arms. Foreign aid, directly in military matters and
indirectly in development programs, contributed more than all
else to case harden the nation's military leaders toward their
own subjects. Sequestered in their military cantonements,
supplied with the most modern of equipment, and surrounded
with the best of physical facilities, they were contemptuous
of their own people and the architects of disaster. Their
ascendancy to power, retention of rule, and descent from that
pinnacle, parallels the investment of foreign aid in Pakistan.
There is no more damning indictment of the nation's military
leadership than the case of East Pakistan, and the community
of foreign aid personnel are not blameless. From the begin-
ning, the regional disparity between East and West Pakistan
was pronounced. Yet, none of the formal planning models de-
veloped in preparation for the third five-year plan (1965-
1970) were formulated as regional models.8 5 The resulting
cleavage of the two wings of the nation.happened not by acci-
dent7 it had been built into the planning process.8 6
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While the nation swiftly heated to the flash point of
civil war, brother priests upset my life. In less than a
month's time, a series of incidental and aggravating clashes
occurred. Backbiting gossip and an all too human disrespect
rooted in envy strained our relationships. The lessons I had
learned of development in the social order were neither ac-
ceptable nor transferable. A land grant for a sweeper's hous-
ing colony in Bahawalpur city had been approved by government
and the pries;t executing the project showed me his landscaping
efforts. I was appalled at the neglect of study for proper
drainage, spatial layout, and prepared house designs. In con-
sternation, 1 informed him: "You're moving a slum from one
place to another. You should have a portfolio an inch thick
before undertaking a project of this sort". He resented my
adviQe, and his resentment recruited allies. I soon found my-
self more a stranger to men I'd lived with for fourteen years
than people I'd never known. In the past, I had endured for
the sake of the people being served and the opportunities to
be exploited in their behalf. Now, I questioned my future
role in the diocese. My success in development had estranged
the diocesan community of priests, and their repudiation of my
style was wracking me. A misfortune in the village of Fati-
mapur settled the outcome.
A tractor-trailer filled with a number of village people
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returning from a wedding party had overturned. Several
persons had died and many others seriously injured. All the
clergy of the diocese, including the bishop, first heard the
news three days later when gathered in Bahawalpur to elect
members for the bishop's council. My spontaneous request to
be excused and visit the village met rebuff. I argued with
the bishop that the meaning of our ministry turned on just
such events, and we had an obligation as certain as the fealty
with which the people honored him. After a fitful night's
sleep, I excused myself from the next day's meeting, went to
the village of Fatimapur, and returned with the formal request
for passage back to the United States. Some of my fellow
priests expressed regret at the decision; for the remainder,
it elicited nominal indifference or silent acceptance; for a
few, hostile delight. I left the Punjab and Pakistan in March
1970. Almost a year to the day, the Pakistan Army unleashed
its maniacal fury to suppress East Pakistan. The rest is the
story of Bangla Desh.
This tale of one man's experience East of the Suez ends
here. The customs of the people, their dress, their habits
and views on the world have been alluded to. Many fine books
describe these matters in greater detail. The purpose of this
study was to fulfill a thesis requirement, and in the process
it has raised questions to the writer himself. What happened
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to him during all those months and years in the Punjab with
the village people of Loreto, Fatimapur, Bahawalpur, and
countless other primitive peasant communities? There is a
partial answer, poetic as it seems.
On the day of my departure, a fellow missionary handed me
a sealed envelope. It contained a small ivory camel and a
farewell letter with this message:
"Dear Rider,
I thought I'd make myself small and you could have
me as a reminder. I symbolize a lot of things. To be
broad, I signify the expanse of the desert with its tin-
kl-e ofacamel bell or cry of a jackal or thundering night-
time silence. To be precise, I manifest Loreto and all
the other places you've covered in the desert.
Deserts make men - they train well. You came as a
youth, you return as a man. And now while you are yet
young.and have your health and a deep faith, go to your
new world. Give it what you have given my sands so gen-
erously.
Let me symbolize the fact that you have made an
oasis in the desert - you have left your mark as no other
will do - no other could do - because there is only one
village of Loreto and she has come of age."
FINIS
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FOREIGN AID COMMITMENTS TO PAKISTAN
(Million Dollars)
Third Plan
Donor Second Plan 1965/66-1968/69
Country/Agency Amount Percent Amount Percent
1. IBRD $ 120 6.1% $ 230 11.9%
2. IDA 207 10.5 143 7.4
3. IFC 10 0.5 12 0.6
A; Total Bank Groupb/ $ 337 17.1% $ 385 19.9%
4. United Statesc/ 889 45.6 517 26.7
5. Germany 216 10.9 152 7.9
6. Japan 144 7.3 128 6.6
7. United Kingdomd/ 124 6.3 84- 4.3
8. Canada 82 4.1 147 7.6
9. Italy 5 0.2 78 4.0
10. France 25 1.3 54 2.8
11. Netherlands 12 0.6 10 0.5
12. Belgium - - 10 0.5
13. Sweden - - 13 0.7
14. Suppliers Credit 33 1.7 59 3.1
B: Total Consortium Countries/
Agencies (1-14) f/ $1877 95.1% $1637 84.7%
15. Denmark 7 0.4 2 0.1
16. Australia/New Zealand 7 0.4 4 0.2
17. Switzerland 10 0.5 18 0.9
18. Turkey - - 4 0.2
19. Asian Development Bank - - 10 0.5
C: Total Other Non-Communist
Countries $ 24 1.3% $ 38 1.9%
20. USSR 41 2.1 74 3.8
21. Yugoslovia 30 1.5 67 3.5
22. China - - 48 2.5
23. Czechoslovakia - - 52 2.7
24. Poland - - 17 0.9
D; Total Communist Bloc
Countries $ 71 3.6% $ 258 13.4%
TOTAL ALL DONORS $1972 100.0% $1933 100.0%
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(Continued)
Notes:
a/ Excludes PL-480 and contributions to the Indus Basin Development
Fund. Estimated value of PL-480 Title I and II imports are:
Second Plan period: $ 706.1 million. Third Plan
(1965/66 - 1968/69) $ 390.3 million.
Commitments to the Indus Basin Fund, including those made under
the supplementary agreement of 1964, total $ 1,210.4 million.
b/ IFC credits are not part of the Bank Group's consortium
contribution.
c/ Includes Ex-Im Bank.
d/ Includes Export Refinance Corporation which is not part of the
UK's consortium contribution.
e/ Includes Canadian Development Finance Corporation which is not
part of Canada's consortium contribution.
f/ Includes commitments by consortium countries outside consortium.
Source: Second Plan: US/AID. Statistical Fact Book - Pakistan.
Karachi. US/AID Pakistan, 1968.
Third Plan: US/AID - unpublished data.
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184APPENDIX II
ESTIMATED COST OF 2 CUSEC FIBER GLASS
FILTER TUBE-WELL WITH 320' DEPTH
Item Description
1 Drilling
2 Electric log
Unit Quantity
ft.
ea.
3 Housing casing ft.
4 Tubewell casing ft.
5 Slotting casing ft.
6 Gravel shroud-
ing ft.
285
75
210
180
285
.7 Developing and
testing
8 Concrete base
and slab
9 Pump, motor &
controls
10 Installation
11 Pump house
Unit Cost
$4.50
75.00
5.50
4.25
1.00
1.25
300.00
50.00
2700.00
200.00
75.00
Cost Per Unit:
Total Cost for Five (5) Units:
Total Cost
$1280.00
75.00
415.00
895.00
180.00
360.00
300.00
50.00.
2700.00
200.00
75.00
$6530.00
$32,650.00
APPENDIX II
(Continued)
ESTIMATED COST FOR ELECTRIFICATION
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Approximate Power Consumption Calculation
1. School, Boarding, Dispensary
2. Village housing (350 X 0.3 per house)
3. Cottage Industry (Mechanical work,
Flour Mill, etc.)
4. Church
5. Agrucultural barn
Total Village Consumption:
Five (5) Tubewells @ 22 KW per unit
Total Need of Electrical Power:
60 KW
105 KW
50 KW
30 KW
40 KW
285 KW
110 KW
400 KW
Cost of Electrification for above 400 KW lines:
11 KW lines (about 4 miles, Rs. 21,000 per mile or U.S.
U.S. Dollars: $16.800.00
Six (6). ll/o.4 KV transformers with accessories: 7,200.00
Total Cost of Electrification $24,000.00
Total Cost of Entire Project:
1. Five (5) tube-wells: $32,650.00
2. Two (2) auxiliary generators: 13,000 .00
3. Electrification: 24,000.00
TOTAL: $69,650.00
Deduction of two (2) tubewell installations: 5,400.00
(pipe and boring fees)
Total Cost of Proposed Project: $64,250..00
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(Continued)
WATER AND SOIL ANALYSIS RESULTS
WATER ANALYSIS:
Total Salts
900
Na 2CO3 NaHCO3
nil 655
NaCl Na SO4
170 75
Allowable
Maximum
nil 500 Desirable2000 500
APPENDIX II
(Continued)-
ASSUMED CROPPING PATTERNS WITH TUBE-WELL WATER SUPPLY
Intensity Future Stage I Future Stage II
K:R 100% 120% 120%
1:1.5 (canal (tubewell
irrigation) irrigation)
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCREASE OF CROP RETURNS
WITH TUBE-WELL IRRITATION
Present Gross Return Per Acre Future Gross Return Per Acre
(Conservative Estimate)
118.00 Rs. 440.00 Rs.
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May 6, 1969
Sir Hugh SlIs-fes, KC.M.G., C..,
Administrator,
CAFO,
14 Nevick Places,
Leads 5.V.1.
Dear Sir Hugh,
West Pakistaa 69/5
Yrnta-Proef graM Store Ria
We submit, for CAPMD's kind coesideraties, the enclosed
project to provide a rat a vermia pro#f grain storeg@ bin
for the Loreto Villaj Cooprative, Lreto Village,I0strict
Musaflarjarh. The 3 ill be of brick constructies and is
estimatl t6 cost Pak. Is. 27,500 (42,145).
Father George Weeater O.P. whs has visited s recently
and whe has presented this project under oa advice a-d
guidance is engaed in very active and senssul work for
the uplift of the peO p Pysinlly ad spiritually in the
Diocese of Hltas, W. P stan.
Yours sincerely,
Oa Nardy
b.c./CRS/New York - Herewith copy of Project Text.
SRev. George Westwater 0.P. - Herewith copy of Project Text,
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APPLICATION FOR GRANT WEMST PAxSTAn/6 0
1. ANE AND S (MRGANZLTXON APPLYIW FOR GRANTs
pr. George Wesitater O.P.
Resideneys Lerete Village
Pistriet 6SSMatterSah
West Pakistan
2* ATURE AND WFUCTIONS
Miestesary Society euanged is the eeie-eemao aplifttet
village people an ah. ie.... of maltan.
3. NAME AND A0 ORGANIZATIOW IVRWS =11 W=CK APPLICAlTON
Is SUUIIWTT
Catholie Relief Services - U.S.C.C.
P.O. Dex 7401
Karachi 3, Pakistan
and
Catholie Relief Services - U.S.0.0.
11, rue do Cornavin
1201 Geneva, Switserland
4. DATE, AMOUNT AND REFERENCE NUMBER OF LAST GRAJTs
N.A.
.So AMOUNT nUESTzD x STERLING AN LOCAL UranacY
as. 25,o (t 2163.7.6)
6. PRECISE GEGRAPCAL LOCATION OF PROJECTs
Lo"ete Village
Distriet Nunttargarh(shat uennr)
west Pakistan
7, ONnAL1D@7enzyT2, S"OCIWrAL AND CONOfIC STVATION OF AREA
IN WmIcE PROJECT Z LXAS
tatil fifteen years age, the fal Desert bordertug the migty
zdas RinVe was flnwa f its austere nnpative sanaepes,
dominated by high east dusa, searcity of water, =miam te-
getaties, at extremes of elimte. Today, two-thirds of the Thai
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Desert wears a new look. The desert baokdrop is giving way to
vast traota of groien field., forest plantations, farm lande,
new villages, and planned cities. It is the most rapidly ex-.
panding agricultural project in West Pakistan with its teeming
millions of population.
The story of this radical transformation from a wasteland to a
progressive region is one of enormous offical and private enter-
prise. This effort to reclaim the wild desert strabhing over
5,000,000 acres along the Indus River began in 1949 when Thai
Development Authority (Tb.D.A.) was created. There has been no
diminution of the original impetus now that agriculture has been
firmly established; rather, there is now marked emphasis on pro-
gressive farming procedures.
In this regard, Loreto Nillage is an outstanding example. Since
its inception under generous government land grant in the year
1954, Loreto Village ean boast a development without a peer in
all of T.D-A. From an initial settlement of less ethan a hundred
men to a firmla established complexus of two thousand people,
the village of Loreto stands as a representative community of
a people with aneient traditions and centuries bred custom burst-
ing into the twentieth century with its industrialized cities
and competitive agricultural society.
The reason for being of Loreto Village is its 1800 acres of
arable land irrigated by oanale. With the exception of a hundred
acre village site, comprising the residential and social lifw
of the village with its homes, school, church. dispensary,
streets, life is centered in the 114 fifteen acre plot* of land
ewaed by individual farmers. Crop produce centers around whea t
(springtime harvest ) and sugar cane (November harvest), with
minimal cotton and secondary grains.
8* DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ANS IMPLEMFMrATION:
To stabilize the economic life of the village, a co-operative
bank was begun four years ago. However, due to lack of capital
sufficient to meet the needs of the demand it has not been able
to reach its full potential. This is especially true as regards
storage facilites for wheat and advances for fertiliser at
planting time.
The last wheat harveet was about 350 tons, and we hope to double
that figure in a few years time with continued emphasis on new
seeds and fertiliser. Sugar cane is contrated to a government
mill eighteen miles away and offers no difficulty beyond the
lack of a good raad.
The neessity for proper wheat storage is evident in the fact
that wheat sells for about 16 rupees per maund at harvest time
and is sold at double that price in the off season of winter.
As a eonsequence, the farmer actually sells his wheat at a loss
during harvest time to pay for taxes, buy new farm implemets,
purchase olothing, *t., and buzys baek this Sae wheat in the
winter moths at double or more the eest. The oMly available
answer to this ehae ti. marketing of wheat is the e moragement
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of eo-oporatives.
The Lorute Village e00Ur1 ftiVe began with an operating
eapital of 1200 rupees (about US$250), nda in the courae of
a siaglo year vas able to show a profit of better than &
en the origial lawmetmaat; most of this profit was obta
from fertilizer and seed sales, both comeodittes require no
lengthy storage facility bocause they are sesal agricultural
needs that are pirehased almost imedtiately. Sewver, practi-
cally all ta. advantages of the Co-operative are egated by
the inability of the people to store wheat at harvest time in
order to anticipate t. araally esealating ests in the off
season of winter.
For this reason, we have doe the aeoesary research and obtained
architectural plas for the onstruction of a rat-proof storage
bin for miniAm requirements of winter wheat necds when the
prices usually escalate to the extreme disadvantage of the
village people.
We envisage a storage bin of 100 ton capacity of brick con-
struction, costing approximately R. 27,500. Of this coat, the
people can immediately contribute the sum of Ra. 2,500. The
investment would yield at 10% per annum storage fees the sum of
about 3000 Ra. This sum would either be used for further storage
bin construction or could be funnelled back into the Co-op as
operating capital.
The program would thus be like the fellowings
WAT cosuMPmox In LORETO VfIlAEZ
UMET PER M0NT1H 3 MaIT8
1 family (5 members) 200 lbs. 600 lbs.
540 eoe-op families 108,000 lbs. 324,oo lbs*. or162 (Mastman) toss
9§T P10T--- FWWA
aI at harvest te (April) ..........------.. 50,000 Ra.
b during winter (off season) ................. 80,000 Rs.
Loss ineurred by people during winter ..... 30,000 Ra.
LOPOSED REKEDYa
construction of 100 tea apaaity storage bia
for wheat . 27,500 R.
Lorete cewepceentributio .................... 2S500Ra.
BALANCE RBQUZSTW AS SUSISi0 ......... 0....... 25,000 Ra
The repayment for this subsidy would be effected by the 10%
return for the storage fees of 100 tos of wheat per year
(minus about 500 Ra. as charges for inasectiide. and handling
costs). This repayment could then be poured back into the
Loreto Co-op to further finamee operating capital, increase
the present purchase of seed ant fertilizer supplies, expand
the nwber of farm aimpleseats new being uoed bY the Co-op
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members, and supply expeAses for additiOaal training of the
members at diverse government and private seminars in agri-
culture.
9. TIMISED COST OF PROJUCT:
fs, 27,500 for a storage bin of 100 ten eapacity of brick
aewatruotin. with eeaerete fleet.
10* SUPPORT PROMISED FROM OTHER SOURCES1
Rs, 2,500 from Leeal peeple
11. SUPPORT REQUESTID PRMII OTHER SOURCES a
None for this projoet
12.o CONTINUATION OF PROJECT:
The Coe-operative society will be able to fimace as an on-going
paying propositiea as loag as aeeded by the farmers.
13. PHASING OF PAYMENTS:
As *oen as possible
14. REPORTING:
As required by the funding agency
APPE.NDIX IV
LORETO SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Pages 193 - 199
LORETO VILLAGE MANAGEMENT COSTS
Page 200
OI
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COMPARATIVE STATEMENT
No. NAME OF BUILDING NEW TOTAL COST OLD TOTAL COST
1. Boys Hostel 4.41.800 3.2.213
Loreto School
2. Girls Hostel 2.23.00 3.62.087
Loreto School
3. Library Science Room 2.01.000 2.12.799
Loreto
4. Girls School 1.69.000 1.96.611
Loreto
5. Agricultaral School 3.31.200 6.40.705
Trainy Centre
Loreto
13.66.300 17.44.415
say 13.67.000
- j
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BOYS HOSTEL - LORETO SCHOOL
S.No. P -a r t i o ul1Ia rs- Qty. Rate Unit Amount
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31..
32.
Excavation in foundation
C.C. 1:36 in foundation
Brick Masonary foundation
Earth filling
41" Brick bat soling
it" C.C. Bed over soling
Water proofing on plinth
3" thick C.C. bed over water proofing
R.C.C. Lintels & beams
R.C.C. Slab 4" thick
R.C.C. Parapet wall
R.C.C. Steps
4j" thick prick masonry
9" " ' "
13j'" " "f "
Brick masonry pillars
Internal plaster t" thick
External plaster $" thick
Cement pointing
Deodar doors
Deodar window
Deodar ventilator
Mosaic flooring
Mosaic Dado 5f hight
G.I Pipe Railing " dia
Water proofing on roof
C.C. Flooring
White wash on ceiling
Water bound Distemper on walls
Colour wash to external walls
Steel cutting
Cost of Steel
20000 oft.
3900 oft.
13000 oft.
14000 oft.
11400 aft.
11400 aft.
12000 aft.
12000 aft.
1600 oft.
19000 aft.
800 aft.
25 Nos.
1400 aft.
4300 oft.
9500 oft.
1000 oft.
37000 aft.
12000 aft.
9800 aft.
1250 aft.
1625 aft.
700 aft.
18000 aft.
1000 aft.
1500 aft.
8400 aft.
3000 oft.
12000 aft.
25000 aft.
12000 aft.
25 ton
25 ton 1400.00
6*00
300.00
160.00
20.00
40.00
40.00
20*00
80.00
425.00
200.00
150.00
100.00
80.00
200.00
200.00
225.00
35.00
40.*00
25.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
250.00
250.00
3*00
25.00
80.00
5.00
8.00
10.00
140.00
% oft.
" aft.
" aft.
" aft.
" oft.
' aft.
'9 aft.
peotep
%ar t.
% oft.
" aft.
" oft.
a aft.
" aft.
" aft.
* aft.
" aft.
" aft.
af t.
% aft.
" aft.
' aft.
" aft.
" aft.
pr toni
" f
oontd.-2-
t/ I
1200.OC
11700.OC
20800.OC
2800.0C
4560.OC
4560.OC
2400.0C
9600.OC
6800.OC
38000.0C
1200.OC
2500.OC
1120.OC
8600.OC
19000.05
2250.OC
12950.0
4800.0(
2450.0C
12500.0(
16250.0(
7000.0C
45000.0C
2500.0C
4500.0(
2100.0C
2400.0('
600.0(
2000.0(1
1200.0(
3500.0(
-2500.0
291840.0(
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BOTS HOSTEL - page 2
Pa r-ti cul ars
Cartage for material
Ele C. & Drainage
Miscellenous
For unseen items
Paintings & Murals
291840.00
10%
20 %
15 %
Total: 50 % 145920.00
4000.00
441760.00
say 441800.00
00* 0euma m
S.No.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
196
GIRLS HOSTEL
S.No. a P a r ti c u 1 a r a Qty. -Rate Unit Amount
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Cartage for materials
EleC.& Drainage
Miscellaneous
For unseen items
Excavation in foundation
C.C. 1:3:6 in foundation
B.B. Masonry in foundation
Brick Bets Packing
C.C. Flooring 1i" thick 1:36
Water proofing on plinth
3" thick C.C. 13:6 Flooring
R.C.C. Beams & Lintels
R.C.C. Slab
Brick Masonry 4j" thick
13" thick
Pillers
Internal plaster
External plaster
Deodar doors
Deodar windows
Mosaic flooring
Mosaic dedo
Water pioofing on roof
C.C. Jali
White wash on ceilings
Water bound Distemper on walls
Colour wash on external walls
M.S. Steel
'9700 oft.
1280 oft.
5400 oft.
8800 aft.
8800 aft.
9800 aft.
9800 aft.
700 oft.
9800 aft.
530 aft.
12400 oft.
300 cft.
23600 aft.
12000 aft.
546 aft.
800 aft.
8800 aft.
620 aft.
9800 aft.
200 aft.
8500 aft.
15100 aft.
12000 aft.
13 ton
10%
20 %
15%
Total: 50 %
% oft.
oft*o t
aft.
sft.
" "N
oft.
" sft.
N "N
" ft.
N "
" aft.
N "N
aft.
"N
6.00
300.00
160.00
40.00
20.00
20.00
40.00
425.00
200.00
80.00
200.00
225*00
35.00
40.00
10000
10.00
250.00
250.00
25.00
300.00
5.00
8.00
10.00
aft.
"
N "N
N "
N "N
" "N
1400.00 per ton
582.00
3850.00
8640.00
3520.00
1760.00
1960.00
3920.00
2975.00
19600.00
424.00
24800.00
675.00
8260.00
4800.00
5460.00
8000.00
22000.od
1550.00
2450.00
600.00
425.00
1208.00
1200.00
18200.00
146849.00
73425.00
29. Paintings & Murals 3000.0C
223274.OC
say 223300.OC
wwvww~ w
N
"
25.
26.
27.
28.
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8CIENCE -LIBRARY
S.No. 'P A R T I C U L A R 3 Qty. Rate Unit Amount
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17,
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Cartage for material
EleC& Drainage
Miscellaneous
Unseen itoms
Paintings & Murals
(Excavation in foundation
C.C. 113t6 in foundation
B.B. Masonry in foundation
Brick bats packing
C.C. Flooring 1j" thick
Water proofing on plinth
3* thick C.C. 1:3:6 Flooring
R.C.C. beams & lintels
R.C.C. slab
R.C.C. Parapet
Brick masonry 4" thick
" " 131" thick
Pillers
Internal plaster
External plaster
Deodar doors
Deodar windows
Deodar ventilators
Mosaic flooring
Mosaic Dedo
Water proofing on roof
Flower Bed
White wash on ceiling
Water bound Distemper on walls
Colour wash on exterior
Steel M.S.
10900 oft.,
2500 oft.
5680 oft.
6700 aft.
6700 aft.
7900 sft.
7900 aft.
500 oft.
7900 aft.
1000 aft.
170 aft.
13500 oft.
210 oft.
16800 aft.
10800 aft.
378.sft.
528 aft.
264 aft.
6700 aft.
720 aft.
7900 aft.
60 Rft.
8000 aft.
8800 aft.
10800 aft.
61
oft.
"w
f "
" aft.
"f "
"f "
if
"
"
6.00
300.00
160* 00
40.00
20.00
20.00
40.00
425.00
200.00
150.00
80.00
200.00
225.00
35.00
40.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
250.00
250.00
25.00
15*00
5.00
8.00
10.00
"1
"
if
"f
"f
oft.
aft.
"f
if
oft.
"f
aft.
oft.
"0
"f
aft.
"
Rft.
% oft.
"f "
if if
10 tons 1400.00 perton
Total
10%
20 %~
15%
50 %
654.OC
7500.OC
9088.OC
2680.OC
1340.OC
1580.OC
3160.oC
2125.00
15800.00
1500.00
136.00
27000.00
473.00
5880.00
4320.00
3780.00
5280.00
2640.00
16750.00
1800.00
1975.00
900.00
400.00
704.00'
1080.00
14000.00
132545.00;
66273.00
w-2000.00
200818.00
say 201000,00
=mama="-
"
61
"
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(IRLS SCHOOL
S.No. P a rt i o ul a r a Qty. Rate Unit Amount
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Cartage for Material
Elec.& Drainage
Miscellaneous
For unseen items
Paintings & Murals
Excavation in foundation
C.C. 1:3s6 in foundation
B.B. masonry in foundation
Brick Bate Packing
C.C. 1:3s6 Flooring ij" thick
Water proofing on plinth
3" thick C.C. 1.3:6 Flooring
R.C.C. Beams & Lintels
R.CC. Slabs
Brick Masonry 4j" thick
* 13j" thick
" " Pillers
Internal plaster
External plaster
Deodar doors
Deodar windows
Deodar ventilators
Mosaio flooring
Mosaic Dedo
Water proofing on roof
White wash on ceilings
Water bound Distemper on walls
Colour wash to External walls
Steel
Total
8300 oft.
1050 oft.
4700 oft.
6450 aft.
6450 aft.
7450 aft.
7450 aft.
510 oft.
7450 aft.
200 aft.
9900 oft.
160 oft.
8700 aft.
15300 aft.
315 aft.
464 aft.
232 aft.
6450 aft.
540 aft.
7450 aft.
6450 aft.
2250 aft.
15300 aft.
10 tons
6.00
300.00
160.00
40.00
20.00
20.00
40.00
425.00
200.00
80.00
200.00
225.00
35*00
40.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
250.00
250.00
25*00
5*00
8.00
10.00
"f
"
"
"
"
"f
"f "
1400.00 purton
10%
20 %
15 %
50 %
% oft.
"f"*
if t.
" aft.
" oft.
" aft.
"oft.
' st.
aft.
"
"
% aft.
"f "
55651.00
-1200000
168953.00
aay 169000.00
Oemm. urnsc
258.0(
3150.0(
7520.0(
2580.0C
1290.OC
1490.0C
2980.OC
2168.0C
14900.OC
160.OC
19800.0C
360.oC
3045*00
6120.00
3150.04Q
4640.00
2320.00
16125*00
1350,00
1863.00
323.00
180.00
1530.00
14000.00
111302.00
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AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL
199
.No. P.&art i a u 1 a r a Qty. Rate unit Amount
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Excavation in foundation
C.C. 1:3s6 in foundation
B.B. Masonry in foundation
4t" thick Brick bats packing
4j" thick C.C. flooring
R.C.C. Beams & Lintels
R.C.C. Slab
R.C.C. Steps
R.C.C. Paropet
4j" thick Brick Masonry
9" thick Brick Masonry
13j" thick Brick Masonry
Pillers * *
Internal plaster
External plaster
Deodar doors
Deodar windows
Mosaic flooring
Mosaic dedo
Water proofing on roof
White wash on ceiling
Water bound Distemper on walls
Colour wash on external walls
M.S. Steel
Cutting & Fabrication for Steel
Cartage for Materials
Elec. & Drainage
Miscellaneous
For unseen items
10000 oft.
2500 oft.
5700 oft.
9000 aft.
9000 aft.
1600 oft.
15000 aft.
42.Nos.'
2100 aft.
560 oft.
2700 oft.
11000 oft.
900 oft.
25000 aft.
21000 aft.
623 aft.
864 sft.
13500 aft.
1100 aft.
10400 aft.
14000 ott.
11000 ift.
21000 aft.
19 tonsI
19 tons
6*00
300.00
160.00
40.00
40.00
425.00
200.00
100.00
150.00
80.00
200.00
200.00
225*00
35*00
40.00
10.00
10.00
250.00
250.00
25.00
5. 00
8*00
10.00
1400.00
140.00
aft.
"f
"f "f
"f if
"f if
"f "f
perton
" "
10 %
20 %
20 %
T10 %
Total 60 %
30. Paintings & Murals
% oft.
" aft.
oft.
No."
% oft.
oft.
f tf
' aft.
ift.
122690.00
4000.00
331173.00
say 331200.00
600.04
7500.04
9120.0(
3600.0
3600.OC
6800.0o
30000.0
4200.OC
3150.0 C
448.0d
4800.00
17600.00
2025.00
8750.00
8400.006
6230.00
8640.004
33750.00
2750.00
2600.00
700.00
880.00
2100.00
26600.00
22660.00
204483.00
U
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FOOTNOTES
l Harza Engineering Co. International. 1963. An Appraisal of
Resources and Potential Developrent. Lahore, West Paki-
stan: Government of Pakistan, p.17.
2 Thal Development Authority. 1954. A Handbook of Thal Develop-
ment Authority 1949-1954. Jauharabad, West Pakistan:
Public Relations Division T.D.A., p.8.
3 One such fort was at Munda. I slept there one evening in
1958 under the shadow of a high 18-foot mud wall, about
five feet thick at the base and enclosing several acres
- of land. These walls have since been dismantled and the
constituent element of mud used to build a number of
shops, houses, and storage facilities for the busy agri-
cultural commerce that has evolved in the recent past.
This development was quickened by the construction of
roads intersecting at what now is known as Munda Chowk
(crossroads).
4' Thal Development Authority, op.cit., p.20.
5 It is interesting to note that as late as 1969 I personally
saw these same maps in use by foreign consulting engin-.
eers to the Pakistan Government, and they expressed
surprise at the changes I described since the maps had
been drawn up half a century before.
6 Darling, Sir Malcolm, ILO Expert. 1954. Report On Labor Con-
ditions in Agriculture. Lahore, West Pakistan: Govern-
ment of Pakistan, p.36.
Callard, Keith. 1957. Pakistan, A Political Study. London:
Allen & Unwin Ltd.: p.18.
8 Thal Development Authority, op.cit., p.58.
Ibid., pp.20-25.
10 Waterston, Albert. 1963. Planning in Pakistan. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.15.
Quoted in Waterston, ibid., p.20.
12 Papanek, G.F. 1967. Pakistan's Development: Social Goals
and Private Incentives. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, p.66.
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13 Quoted in Waterston, op. cit., pp.20-21.
14 Ibid., p.33.
15 Thal Development Authority, 2k. cit., p.71.
16 Pakistan. 1957. The First Five-Year Plan 1955-1960.
Planning Commission, Karachi: p.265.
FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2
17 When I inquired of one doctor what medicines I should carry
with me to help the people, he plucked the sides of his
pants and said: "Carry malaria pills in one pocket, and
anti-malaria pills in the other".
FIGURE 3
In the winter of 1957-58, the head of an international re-
lief agency told me that 54 wagons of relief supplies
earmarked for the diocese had been "lost" in transit.
There was no recourse for such hijackings, and every
missionary could recite a litany of similar cases.
19 The New York Times. June 13, 1972.
"In the yearly hell of a North India summer, blinding
dust storms so thick that all traffic must stop are a
welcome phenomena. For, while they last, the whirling
brown clouds blot out the deadly sun".
20 One of the great hazards of the desert is freezing to death.
In the winter, few people have adequate clothing for
long exposure to the cold and often freeze to death on
night field watches in temperatures proximate to, or
slightly below, freezing.
21 The priest-worker movement involved priests who worked and
labored in factories, on docks, in mines, and wherever
a wage earner could be gainfully employed. The movement
was identified with the Dominican Order of France, and
suppression of the movement had reverberations for the
Dominicans in America of which I was one.
22 During this period I read the then Senator Kennedy's Pro-
files in Courage, and was so moved I wrote him a letter
of thanks for the inspiration his book afforded me.
Little did I or anyone else anticipate the favored
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position Pakistan would receive in U. S. foreign policy
when he became President.
23 Unpublished paper of the writer detailing the political
process of Loreto village, entitled: "The Rise and Fall
of Mutab Khan", M.I.T. 1970.
24 When I questioned a lawyer who had been no great friend of
the British about the high opinion he rendered for ICS
personnel, he replied: "When an ICS officer walked into
a court room, you stood back in awe and wonder". The
selection ratio of candidates ran as high as one in ten
thousand.
25 Myrdal, Gunnar. 1970. The Challenge of World Poverty. New
.York: Vintage Books, p.153.
26 Myrdal, Gunnar. 1969. Asian Drama. New York: Random House,
Vol.I, p. 3 1 9 .
27 Waterston, A., o2. cit., p.11.
28 Ibid., p.11.
29 General Marden, formerly military attache of the British
Army to the independent state of Bahawalpur with head-
quarters at Ahmedpur East, Bahawalpur, West Pakistan.
30 A similar judgment was made to me in a lengthy conversation
with Major General Nasir Ahmed Khan, a one time Chairman
of T.D.A. He was consulted concerning the Army's role
in the nation immediately preceding the take-over in
1958 by Ayub Khan. He was a close friend of the first
Martial Law Administrator and strongly opposed the en-
trance of the Army into a commanding political role. In
their conversations he questioned either his or the
Field Marshal's ability to handle the nation's political
problems; all that either of them had ever experienced
was childhood life in remote villages and the lifelong
regimentation of a military career. He told me that the
Army had corrupted itself and would destroy the nation
by continuing to rule. His observations proved pro-
phetic.
31 Pakistan. 1956. The First Five-Year Plan (Draft) 1955-1960.
Planning Commission, Karachi: p.20, #53.
32 Ford Foundation. 1965. Design for Pakistan. p.13.
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33 Tbid., p.15.
Papanek, G. F., o. cit., p.6.
35 The Economist, London: April 13, 1968, p.47.
"If Pakistan has reason for special gratitude to an out-
side body, it must be the World Bank in the signing of
the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. All the figures in
these projects are near-astronomical. The Mangla Dam on
the Jhelum has cost $658 million...Tarbela Dam on the
Indus $830 million...financed by the Indus Basin Develop-
ment Fund with resources $1,200 million."
36 Myrdal, Gunnar, op, cit., pp.327,328.
"But perhaps the most substantial gain from the greater
confidence Ayub Khan brought to the conduct of its for-
eign relations was the agreement Pakistan reached with
India in September, 1960 for ending their dispute over
the distribution of the Indus basin waters. Admittedly,
this was made possible only because the Western powers
agreed to finance almost the whole cost of the scheme."
37 Falcon, W. P. and Papanek, G. F. 1971. Development Policy
II: The Pakistan Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, p.4.
38 The first totally staffed, managed, organized, and executed
project by all Pakistan personnel on the Indus Basin
project was the link canal between the Taunsa Barrage
and the Chenab River. Availability of heavy duty con-
struction equipment on the site averaged 20% vs 80% for
the same equipment when employed by Morris and Knudsen,
the U. S. contractors at Mangla Dam. A World Bank offi-
cial informed me that his reports would be critical of
the project as executed by an all Pakistan staff.
39 Ali, Tariq. 1970. Pakistan-Military Rule of People's Power.
New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., p.228.
40 Karpov, A. V. and Ross Nebolsine. 1961. Indus Valley: ey
to West Pakistan's Future. Lahore, West Pakistan: Gov-
ernment of West Pakistan, p.14.
41 Summary of the 1st meeting of the Committee on Aid Utili-
zation (SECRET), Government of Pakistan: Dacca, 19th
September 1962.
"5..The inability of many of our sponsoring agen-
cies to prepare aid worthy projects was identi-
fied as one of the major reasons for slow
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committment of funds....
7. The Chairman stated that apart from the employ-
ment of consultants, the preparation of projects
could be improved by utilizing the expert ser-
vices available with the local. missions of aid
cjiving agencies".
42
Appendix I.
Ahmad Hussan, later to become Secretary for all Water and
Power Development in West Pakistan. The same man ap-
proached me a year after the water supplement to Fati-
mapur village for assistance in an illegal money
exchange.
44 Such fortuitous events never really resolved a problem;
they merely made them public. Graft, bribery, and offi-
cial corruption too often, all too often, intervened.
In the present instance, the additional irrigation water
had been allocated for the next planting season beginning
on April 15th. The local canal overseer demanded a bribe
of several hundred rupees for complying with the Deputy
Chief Engineer's orders!
45 I met him again on two other occasions in the West wing.
He invariably impressed me as the only man with an under-
standing and systematic approach to the problems of
rural Pakistan.
46 The Reader's Digest, March 1961: "The Story of Loreto".
Both the Reader's Digest and Time magazine were avidly
read by the higher echelons of government and the nation
was very sensitive to what they printed.
47 Misereor is a German Catholic Relief organization of social
concern with yearly expenditures in multi-million dollar
figures. They assist any worthwhile project, Catholic
and non-Catholic. Their chief difficulty lay with their
clergy clientele who had little training for project
reporting.
48 The demise of Village-Aid programs as major features of the
Five-Year Plans in both Pakistan and India are witness
to this fact. Too much tried to be accomplished in too
short a time.
49
Myrdal, Gunnar. op, cit., p.336.
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50 The expression "Basic Democracy" came into disrepute with
the people long before the downfall of Ayub Khan.
51 Myrdal, Gunnar. op. cit., p.247:
"Jinnah and tTe Muslim League...concentrated on the one
supreme, but negative, aim of drawing a firm boundary
line against the Hindus. The following they won was
interested not in better things for the masses but in
communal vindication."
52 Thornburn, S. S. 1886. Musalmans and Money-Lenders in the
Punjab. London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, p.140.
53 Myrdal, Gunnar. Asian Drama. Vol.III, p.1748:
Pakistan 1960-61:
Modal age range of Percent of children of
Primary education: modal age range enrolled:
6 - 11 8% (both sexes)
The New York Times. June 23, 1972: Under the title, "Paki-
stan Reform Appears Far Off: Budget Shows Scant Funds
to Help Nation's Poor"
"...New outlays for education are largely limited to fi-
nancing 1,000 scholarships for the children of peasants
and other poor people...(but it) is reportedly costing
$3.2 million to build a new President's House in
Islamabad".
Myrdal, Gunnar, op. cit., Vol.I, p.331:
"The remarkabIe eTTectiveness of Pakistan's public re-
lations with Westerners, especially Americans, has from
the beginning and even more since the military take-over
undoubtedly been attributed in part to the worldly out-
look and modes of living of the Pakistani leaders".
Papanek, G. F. op. cit., p.1 9 9 .
56 The shakedown of the peasantry for a rupee contribution to
the "Red Cross" by Colonization Officers and tehsildars,
is only surpassed by the extortion perpetrated on truck
drivers by the magistracy at every district crossroads.
57 I one time confronted the 'editor of the now defunct Paki-
stani Civil and Military Gazette with the observation
that his editorial diatribes against the downtrodden
christians intensified the opportunity for a demogogue
to inflame passions in the slums. If the christisn slums
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ever erupt, no priest, no bishop and no pope will be
able to hold them back for the discrimination they have
endured as "sweepers".
58 One newspaper reported a study by UNICEF which gave the
city of Lahore 40 beggars for every thousand people.
S. Alamgir, now retired from civil service.
60 Pakistan, 1956. The First Five-Year Plan (Draft),op.cit.,
p.132, #113.
61 The Economist, London: March 6, 1965. Under the title,
."Pakistan's Success Story":
"While India's planners have been rethinking their
strategy in the face of a faltering economy, Paki-
stan is doing well. Pakistan gives bigger scope
to private industry than almost any other develop-
ing country; and its planners are now actually
raising their targets for the third plan which
comes into force in July (1965). While they pre-
viously envisaged a rise of 30 percent in real
national income over 5 years, they now hope for 37
percent or even more."
62 As quoted in Waterston, A., op. cit., p.130.
63 Very little of the professional'literature written as an
outgrowth of the Pakistan experience suggests a comfort-
able relationship between the foreign expert and his
surrounding milieu.
64 The Ayub Government permitted and fostered the most violent
of rhetoric in the nation's media which was government
controlled.
-Brines, Russel. 1968. The Indo-Pakistani Conflict. London:
Pall Mall Press, p.284.
65
The cases of women who have their noses chopped off for
apparent infidelity are legion. Yet, every city and
town has its red light district freely patronized by men
and with society's endorsement.,
66 Brines, Russel. 1968, op. cit., p.433.
67 It is only just to briefly digress and make mention of the
fine missionary men and women who contributed to this
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development of Loreto village in the brief space of ten
years. Fr. Terance Quinn, with his civil engineering
degree Uid much to design and build and govern the vil-
lage for five years. Fr. Timothy Carney processed and
settled refugees from the water-logged area of Sialkot
in upper Punjab. And, four American Sisters (Sparkill,
New York) rotated every three years as school adminis-
trators and teachers, assumed responsibility for the
village dispensary, introduced adult education, and
started the nucleus of a woman's community center.
68 Mr. Donald Barbaree - Peace Corps Volunteer; later employed
by Louis Khan. Mr. Dolf F. Stieber, later Manager of
the large regional Bank of America in Singapore.
69 Appendix II and III and Figure 4.
70 The Pakistan Development Review: An Analysis of "Revelle
Report". Vol.III, Summer 1963, Number 2: Ghulam Mohommad
& Christoph Beringer:
"We believe that the main hurdle to the implemen-
tation of the Revelle Plan is likely to be the dif-
ficult problem of administration, education and
extension and not the cost of pumps and fertilizer
which, on balance, have received most of the empha-
sis in the Report."
71 The much heralded policy of limited land holdings and the
break-up of large tracts by the Ayub regime probably
redistributed not more than 2 percent of all cultivated
land. (The Economist, London: December 2, 1961: quoted
in Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol.1, p.329.)
72 The futility of having recourse to government for help was
universally shared by the peasantry.
73 Ahmad, Mushtaq. 1970. Government and Politics in Pakistan.
Karachi: Space Publishers, pp.310, 347.
74 Practically the only language instruction books available
in Pakistan for local dialects had been Written by for-
mer colonial officers or foreign missionary educators.
Newspapers often complained of Pakistan government offi-
cials who were unable to converse in the local languages.
75 The Development Advisory Service (DAS) publications of Har-
vard University are notable examples of this discrepancy.
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76 Apthorpe, R. J. 1970. People, Planning and Development
Process. London; Frank Cass an(' Co. Ltd., p.142:
ITndeed the social scientists, administrators, mis-
sionaries etc., resident in Africa then had in
common a very large range of behavioral character-
istics". By extension, the same was true of Paki-
stan.
Appendix IV and V.
78 Harold T. Smith was known as "Tube-well" Smith because he
had drilled more footage for wells than anyone else in
the world. His progressively less costly contracts
despite increases in materials was the result of his in-
service training of Pakistani personnel in all depart-
ments to replace high cost foreigners.
79 The Economist. London: March 29, 1969; p.15:
"Though President Ayub did more for the Bengalis than
his predecessors, he has united them against the center;
and ten years of quiescence have brought East Pakistan,
in the end, nearer to both secession and revolution than
ten years of parliamentary disorder did."
80 Planning Department, Government of Pakistan: Discussion
with World Bank Economic Mission - February 1-5, 1969;
p.7, paragraph 5:
"Efficiency in respect of Project implementation
and mangement practises of autonomous bodies needs
to be improved."
-The Nation, April 14, 1969; p.455: Under article entitled:
"Law and Order in Pakistan":
" ...corruption is so severe that Ayub's son has
progressed within five years from a monthly salary
of about $150 to possessions estimated at more than
twenty million."
81 Estimated per capita income was about $50 - $60. Like all
statistics for underdeveloped countries, it only empha-
sized the poverty of the people and is not a true eco-
nomic measurement.
82 Pakistan. The First Five-Year Plan 1955-60. National Plan-
ning Board; Government of West Pakistan: p. 1 5 4 .
83 Pakistan. Basic Facts - 1969-1970. Government of Pakistan;
212
Ministry of Finance; p.108:
"The expenditure on defense was estimated at Rs.
12,384 million against the Plan (1965-60) projec-
tion of Rs. 5,890 million. The shortfall of
Rs.7,577 million in the revenue surplus was mainly
accounted for by unanticipated defense expenditure."
-Even after the loss of East Pakistan this exorbitant outlay
for defense continues. The New York Times, June 17,
1972:
"The Pakistan Government plans to spend more than
60 percent of federal revenues for defense outlays
according to the budget."
-Questionable use of foreign aid for military purposes was
reported in the New York Times, June 8, 1972 under the
title: "U.S. Report Says Pakistan Spent Aid for Defenses":
"Washington--The General Accounting Office has re-
ported to Congress that most of a grant of about
$10 million made to Pakistan last fall for humani-
tarian relief was diverted for the construction of
military defenses on what was then the East Paki-
stani border with India."
84 Newsweek, December 6, 1971: Yaha Khan, Martial Law Adminis-
trator: "If she (Mrs. Ghandi) wants war,,...then I will
give it to her. If that woman thinks she is going to
cow me, I refuse to take it."
85 MacEwan, Arthur. 1971. Development Alternatives in Pakistan.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.196:
"In spite of the concern with regional aspects of
the plan, however, none of the formal planning mo-
dels developed in the preparation of the Third
Plan were formulated as regional models."
86 Ibid., p.147:
'Much of the economic planning in Pakistan is carried
out on an explicitly regional basis. The reduction of
regional income disparity is put forth as a high priority
planning goal, and the target is the complete elimi-
nation of disparity by 1985. The attainment of that goal
will require the reversal of a trend. Although data are
poor, it is generally agreed that disparity has increased
significantly since the early 1950's. Whereas the West
Pakistan real per capita income then exceeded that in
the East by less than 20 percent, in 1964-65 the differ-
ence was at least 30 percent."
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